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I. INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule compels the suppression, in federal and state
criminal prosecutions,' of evidence seized by police in violation of the
fourth amendment. 2  Debate over the appropriateness of the rule as a
means of enforcing the admonitions of the fourth amendment has
spawned hundreds of law review articles. The justification for convert-
ing more trees into paper for yet another discussion is that although the
Supreme Court has thus far merely whittled away at the suppression
doctrine, the Court may soon decide to abandon the doctrine entirely.
3
1. The Supreme Court first applied the rule to federal prosecutions in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and extended the rule to state prosecutions in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Court
held that the same constitutional standards of search and seizure developed for federal
prosecutions would govern state prosecutions. The term "exclusionary rule" has been
applied to rules barring admission of evidence obtained in violation of a number of con-
stitutional provisions: Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (identification testi-
mony secured in violation of the fifth and sixth amendments); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (same); Miranda v. Arizona, 383 U.S. 436 (1966) (involuntary
confessions obtained in violation of the fifth amendment); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (evidence obtained by methods that "shock the conscience" and thus
violate due process). The term has also been used to describe cases barring the admis-
sion of evidence acquired in violation of federal statutes and court rules: Lee v. Florida,
392 U.S. 378 (1968) (47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970) ); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958) (18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970) ); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)
(FED. R. CriM. P. 5(a)). Whenever the terms "exclusionary rule" or "suppression doc-
trine" are used hereafter, they refer only to the rule which excludes the fruits of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated. .... "
3. See text accompanying notes 82 & 93-96 infra. The Supreme Court majority
clearly opposes the exclusionary rule but may wait to abandon or restrict it until Con-
gress or a state legislature enacts an alternative or supplementary remedy for fourth
amendment violations. See generally text accompanying notes 48-96 infra. The Court
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Because such a decision could have a profound effect on criminal justice
systems in America, a comprehensive review of the arguments advanced
on both sides of this issue would seem to be especially timely. In this
Article, following a summary of the exclusionary rule's development,
these arguments are set forth and examined. In the interest of discover-
ing the remedies most likely to secure a citizen's fourth amendment
rights, this Article also considers many of the alternative or supplemen-
tary enforcement devices that have been proposed over the years.4
Throughout the ensuing discussion of the exclusionary rule, it might
be helpful to consider to what extent the ultimate solution to the
problem lies in the decriminalization of "victimless"-or complainant-
less--crimes, such as liquor, gambling, and certain narcotics offenses.
almost considered the fate of the exclusionary rule in California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33,
rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 1068 (1972), but ultimately remanded the case to the state
supreme court on the question whether the evidence had been excluded on independent
state grounds. By finding an independent state basis for the decision, the California
high court thwarted any chance that Krivda might become an important event in the
life of the suppression doctrine. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 453, 105
Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973); see 1974 Wis. L. REv. 212.
4. The serious gap in this exploration of alternatives is the lack of discussion of
the methods used by other countries to control police lawlessness. Even though there
are difficulties in analogizing from foreign societies to American society, we can learn
much from such a study. That exploration, however, is beyond the space limitations of
this Article. Important references include: Weiler, The Control of Police Arrest
Practices: Reflections of a Tort Lawyer, in STuDIS IN CANADIAN TORT LAW 416 (A.
Linden ed. 1968); Address by Sir Reginald Sholl, Philadelphia Bar Association, March
7, 1968, reprinted in 118 CONG. Rnc. 1332 (1972); Address by Lord Chief Justice Widg-
ery, American Bar Association Convention, July 16, 1971, reported in New York Times,
July 17, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 3; Baade, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil
Cases: A Comparative Study of a Classic Mismatch, 51 TEX. L. RaV. 1325 (1973)
(England, Scotland, Ireland, Canada); Clendenning, Police Power and Civil Liberties,
4 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 174 (1966) (Canada); Cohn, The Exclusionary Rule Under For-
eign Law-Israel, 52 J. Cnam. L.C. & P.S. 282 (1961); Cowen, Admissibility of Evi-
dence Procured Through Illegal Searches and Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurls-
dictions, 5 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1952); Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence
on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 ClIM. L.Q.
88 (1972); Franck, Evidence Obtained by the Police by Illegal Means, 33 CAN. B. RV.
721 (1955) (Canada, England, Scotland); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALm. L. REv. 929, 953 (1965) (Scotland); Gray, The Admissi.
bility of Evidence Illegally Obtained in Scotland, 1966 Jum. REV. 89; Groom, The Ad-
missibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 13 Cmnrr's LJ. 54 (1964) (Canada); Mar-
tin, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law-Canada, 52 J. Crum. L.C. & P.S. 271
(1961); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CI. L. Rv.
665, 702-06 (1970) (Canada) [hereinafter cited as Oaks]; Parker, The Extraordinary
Power to Search and Seize and the Writ of Assistance, 1 U.B.C.L. REV. 688 (1963)
(Canada); Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches. The Canadian
Tort Remedy and the US. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POLICE Sm. & AD. 36 (1973); Vil-
liams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law-England, 52 J. ClIM. L.C. & P.S.
272 (1961); 85 L.Q. REv. 157 (1969) (England); 2 U.B.C. LEGAL NoTs 415 (1956).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/2
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Many observers claim that "[ilt is peculiarly with reference to these
victimless crimes that the police are led to employ illegal means of law
enforcement" 5 and that "[a] high proportion of motions to suppress
involve such crimes."6  If trimming the overreach of the criminal law
would substantially reduce the incidence of illegal searches and seizures
and, consequently, of motions to suppress, the difficulties associated
with the exclusionary rule might largely evaporate.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ExcLusIoNARY RULE7
The exclusionary rule evolved from the early common law inclination
to protect privacy, a concept illustrated in two mid-eighteenth century
cases. In the civil trespass action of Wilkes v. Wood,8 the plaintiff, one
of 49 people who had been arrested in an effort to find the author of
objectionable material,9 mounted the first successful challenge to a
5. N. MoRIus & G. HAwKnis, THE HONEST PoLmCIAN's GumE TO CRIME CON-
TROL 6 (1970). See also H. PACKER, Tim LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 349
(1968); Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP.
CT. REv. 1, 38-39; Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027,
1028, 1034 (1974).
6. Oaks, supra note 4, at 724. In studies reported by Professor Oaks, "over 50
percent of the motions to suppress in Chicago and the District of Columbia were filed
in cases involving narcotics and weapons .... ." Id. at 681. In Chicago, 26 percent
of all motions to suppress were filed in gambling cases, while 24 percent and 28 percent
were filed in narcotics and weapons cases, respectively. Id. at 681, 682. Significantly,
close to 100 percent of the motions to suppress made in gambling and narcotics cases
were granted, but only about 66 percent of the motions in weapons cases were granted.
Id. at 685. Accordingly, many of the defendants released as a result of the exclusionary
rule seem to be those charged with "victimless" crimes, or crimes without complainants.
See text accompanying note 226 infra. See also Critique, On the Limitations of Em-
pirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and
United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740, 774 (1974). One must be careful,
however, in characterizing offenses as victimless crimes. To the extent that narcotics
cases involve dealer defendants and dangerous drugs, they do not involve victimless
crimes. Moreover, the offense of unlawful possession of a lethal weapon is designed
to prevent crimes with victims. On exclusion of guns, see Comment, Trends in Legal
Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule, 65 J. Cim. L & C. 373, 377 n.43 (1974).
7. See generally Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L.
REV. 185 (1961); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its
Development and Application, 35 S. CAL. L REV. 64 (1961); Comment, Admissibility
of Illegally Seized Evidence-The Federal Exclusionary Rule-A Historical Analysis, 38
U. DETROIT L.J. 635 (1961).
8. 19 Howell's St. Trials 1154, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 992 (4th ed. 1971).
9. See L LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (1960).
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general warrant.10 Two years later in Entick v. Carrington," another
civil trespass action involving an arrest for seditious libel, the plaintiff
defeated a warrant to seize his private papers. The court held that no
process would issue in a criminal case for a person's papers if they were
to be used as evidence against him because "the law obligeth no man to
accuse himself."' 2
More than 120 years later, the Supreme Court relied on Entick in
deciding Boyd v. United States.'3 The federal government had initiated
a civil proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain goods alleged to have
been illegally imported by the defendant. Pursuant to federal statute,
the trial court ordered the defendant to produce his invoice for some of
the goods in question. Defendant complied under protest and appealed
the subsequent civil judgment against him on the ground that the laws
authorizing the production of the invoice were invalid. The Supreme
Court held that the fourth and fifth amendments, applicable because the
forfeiture proceeding was quasi-criminal, barred the compulsory pro-
duction of a defendant's private books and papers because such a
production was equivalent to both an unreasonable search and seizure
and compelled self-incrimination.' 4
In 1904, the Supreme Court was willing to assume arguendo that the
fourth amendment governed state activity, 1 but four years later, in
Twining v. New Jersey,'6 the Court held that the first eight amendments
to the Constitution did not, after all, apply to the states. Thus, in 1914,
in the landmark decision of Weeks v. United States,'7 the Court applied
10. A general warrant was an authorization from the state secretary's office in Eng-
land to seize (without naming any person) the author, printer, and publisher of any ob-
scene and seditious libel specified in the warrant. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307, 316 (1959) (Douglas, 3., dissenting).
11. 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
12. 19 Howell's St. Trials at 1073.
13. 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886).
14. Note that Boyd held the private documents immune from seizure. This is quite
a different notion from that currently associated with the exclusionary rule. Ever since
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the crucial factor has been not the nature
of the object sought to be seized but the procedure used (only upon probable cause) to
seize the object. Thus today virtually no object is immune from reasonable seizure.
Nevertheless, Boyd was the first hint that the exclusionary rule could be a remedy for
an unreasonable search and seizure. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study
of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STurms 243 (1973).
15. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). The Court held that evidence, oth-
erwise admissible, was not inadmissible on the ground that it was unconstitutionally
seized; how the evidence was obtained was irrelevant. Boyd was distinguished as involv-
ing a defendant's resistance of a judicial order to produce documents.
16. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
17. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
[Vol. 1975:621
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the fourth amendment exclusionary rule only to federal criminal trials. 8
In Weeks, the defendant was charged with the federal offense of using
the mails to transport lottery tickets. Rebelling at the notion that a
federal court should approve and participate in violations of the fourth
amendment by receiving evidence seized illegally by federal officers, the
Court held that the Government was prohibited from introducing into
evidence items seized by federal officers without a warrant. Other
papers and lottery tickets seized by state officers, however, were not
similarly excluded from the federal trial. 9
The Court distinguished Weeks from Adams v. New York,20 a case in
which the state was held entitled to introduce unconstitutionally seized
evidence against the defendant despite the defendant's objection at trial.
In Weeks, the defendant had moved for return of his papers and lottery
tickets, not during, but prior to, his federal criminal trial. Since the
Court in Adams had held property issues involved in search and seizure
questions to be collateral to the criminal proceeding, the Court regarded
its holding in Weeks that a defendant could petition before trial for
return of his illegally seized property as consistent with Adams. Adams
was also distinguished on the ground that the police officers there had
obtained a valid search warrant, although the items they actually seized
were not named in the warrant; in Weeks, by contrast, the search was
invalid from the outset.
By 1920, when the Court decided Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,2' the distinction made in Weeks between permissible motions to
return property prior to trial and impermissible motions to suppress
evidence during trial was no longer tenable. In Silverthorne the Court
held that suppression could be sought after a federal criminal trial had
commenced. In addition, the Court extended the protections of the
federal exclusionary rule to corporate defendants. Government officers
in Silverthorne had illegally obtained the defendant-corporation's docu-
ments, which they returned upon the corporation's motion, but only
after making copies of the originals. These copies were used to frame a
new indictment against the defendants. When the court subpoenaed the
18. When Weeks was decided in 1914, every state except Iowa admitted into evi-
dence the fruits of unconstitutional searches. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29, 33-
34 (1949); State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164,96 N.W. 730 (1903).
19. This rule permitting federal court use of evidence seized illegally by state offi-
crs was later appropriately dubbed the "silver platter" doctrine. See text accompanying
notes 28 & 29 infra; note 394 infra. See also Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court of
Evidence Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 229.
20. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
21. 251 U.S. 385 (1920); see note lOOinfra.
627
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originals, the corporation refused to comply and was held in contempt.
Reversing the contempt citation, Justice Holmes declared:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. 22
Such pronouncements bolstered the federal exclusionary rule, but
most state supreme courts still had not adopted exclusionary rules for
proceedings in their lower courts.23  Six years later, in 1926, the antiex-
clusionary rule states gained the distinguished support of then Judge
Cardozo. Writing in People v. Defore,24 he rejected the exclusionary
rule for New York state criminal proceedings. In words that continue
to be quoted by opponents of the suppression doctrine,2 Cardozo
declared: "The criminal is to go free because the constable blun-
dered., 6
One year later, the Supreme Court considered the combined blunders
of state and federal officers in Byars v. United States.2 7 The federal
conviction was reversed because it was based on evidence seized uncon-
stitutionally by state police with the participation of federal officers. In
1949, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Lustig v. United
States,28 announced that the "crux" of Byars
is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in
it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by State
authorities is turned over to federal authorities on a silver platter.20
Thus, federal courts could convict a defendant on the basis of evidence
that state police seized illegally, so long as the state police broke the law
all by themselves.
On the same day that Lustig was decided, the Court handed down its
important decision in Wolf v. Colorado.30 The core of fourth amend-
22. 251 U.S. at 392. Justice Holmes subsequently reiterated this idea: "If the
search and seizure are unlawful as invading personal rights secured by the Constitution,
those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence were allowed to be used."
Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926).
23. In 1951, North Carolina became the first state to adopt an exclusionary rule
by legislation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15.27 (Supp. 1951), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-27.2(f) (1975).
24. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
25. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
26. 242 N.Y. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587.
27. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
28. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
29. Id. at 78-79.
30. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
[Vol. 1975:621
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ment protections of privacy was held applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment because this core "is 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' ",3 Nevertheless, the states were not constitutionally
required to apply the exclusionary rule because the rule was a product of
"judicial implication"32 in federal cases and not expressly conferred by
the fourth amendment. In short, the right was federal, but the remedy
was left to the states.
The Court, impressed by the reluctance of many states to adopt the
exclusionary rule following Weeks, thought it wise to defer to the states'
judgment about the best means to enforce the right against unreasonable
search and seizure. The Court was not then convinced that methods
other than the exclusionary rule would not adequately protect this
fundamental right.
Mr. Justice Black, concurring, argued that the exclusionary rule "is
not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created
rule of evidence which Congress might negate.13 3  Justices Douglas,
Murphy, and Rutledge dissented from the view that the exclusionary
rule was not part of the fourteenth amendment's protections. The fed-
eral exclusionary rule established in Weeks was unchanged by this de-
cision.
Just a few years elapsed before the Supreme Court began to make
inroads on Wolf, at least with respect to physical violence against
persons by state police. In Rochin v. California,4 the Court reversed a
conviction based on evidence that had been forcibly seized from the
state criminal suspect by pumping his stomach-police behavior that
"shocks the conscience.1 35 Two years later, in 1954, the Court allowed
a conviction to stand in Irvine v. California,6 but in an application of
the theory of increasing misery, the harsh result in this case was to be
instrumental in the downfall of Wolf.3 7  The evidence in Irvine had
31. Id. at 27, citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
32. 338 U.S. at 28.
33. Id. at 39-40. This view is significant because Congress has had before it pro-
posals to amend or abolish the exclusionary rule. See text accompanying notes 330-71
bIfra. But see note 57 infra and accompanying text (justice Black's position that the
interaction between the fourth and fifth amendments mandates the exclusionary rule in
earch and seizure cases).
34. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
35. Id. at 172. See also People v. Bracamonte, 18 BNA C im. L. REP. 2099 (Cal.,
Oct. 7, 1975) (heroin evidence obtained by forced ingestion of emetic solution excluded
as unreasonable search and seizure violating fourth amendment, court finding it unneces-
sary to reach due process issues).
36. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
37. See Allen, supra note 5, at 7.
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been obtained through an eavesdropping system that state officers had
installed by making repeated surreptitious invasions of the suspect's
home. The Court's affirmance that a state court could admit such
evidence, based on the authority of Wolf, pointed to the inability of the
law to redress a very serious invasion of privacy. In dissent, Justice
Douglas again insisted that the fourteenth amendment compelled the
exclusionary rule.8 8
The following year, California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor
provided the inevitable response to Cardozo's People v. Defore opinion.
Embarrassed by the excessive behavior of the California police con-
doned in Irvine v. California, Traynor, writing for the majority in
People v. Cahan,89 overturned more than thirty years of precedent and
adopted the exclusionary rule as an evidentiary, not a constitutional,
doctrine. The police conduct in Cahan involved not mistakes of some
rookie officer but deliberate, calculated illegality fostered by police
department policy. With the approval of the Los Angeles Chief of
Police, officers had secretly installed microphones in homes occupied by
some of the defendants. Subsequently, arrests and searches were made
without warrants, most of them after forcible entries not preceded by
demands for admittance.
At about the same time, the Supreme Court was beginning to close
some of the loopholes in its fourth amendment enforcement policy. In
Rea v. United States,40 the Court, exercising its supervisory power over
federal law enforcement personnel, held that when a federal agent's
evidence had been obtained by invalid federal process, the agent should
have been enjoined from testifying in a state criminal trial. Then, in
Elkins v. United States,41 the Court rejected its notorious "silver platter"
doctrine, which had been in operation since Weeks, although the doc-
trine was not so named until the Lustig case. Federal courts could no
longer receive unconstitutionally seized evidence from federal or state
officials. The doctrine was overturned, however, not on constitutional
grounds, but under the Court's supervisory power over the lower federal
courts.
38. 347 U.S. at 149.
39. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). This decision overruled a well-estab-
lished doctrine of admissibility. See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d
44 (1942). For Justice Traynor's elaboration on the reasons for the change in doctrine,
see Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 321-22.
Traynor indicated that the harsh result in Irvine v. California had a significant role in
shaping the decision in Cahan. Id. at 324.
40. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
41. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
42. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Finally, in 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,42 the Supreme Court held that the
states could not constitutionally convict people of crimes by using
evidence seized in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. In
a flagrantly unconstitutional search and seizure, Ohio police had broken
into Ms. Mapp's house, claiming, somewhat unconvincingly, that they
had a warrant bearing on a crime unrelated to the charge of possessing
obscene material finally leveled against her.
Justice Clark, writing for the Court in an opinion with which only
three other Justices concurred, declared that both the integrity of the
judicial process and the deterrence of police misconduct compelled the
exclusionary rule in state criminal trials. The Court chose to decide the
case on this ground even though the defendant's attorney had not urged
that Wolf be overruled, but rather had based the appeal primarily on the
claimed unconstitutionality of the statute under which Ms. Mapp was
prosecuted.4 3 Nevertheless, the Court held:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared en-
forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as is used against the Federal Government. 44
Mapp thus forced twenty-four states to adopt the exclusionary rule, the
other states having previously adopted the rule voluntarily. 45
Because the exclusionary rule was imposed on the states by a mere
plurality opinion, it was to be anticipated that the states would maintain
pressure on the Supreme Court to erode this enforcement mechanism.
Four years after Mapp, in Linkletter v. Walker,46 the Court held that
Mapp would be applied only prospectively because the main purpose of
the exclusionary rule--deterrence of police lawlessness-would not be
served by retrospective application. Although the Court conceded that
some general deterrence might result from retroactive enforcement, the
Court was concerned about the possibility of the "wholesale release" of
prisoners who had been the victims of unconstitutional police work prior
43. Id. at 646 & n.3. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, further elaborated on what he
considered the majority's unnecessary "reaching out" to overrule Wolf. Id. at 672-77.
44. Id. at 655. In light of this phrasing of the basic holding, bills pending in Con-
gress to alter or eliminate the exclusionary rule in federal proceedings seem to have po-
tential for changing the enforcement device required of the states by Mapp. See text
accompanying notes 369-71 infra.
45. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 219, 224-25 (1960).
46. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). On retroactivity, see Schaefer, The Control of "Sun-
bursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. RL. 631, 643-45 (1967);
Traynor, supra note 39, at 338-42.
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to Mapp.47  This compromise did not, however, appease the detractors
of the exclusionary rule as an enforcement mechanism.
In a 1971 dissent, Chief Justice Burger launched his own assault on
the exclusionary rule. Petitioner's complaint in the civil action of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics48 alleged that, without probable cause,
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics . . . entered his apartment
and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations. The agents manacled
petitioner in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the
entire family. They searched the apartment from stem to stern. There-
after, petitioner was taken to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where
he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. 40
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that a federal
cause of action sounding in tort arises under the fourth amendment
when a federal agent conducts an unreasonable search or seizure. The
civil action, in which the individual federal agent is the defendant, is
presumably analogous to that available under section 19830 for viola-
tions of constitutional rights by state officers. The Chief Justice and
Justices Black and Blackmun dissented on the ground that such a
remedy should not be recognized without express federal legislation. In
the view of the Chief Justice, such legislation would provide an adequate
enforcement maechanism for the fourth amendment so that the exclu-
sionary rule could be abandoned. In attacking the suppression doc-
trine, Chief Justice Burger proposed federal legislation that he thought
would pass constitutional muster51 and included an anti-exclusionary
rule bibliography.52
Decided the same day as Bivens, Coolidge v. New Hampshire3 stimu-
lated five opinions, each adopting and rejecting portions of the others.
When the smoke cleared, the Court had held a state search of a car
pursuant to a warrant unconstitutional because the warrant was not
47. Since roughly half the states had adopted the exclusionary rule before Mapp was
decided, the anticipated flood of habeas petitions presumably would have come only
from prisoners in the states forced to adopt the rule after 1961.
48. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
49. Id. at 389. The unconstitutional search turned up no incriminating evidence.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
51. 403 U.S. at 422-23 (Burger, C., dissenting).
52. Id. at 426-27.
53. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate 54 but by the state Attor-
ney General, who served as chief prosecutor at the trial. That an
attorney general was authorized under existing state law to issue search
warrants when acting as a justice of the peace55 did not make him a
neutral and detached magistrate. The opinions of Justices Harlan
(concurring), Black (concurring and dissenting), and Blackmun (join-
ing parts of Black's opinion) are noteworthy for their insistence that the
exclusionary rule is not required by the fourth amendment,56 although
Justice Black reiterated his view that the fifth amendment compels the
rule.17
A significant recent reference to the exclusionary rule occurred in
the dicta in United States v. Calandra,5" a six-to-three decision of the
Court in early 1974. In holding that a witness testifying before a grand
jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are
based on evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure,59
54. Id. at 449.
55. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 595:1 (1955) (repealed 1969).
56. 403 U.S. at 490-91,493, 496-98, 510.
57. Id. at 496-99; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (Black, J.,
concurring). Compare the view that "[s]ince the typical evidence secured through an
unconstitutional search and seizure is non-testimonial and non-communicative, the abil-
ity of the fifth amendment to assist the fourth amendment in suppressing such evidence
is questionable." Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No
Future, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507, 516 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
58. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclu-
sionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MwN,. L. Rv. 251 (1974); Comment,
The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule in the Grand Jury Setting: United States
v. Calandra, 9 HARv. Crv. RIOnTs-Crv. LiB. L Rv. 598 (1974); Note, Exclusionary
Rule Under Attack, 4 U. BALT. L. REv. 89, 102-13 (1974).
59. Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the case was controlled by Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, in which the Court had rejected any use of the fruits of an
illegal search. 414 U.S. at 361-64. For further discussion of Silverthorne, see text ac-
companying notes 21 and 22 supra. See also Critique, supra note 6, at 779-90. The
Critique author notes that Calandra, by upholding the production of illegally seized evi-
dence before a grand jury, may merely have legitimated a long-standing practice that
had gone undetected because of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Id. at 784. As
early as 1966, however, the Court expressed doubt that the exclusionary rule extended
to grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966). But note
that if illegal eavesdropping produces evidence of guilt, the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970), has been held to provide a defense
to a grand jury witness held in contempt for refusing to answer questions based on that
evidence. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). The Court's reasoning
in Calandra has recently been extended to protect the knowing use by congressional
committees of unlawfully seized materials, provided agents of the committees have not
themselves actively participated in the original unlawful seizure. McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1043-47 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (divided panel).
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the majority went out of its way to insist that the only justification for
the exclusionary rule is deterrence of official lawlessness. 60
The Court may have receded very slightly from its Calandra position
in Brown v. Illinois,"1 in which Justice Blackmun, writing for the major-
ity, noted that "considerations of deterrence and of judicial integrity, by
now, have become rather commonplace in the Court's cases." 2  The
Court rejected the notion that the mere giving of Miranda"8 warnings
dissipates the taint of a defendant's illegal arrest and renders post-arrest
statements admissible. But the holding was carefully limited to reject-
ing a per se rule of dissipation, which, it was conceded, would otherwise
eviscerate "[a]ny incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations ...
by making [Miranda] warnings, in effect, a 'cure-all,' and the constitu-
tional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures. .. 'a form of
words.' "04
Moreover, the majority opinion seemed to be hinting that the Court
may further restrict the exclusionary rule, at least in cases in which
statements, as opposed to tangible items of evidence, are elicited as a
result of fourth amendment violations:
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint
of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful
the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule
would be substantially diluted.65
By focusing on the severity"0 of the fourth amendment violation, the
Court apparently was suggesting that Miranda warnings, by themselves,
would suffice to dissipate the taint caused by the vast majority of police
illegalities that fall short of the stringent standard of "wanton and
purposeful." Justice Powell, whose concurring opinion was joined by
Justice Rehnquist, embraced such an approach. He distinguished "offi-
60. By adopting the position that the rule rises or falls with its deterrant capability,
the majority opened the door to the world of cost-benefit analysis and the argument that
since the Court cannot really tell whether the rule deters, the states may devise their
own remedies. Such a determination would, of course, be the death knell of Mapp v.
Ohio.
61. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
62. Id. at 599.
63. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384U.S. 436 (1966).
64. 422 U.S. at 602-03.
65. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
66. For discussion of the "substantial violation" approach to suppressioh of evi-
dence, see note 261 infra.
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cial conduct. . . flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights" from
"'technical' violations of Fourth Amendment rights." 67
Like Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion, Justice Powell may
have retreated slightly from the bold assertion in Calandra that the sole
justification for the exclusionary rule is its ability to deter. Justice
Powell wrote in Brown that "[tihe basic purpose of the rule, briefly
stated, is to remove possible motivations for illegal arrests" and that "the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule" and "the corresponding man-
date to preserve judicial integrity" are highest in the case of "flagrantly
abusive" fourth amendment violations. 68 He opined, however, that
when the police transgression was neither willful nor negligent, but in
good faith, "the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does not
obtain, and I can see no legitimate justification for depriving the prose-
cution of reliable and probative evidence."' 9 The position taken seems
to be that although judicial integrity is a legitimate consideration in the
application of the suppression doctrine, it cuts in favor of suppression in
cases of egregiously unreasonable searches and seizures and in favor of
admission in cases of "technical" violations.
According to the Court, the kind of violation involved in Brown is a
question for the state tribunals. Justice Powell suggested that the
Supreme Court of Illinois should "consider whether the officers might
reasonably, albeit erroneously, have thought that probable cause exist-
ed."0 Having previously acknowledged that "[a]ll Fourth Amendment
violations are, by constitutional definition, 'unreasonable,' ,,71 the Justice
apparently was proposing the often criticized rule that only "unreasona-
ble" unreasonable searches and seizures should trigger the exclusionary
rule while "reasonable" unreasonable conduct should not.72
Although the Court in Brown was applying the suppression doctrine
for the first time in four years7" to overturn a defendant's conviction, the
Court hinted at the precarious fate of that doctrine: "Members of the
67. 422 U.S. at 610-11 (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part) (emphasis
added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 612.
70. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 609.
72. For discussion of this "reasonableness" test, see text accompanying notes 303
& 304 infra.
73. See note252infra.
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Court on occasion have indicated disenchantment with the rule ....
Its efficacy has been subject to some dispute.""4
That Justice Blackmun understated the antagonism to the rule of a
majority of his brothers is evident in the Court's five-to-four decision in
United States v. Peltier,75 handed down the day before Brown. The
case involved a border search that clearly violated Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States;76 the marijuana found in this search was admitted in
evidence, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
conviction on the authority of Almeida-Sanchez.77 Reversing the Ninth
Circuit decision, the Court held that Almeida-Sanchez would not apply
retroactively, even to cases that, like Peltier, were pending on direct
review at the time Almeida-Sanchez was decided. The dissenters
argued that under clearly established principles of retroactivity, the
majority was in error and concluded that hostility to the exclusionary
rule was the most likely explanation for the strained reasoning of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court.78 Moreover, the dissenters empha-
sized that it was the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks that was under
attack and not the state rule of Mapp.70
The majority's test for the retroactive application of search and
seizure decisions was worded in very general terms:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police con-
duct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only
if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment."°
The principle is so broadly stated, and the majority's dislike of the
suppression doctrine is so apparent, that Justice Brennan, who has
emerged as the Court's most vocal defender of the doctrine, feared the
principle would spill over into ordinary search and seizure cases that
do not involve questions of retroactivity.
An analysis of ,the Court's unsuccessfully veiled reformulation [of the
exclusionary rule] demonstrates that its apparent rush to discard 61
74. 422 U.S. at 600 n.5.
75. 422 U.S. 531 (1975). For a summary of the Supreme Court's spring 1975
exclusionary rule decisions, see 44 U.S.L.W. 3101-02 (1975).
76. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
77. United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974).
78. See 422 U.S. at 550-51 (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 552 n.10.
80. Id. at 542.
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years of constitutional development has produced a formula difficult to
comprehend and, on any understanding of its meaning, impossible to
justify.
* ' * True, the Court does not state in so many words that this formu-
lation of the exclusionary rule is to be applied beyond the present retro-
activity context. But the proposition is stated generally and, particularly
in view of the concommitant expansion of prospectivity announced
today . . . I have no confidence that the new formulation is to be con-
fined to putative retroactivity cases. Rather, I suspect that when a suit-
able opportunity arises, today's revision of the exclusionary rule will be
pronounced applicable to all search and seizure cases. 8 '
The Court has indeed been asked to extend Peltier in precisely the
manner Justice Brennan fears, and the Court has agreed to consider the
question. On the last day of its 1974-1975 term, the Court granted
certiorari in Stone v. Powell,8 2 in which the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that evidence seized during defendant's arrest for
vagrancy under an ordinance later found to be unconstitutional was
inadmissible at the defendant's trial for murder. One of the questions
presented is whether the "exclusionary rule [should] apply to suppress
the fruits of a reasonable search incident to arrest based upon probable
cause for violation of [a] then valid ordinance."83
But even if the Court does not extend Peltier to allow admission of
the evidence in Stone, the Peltier reasoning would, according to Justice
Brennan, still have ominous implications.
[T]his new doctrine could stop dead in its tracks judicial development
of Fourth Amendment rights. For if evidence is to be admitted in crim-
inal trials in the absence of clear precedent declaring the search in ques-
tion unconstitutional [because the police would not know or be charge-
able with knowledge that their behavior was unconstitutional], the first
duty of a court will be to deny the accused's motion to suppress if he
cannot cite a case invalidating a search or seizure on identical facts.
84
An insight into the extent of the majority's, or at least Justice Rehn-
quist's, hostility to the exclusionary rule may come from observing the
Court's translation of Justice Brennan's concern that opportunities for
81. Id. at 551-52.
82. 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), granting cert. to 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974). For a
smmmary of the oral argument in Stone v. Powell, see 44 U.S.L.W. 3485-89 (1976).
83. 43 U.S.L.W. 3681 (1975).
84. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
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judicial articulation of fourth amendment values will cease s' into a
question "[w]hether today's decision will reduce the responsibilities
of district courts . "8... 6
The majority's contribution to the ongoing debate over the justifica-
tions for the exclusionary rule is ambiguous. In its opinion, the Court
acknowledged that "considerations of. . . judicial integrity" are rele-
vant in determining whether to exclude evidence s8 although the Court
"has relied principally [but not exclusively] upon the deterrent purpose
served by the exclusionary rule!' s8 in making that determination. Later,
however, the opinion lapsed into repeated references to "the purpose of
the exclusionary rule [being] to deter."89 Justice Douglas, in a sepa-
rate dissent, countered with a reference to "the purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule."90  Justice Stewart joined only that portion of Justice
Brennan's dissent challenging the Court's break from established ret-
roactivity principles, rather than those parts deploring the assault on the
exclusionary rule. Thus, six members of the Court remain firm in their
opposition to the suppression doctrine and continue to set the stage for a
Court determination that, because the exclusionary rule seems deficient
in serving its primary goal of deterrence, at least Mapp v. Ohio should be
overruled, and perhaps Weeks v. United States as well.91 Justice Bren-
nan voiced the alarm of the suppression doctrine's defenders:
85. Id. at 554-55.
86. Id. at 542-43 n.13.
87. Id. at 53 8-39. Indeed, "the 'imperative of judicial integrity' played a role in this
Court's decision to overrule Wolf v. Colorado .... " Id. at 536.
88. Id.
89. E.g., id. at 542 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 543 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
91. Justice Brennan, whose dissent in United States v. Calandra was joined by Jus-
tices Douglas and Marshall, warned of this prospect:
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "close[d] the only courtroom door re-
maining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness" in violation of
Fourth Amendment rights .... The door is again ajar. As a consequence,
I am left with the uneasy feeling that today's decision may signal that a major-
ity of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door still
further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure
cases ....
414 U.S. at 365. See also Note, supra note 57, at 518.
Professor Kaplan believes the exclusionary rule will not be abandoned by the Justices
currently sitting on the Supreme Court:
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall have indicated their satisfaction
with the exclusionary rule [citing Justice Brennan's Calandra dissent]. Jus-
tices White and Stewart have been reluctant to overturn or restrict past deci-
sions, even those with which they originally disagreed. See, e.g., Kirby v. Ii-
nois, 406 U.S. 682, 705 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
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I said in my dissent in United States v. Calandra. . . that that decision
left me "with the uneasy feeling that. . . a majority of my colleagues
have positioned themselves to. . . abandon altogether the exclusionary
rule in search-and-seizure cases." . . . My uneasiness approaches con-
viction after today's treatment of the rule.
If a majority of my colleagues are determined to discard the exclu-
sionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they should forthrightly do so,
and be done with it. This business of slow strangulation of the rule,
with no opportunity afforded parties most concerned to be heard, would
be indefensible in any circumstances. But to attempt covertly the ero-
sion of an important principle . . . clearly demeans the adjudicatory
function, and the institutional integrity of this Court.92
Forthright confrontation of the exclusionary rule may be on the
Court's agenda for its 1975-76 term. Before adjourning for the
summer, the Court granted certiorari in Wolff v. Rice,93 in which
Omaha police had obtained a search warrant subsequently found to
have been issued improperly. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the judge conducting the suppression hearing erro-
neously considered facts in the possession of the police but not presented
to the magistrate who issued the warrant.94 Excising such facts, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the warrant under which police searched for
explosives was not supported by probable cause and that the evidence
seized must be suppressed. The Supreme Court has agreed to consider
several questions, including the following: "Should [the] Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule be modified to admit evidence obtained by good-
faith conduct of police where exclusion would have no deterrent
effect?" 5  Because Wolff v. Rice involves an illegal seizure by state
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1040 n.72. The effect of the resignation of Justice Douglas
and the appointment of Justice Stevens upon Professor Kaplan's calculus is presently un-
clear. Justice Powell has indicated that he would not suggest the total abandonment of
the exclusionary rule "in the absence of some other deterrent to deviant police conduct."
Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 267-68 n.25 (1973) (concurring opinion).
Whether or not the result in Calandra ultimately leads to the abandonment of the sup-
pression doctrine, it may reduce the number of motions to suppress in felony cases since,
in most instances, defendants plead guilty after they are indicted. See Critique, supra
note 6, at 783.
92. 422 U.S. at 550-51, 561-62 (dissenting opinion).
93. 422 U.S. 1055 (1975).
94. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975).
95. 43 U.S.L.W. 3681 (1975). The Court has also granted certiorari in United
States v. Miller, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975), a case presenting the question whether "exclu-
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police, it requires reconsideration of Mapp, but not of Weeks. Factual-
ly, the case is conducive to further erosion of the exclusionary rule; the
defendant, a local Black Panther leader, is seeking to use an apparently
minor fourth amendment violation to reverse his conviction of first-
degree murder in connection with the bombing death of a police
officer. If the opponents of the suppression doctrine have their way,
the Court will use Wolff to resurrect Wolf.9s
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Argument for and against the exclusionary rule has focused on three
basic questions: (A) whether it is constitutionally compelled, (B)
whether in fact the rule deters violations of the fourth amendment, and
(C) regardless of its deterrent effect, whether the rule's social benefits
exceed its social costs.
A. Constitutionally Compelled
1. Personal Privacy Right of the Defendant
Both the fourth and the fourteenth amendments protect persons
against unreasonable searches and seizures. If it is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy to seize property unreasonably, it is an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy to keep and use such property. The unreason-
able seizure that is barred by the fourth amendment continues as long as
the evidence is held; implicit in the ban on seizing is the ban on using
after seizing.97
sion of evidence obtained by defective grand jury subpoenas [is] required at retrial."
43 U.S.L.W. 3641 (1975).
96. Partially overruled by Mapp, Wolf v. Colorado had held that the fourth amend-
ment, but not its exclusionary enforcement device, was applicable to the states. See text
accompanying notes 30-33 supra. For a summary of the oral argument in Wolff v. Rice,
422 U.S. 1055, granting cert. to 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), see 44 U.S.L.W. 3485-
87 (1976). Conceding that "the privilege of overruling Supreme Court decisions
should ordinarily remain with that court," Judge Van Graafeiland recently pro-
tested the unwillingness of his brothers to modify the exclusionary rule without waiting
"for the proverbial 'brown cow' case to be decided" by the Supreme Court. United
States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), reported in 18 BNA
CRim. L. REp. 2465, 2467 (1976).
97. But cf. text accompanying note 163 infra. Such an argument harks back to the
basis of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which was the right to the return
of property illegally seized. A difficulty with this view is that even as early as Boyd,
a person had a right to the return only of property that was lawfully his-he had no
right to recover contraband that had been seized. Thus, in the vast majority of cases
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2. Personal Right Not to Be Convicted on Unconstitutional Evidence 8
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended the commu-
nity "to reap an advantage that could be secured only by violating"
constitutional commands.9 9 The fifth amendment's due process and
self-incrimination clauses give the federal criminal defendant and,
through the fourteenth amendment, the state criminal defendant a right
not to be convicted on the basis of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment.' What does the due process clause mean if it does
not mean that a defendant cannot be convicted on evidence obtained in
violation of due process of law?' 01
ia which motions to suppress are made-those involving drugs, gambling paraphernalia,
and weapons-the victims of illicit seizures would not have a privacy right to return
of the property. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1030.
Compare the view that suppression of wrongfully obtained evidence is a form of com-
pensation to the defendant for the violation of his constitutional rights. See Comment,
Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 153-54 (1948). This
view has been criticized by Judge Friendly and by Justice Traynor. Friendly, supra note
4, at 951; Traynor, supra note 39, at 335. In United States v. Calandra, the Court
stated that the "purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the pri-
vacy of the search victim. . . ." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
See generally Note, supra note 57, at 508-10.
98. The right given primary protection by the fourth amendment may not be the
right to privacy, but "a privilege against conviction by unlawfully obtained evidence."
Allen, supra note 5, at 35. In Calandra, the Supreme Court stated that the exclusionary
rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gen-
erally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Some commentators
consider this suggestion that "the exclusionary rule does not function as a fundamental
right of the accused" to be a serious departure from precedent. See Critique, supra note
6, at 787. See also Note, supra note 57, at 509.
99. Allen, supra note 5, at 34. See also People v. Calan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955).
100. See Oaks, supra note 4, at 671 n.25. In Calandra, the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule is not a "personal constitutional right" of the defendant. United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Consider, nevertheless, the following view:
The idea that a person has a personal right under the fourth amendment alone
without the aid of the fifth amendment to have illegally obtained evidence ex-
cluded is strengthened by the result in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). There a corporation was involved as a defendant
and of course had no right against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the Court
suppressed the evidence.
Note, supra note 57, at 509 n.14. For discussion of Silverthorne, see text accompanying
notes 21 & 22 supra.
101. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liber-
ties Union of S. Cal. as Amici Curiae at 6, in California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for ACLU]:
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Justice Black, among others, championed the view that the self-
incrimination clause, and not the due process clause, precluded convict-
ing a person on evidence taken from him illegally. 10 2  This view,
however, has never gained the support of a majority of the Supreme
Court. 03
To find on the one hand that the State has violated a defendant's fourth
amendment rights in obtaining evidence against him, and then to find on the
other hand that his conviction based upon such evidence has been obtained
consistent with the requirements of due process of law is unacceptable logic.
Although Justice Frankfurter opposed mandating the exclusionary rule in state criminal
proceedings, he wrote, in a coerced confession case handed down the same day as Wolf,
that "[i]n holding that the Due Process Clause . . . vitiates a conviction based on the
fruits of such procedure, we apply the Due Process Clause to its historic function of
assuring appropriate procedures before liberty is curtailed or life is taken." Watts v. In-
diana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949).
For arguments supporting the position implicit in the rhetorical question asked in the
text, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47-
48 (1949) (Rutledge, I., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886);
Allen, supra note 5, at 35.
Those who take the position that the fourteenth amendment due process clause re-
quirements are more flexible than those provisions of the Bill of Rights that the due
process clause applies to the states would not agree that the due process clause requires
the same exclusionary rule as does the fourth amendment. Even if the fourth amend-
ment compels exclusion regardless of the severity of the constitutional violations, these
persons might argue that there is no denial of fourteenth amendment due process merit-
ing suppression unless a police officer intentionally violates a person's fourth amendment
rights. See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLuM.
L. Rnv. 181, 187-92 (1969).
102. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). On
Justice Black's position, see Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argu-
ment for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 1129,
1141-42 n.48 (1973). For similar views, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47-48
(1949); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Feldman v. United States,
322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 643 (1886); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unrea.
sonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 342, 347-50 (1967); cf. Kamisar, Wolf
and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43
MINN. L. Rnv. 1083, 1088-90 n.16 (1959). Contrast Justice Holmes' contention that
the fifth amendment does not include an exclusionary rule because under that amend-
ment a "party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production."
Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913); see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissent-
ing). Professor Hill has contended that Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), by
holding Mapp prospective only, undercut the self-incrimination justification. Hill, supra
note 101, at 182-83 n.14.
103. Self-incrimination clause protection has been limited to the suppression of testi-
monial evidence. Kamisar, supra note 102, at 1131.
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3. Only Effective Means to Assure Police Compliance with Fourth
Amendment
It is said that because there is no other effective remedy for unreason-
able searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule is implicit in the fourth
and fourteenth amendment---"an essential part of the right to priva-
cy."'90 4  To deny the remedy in such circumstances is to deny the right
104. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12
(1968); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 433 (1974); At-
kinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Sei-
zures, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 11 (1925); cf. Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility
of Evidence, 64 HAuv. L. REv. 1304 (1951) (calling the rule "the most effective rem-
edy"); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14
(1956) (dubbing the rule "the most effective judicial deterrent"); Wright, Must the
Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736, 738 (1972). The
questions whether the exclusionary rule deters and whether other devices might deter are
considered in the text accompanying notes 130-39 & 183-205 infra.
Even if the exclusionary rule does not effectively deter, it may be important that it
is a clearly visible remedy, teaching the public that violations of the right will not be
ignored. The argument might then be not that the rule is the most effective deterrent
but that it is the most publicly visible legal response. Professor Kamisar has suggested
that our uncertainty about whether the exclusionary rule deters is less important than
our knowledge that other alternatives will not deter. Kamisar, supra note 102, at 1150.
Professor Oaks criticizes this view, writing:
Kamisar is merely saying what the Supreme Court and a considerable number
of scholars have said over and over again, that in the absence of any better
alternative, we are willing to take the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
solely on the basis of assumption.
Oaks, supra note 4, at 678 (footnote omitted). But Kamisar's statement may be aimed
more at what Oaks termed "the inappropriateness of an important federal constitutional
right ...without a clearly available federal remedy." Id. at 673; see id. at 711. See
also Critique, supra note 6, at 780-81.
Consider this children's nursery rhyme quoted in Christensen, Suppression of Evidence
Without the Aid of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 8 HAWAII B.J. 109 (1972):
For every evil under the sun
There is a remedy or there is none
If there be one try and find it
If there be none, never mind it.
If a nursery rhyme can be used to support the suppression doctrine, burlesque jokes are
not out of order as weapons of attack:
This reasoning (that the exclusionary rule is legitimate because "nothing else
works") reminds one very much of the old vaudeville skit about the drunk
looking for his keys under a light post. When questioned he admitted that he
had lost the keys some blocks away but argued that it made no sense to look
there because it was far too dark.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1032. See also an ode to the Mapp majority in Comment, The
Decline of the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative to Injustice, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 68
(1972).
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itself. Accordingly, many of the attacks on the exclusionary remedy are
really attacks on the substantive right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.105 The only proper avenue for redress that the
detractors of the rule have, therefore, is to amend the Constitution by
repealing the fourth amendment or to overturn (insofar as inconsistent)
Wolf v. Colorado, which held the fourth amendment applicable to the
states through the fourteenth. This recourse clearly is one which propo-
nents of the exclusionary rule would oppose as not in the best interests
of society.
4. Judicial Integrity Diminished by Approval of Law Breaking in the
Name of Law Enforcement
a. Statement of the Argument
For those charged with enforcing and upholding the laws to violate
them with impunity is anarchistic.'0 " This basis for contending that the
exclusionary rule is constitutionally required has been called "the imper-
ative of judicial integrity."'0 7 Courts must avoid even the appearance
of approving or participating in unlawful searches and seizures by using
evidence so obtained lest they denigrate the principles underlying the
Constitution. °"
105. See Brief for Respondents at 81-83, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972);
Remarks by New York Senator Robert F. Wagner, New York Constitutional Convention
of 1938, RECoRD OF TnE NEw YORK CONSTrrTONAL CONVENTION 559-60 (1938), re-
printed in Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liber-
ties, 45 ILL. L. RFv. 1, 19 n.56 (1950); Allen, supra at 19. But cf. Oaks 737 (unrespon-
sive retort to Professor Allen). Consider also Professor Oaks' contention that the
"handcuffs-the-police" objection to the exclusionary rule is actually an attack on the sub-
stantive right involved. Id. at 754. See text accompanying notes 206-08 infra.
106. Justice Walsh, writing for the minority in the leading Irish case of People v.
O'Brien, [19651 I. R. 142, 169 (Sup. Ct. 1964), argued that should Ireland ever experi-
ence the "lamentable state of affairs" represented by widespread police misconduct, the
exclusionary rule would be preferable to "a rule which might appear to lend itself to
expediency rather than to principle." Professor Oaks maintains that in America
"[w]e know that there is widespread illegal law enforcement behavior .... " Oaks 716
(emphasis added).
107. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
108. The courts must endeavor "to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawless-
ness. . . ." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). In Terry v. Ohio, Chief Justice Warren stated: "Courts which sit under our Con-
stitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional
rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such inva-
sions." 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). See also Brief for Cal. Pub. Defenders Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae at 48, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); Note, supra note 57, at 510-
11; Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding thehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/2
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In the language of the game theory of the adversary process, 1' 9 "fair
play" requires that the government not profit from its own illegal acts." x0
Because an individual's fundamental rights cannot be sacrificed in the
interest of expediency without threatening the basis of a free society, 1 '
Justice Brandeis maintained that the government should be denied relief
when it enters court with the unclean hands of a Constitution-viola-
tor.112 And Holmes thought it better for some criminals to go free than
for government to "play an ignoble part."1 3  According to Chief
Justice Warren, society has a
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1129 (1973); text preceeding and
accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
109. Cf. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRAus 80 (1949). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) and authorities cited therein. Compare Justice Stone's comment that "[a]
criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the Government may be checkmated
and the game lost merely because its officers have not played according to rule." Mc-
Guire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927).
110. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
11I. "There exists today no greater danger to the democratic process than this ends-
[conviction of the guilty] justifies-the-means [illegal search plus perjury] rationale." C.
Sevilla, ReMapping the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Suggestion, 1973 (unpub-
lished paper of a California public defender). See also United States v. King, 478 F.2d
494, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. Calan-
dra, 465 F.2d 1218, 1226 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Sevilla, Exclu-
sionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 839 (1974); Note, The United
States Courts of Appeals: 1972-1973 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 62 GEo. L.J.
401,406-07 (1973).
112. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). Brandeis' dissent was not based on constitutional grounds. For the criticism that
Brandeis' view represents an exercise of judicial power "beyond judicial competence,"
see Hill, supra note 101, at 212 & n.169. Professor Hill's view is subject to the objec-
tion that, under the traditional equitable doctrine of clean hands, the government should
be held to a higher standard of behavior than private individuals.
113. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Compare the position taken by Justice Walsh of the Irish Supreme Court: With respect
to intentional violations and absent "extraordinary excusing circumstances . . . such as
the imminent destruction of vital evidence," "[tihe defence and vindication of the con-
stitutional rights of the citizen is a duty superior to that of trying such citizen for a
criminal offense." People v. O'Brien, [1965] Ir. R. 142, 170 (Sup. Ct. 1964). On the
other hand, J. Edgar Hoover has stated in opposition to the exclusionary rule: "[lIt
is well to remember the words of Patrick Devlin, former Justice of the High Court of
England: 'When a criminal goes free, it is as much a failure of abstract justice as
when an innocent man is convicted."' FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Sept.
1971).
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illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves. 114
The same concern was echoed by Justice Clark when he wrote for the
majority in Mapp v. Ohio: "Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of
the charter of its own existence." 1 5
b. Analogy to Treatment of Coerced Confessions
Although Professor Oaks has expressed doubts about whether the
judicial integrity rationale determines search and seizure cases,"10 there
seem to be strong arguments that it does determine cases in the coerced
confession area and that it should determine at least some kinds of
search and seizure issues. Most commentators support exclusion
of involuntary confessions regardless of their opinion of the ex-
clusionary rule in search and seizure cases. The traditional rationale
for this distinction is that a coerced confession is likely to be unreliable
(because the suspect will falsely confess to end the coercive in-
terrogation), while the seizure of tangible evidence without probable
cause does not make the evidence any less reliable." 7 Whether or not
114. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959). See also Allen, supra note
105, at 20.
115. 367 U.S. at 659. Justice Frankfurter also shared this view that the integrity of
the legal system plays a very real role in the survival of the republic. On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
116. He offers as proof several examples of affirmed convictions predicated on ille-
gally seized evidence. Oaks, supra note 4, at 669-71. But see United States v. Karatha-
nos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), reported in 18 BNA CluM. L. RP. 2465
(1976). See also Comment, supra note 104, at 76.
117. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35 (1965); AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION CRIMINAL LAw SECTION, COMMITEE AND SECTION REPORTS TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES, Recommendation 1-6, at 12 (1972); Friendly, supra note 4, at 951; Oaks
666, 737-38. Perhaps illegal seizure does diminish the reliability under some circum-
stances. Illegally obtained narcotics, for example, may be unreliable because of the ease
with which police can frame a suspect by planting drugs on him or on his property if
the police do not have to convince a magistrate of probable cause. Of course, police
who have gone before a magistrate may still plant narcotics, but they might have to per-
jure themselves in the affidavits for warrants, which may be a risk some officers would
choose not to run.
It has been asserted that there are only two issues of reliability in search and seizure
cases: whether the evidence was found in the place alleged and the extent to which it
incriminates the defendant. Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary
Rule, 25 Sw. L.J 573, 583 (1971). The planting of contraband involves the first issue.
The second issue arises in those cases "in which the accused is merely an innocent victim
of circumstances," id. at 576 n.25, such as United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951),
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illegal seizure diminishes the reliability of evidence, reliability is not a
sufficient basis for distinguishing the treatment of involuntary confes-
sions and unlawfully obtained evidence. This insufficiency is obvious
when one observes that involuntary confessions that have been corrobo-
rated (and are therefore reliable) are nevertheless excluded." s
Why then are corroborated involuntary confessions excluded? Pro-
fessor Paulsen has reasoned that they are excluded at least "in part
because the police have engaged in forbidden conduct of a most serious
kind and will not be permitted to keep the advantage of it."" 9  The
same theme reappears in the Supreme Court's opinion in Spano v. New
York: ' 20
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law. . 121
Aocording to Professor Kamisar, the general 'exclusion of coerced con-
fessions is based on dual rationales: unreliability and deterrence of
police illegality. 122
But if both reliable and unreliable confessions are excluded, are there
significant differences between illegal confessions and wrongfully seized
evidence that would make the exclusion of one more likely to deter than
in which defendants' nephew stored narcotics in their hotel room without their permis-
sion or knowledge. See Kamisar, supra note 102, at 1120 & n.122. Indeed, Mapp v. Ohio
appears to have been such a case. There was evidence that Ms. Mapp had no knowledge
of the obscene matter in the storage area of her dwelling. It should be remembered
that
if the practices of law enforcement officers raise significant doubts as to
whether the evidence they offer is trustworthy, the evidence may be excluded
whether or not obtained in violation of constitutional or statutory standards.
Hill, supra note 101, at 197.
118. See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Justice Traynor,
in referring to cases excluding involuntary confessions, asserted that "[tihe constant ba-
sis for exclusion proved to be other than untrustworthiness of confessions resulting from
coercion, however crude or subtle; such confessions could at times be highly trust-
worthy." Traynor, supra note 39, at 325 (footnote omitted).
119. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv.
411,428 (1954).
120. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
121. Id. at 320.
122. Kamisar, supra note 102, at 1115 & n.109. Compare the Supreme Court's dec-
laration in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961), that "constitutionally imper-
missible methods," not the untrustworthiness of an involuntary confession, render it in-
admissible.
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the exclusion of the other? If one theorizes that confessions are elicited
only when prosecution is the goal, suppressing coerced confessions
might have a greater deterrent effect on police than exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. 123 Under this theory, it would be useless for police
to obtain an illegal confession because they would not be able to use the
confession in court. It is not uncommon, however, for police to interro-
gate a person and seek a confession "to obtain the recovery of stolen
property, to locate a kidnapped person or to clear a crime, all without
intention of prosecuting.' '1 24
Perhaps the same judicial integrity rationale used to justify the exclu-
sion of reliable confessions obtained without Miranda1 25 warnings ought
to bar tangible evidence seized in contravention of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. If it can be demonstrated that coerced confes-
sions are usually the product of deliberate, or at least nonaccidental
police misconduct, a plea for parity might be limited to substantial
(for example, intentional, reckless or grossly negligent) fourth amend-
ment violations. As for what constitutes a substantial violation of Ameri-
can constitutional provisions, consider the perspective of a commentator
who has examined the approaches to the police illegality problem not
only in the United States but also in England, Canada, Scotland, and
Ireland:
While there is a growing consensus that the exclusionary rule should be
limited to cases of grave constitutional violation, ...[w]herever un-
lawful acts are part of a pattern, [the acts] are also inescapably grave
violations of constitutional rights, and therein lies the "American
dilemma" of the exclusionary rule.126
It can be argued that the analogy between the fourth and fifth
amendments breaks down because the fifth amendment contains an
explicit exclusionary rule while the fourth amendment does not.127  It
123. For the many other purposes police have for conducting searches and seizures
besides gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution, see text accompanying notes 192-
94 infra.
124. Oaks, supra note 4, at 722. Professor Oaks emphasizes that such situations are
exceptional and that the "predominant incentive for interrogation is to obtain evidence
for use in court." Id.
125. Mirandav. Arizona, 383 U.S. 436 (1966).
126. Baade, supra note 4, at 1361-62.
127. The fifth amendment provides that "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fourth amendment is quoted in note 2 supra. In 1925, in a leading article on the exclu-
sionary rule, Professor Atkinson argued that the case for a fourth amendment exclusion-
[Vol. 1975:621
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must be realized, however, that although the framers did not provide for
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from court, the reasons for
including such a clause may never have occurred to them. For the
framers, the fourth amendment may well have been a response to the
widespread invasions of privacy by the British in the past, invasions
aimed at harassing the colonists rather than at securing evidence to be
used in court. Thus, the ban on unreasonable searches and seizures
may not have been written with an awareness that one day Americans
would routinely be subjected to unlawful searches for the purpose of
gathering evidence for their convictions.12 In interpreting the fourth
amendment then, jurists should consider both the past and present
conditions and remember that "[a] constitution states or ought to state
not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding fu-
ture.'1, 29
B. Deters Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
1. Direct Persuasion
Although over the years some authorities have asserted flatly that the
exclusionary rule effectively deters police from conducting unreasonable
searches and seizures,' it seems more accurate to describe the rule as
ary rule was in some respects even stronger than the case for a fifth amendment exclu-
sionary rule. Atkinson, supra note 104, at 29.
128. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 316-20 (1959); T. TAYLOR, Two
STrDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45 (1969); J. Spiotto, An Empirical Study
of the Exclusionary Rule: From Its Origins to Its Alternatives 10 n.25, April 24, 1972
(unpublished paper on file at University of Chicago Law School library and United
States Dept. of Justice); Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 362, 397, 398, 401, 450 n.168;
Friendly, supra note 4, at 948; Spiotto, supra note 14.
129. B. CARwozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcrAL PROCESS 83 (1921) (emphasis
original). In a similar vein, Professor Amsterdam has stated:
I see [no] reason to conclude that the framers intended the fourth amendment,
any more than the rest of the Bill of Rights or the Constitution, to state a prin-
ciple like the dwarf in Gunter Grass' Tin Drum, who suddenly and perversely
decided to stop growing because growth was what grownups expected of him.
Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 399.
130. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636-37 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dis-
senting); cf. United States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976).
reported in 18 BNA CrIum. L. REP. 2465, 2466 (1976) (Mansfield, J.). For a
theoretical argument that the rule should deter police illegality, see Chambliss, Types
of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 703,
712. For the argument that the rule may be said to deter because few egre-
gious cases of police violations have been reported since its adoption, see American Bar
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deterring only certain kinds of police misconduct. When police want
the subject of their search and seizure to be prosecuted, they generally
take more care to act within the Constitution than they otherwise
might.181 Professor Oaks has concluded that in "crimes such as
homicide, where prosecution is almost a certainty and where pub-
lic interest and awareness are high . . . the exclusionary rule is
likely to affect police behavior."'13 In this situation, the rule deters by
making it unprofitable for police to seize evidence illegally.1 8
Professor Allen has suggested that the rule also plays a corrective role
when the illegal conduct results from "remediable ignorance of the
law." 13 4 According to Professor Oaks,
[s]cholars who have made sustained observations of police operations
have... [concluded that] [t]he exclusionary rule has contributed to an
increased awareness of constitutional requirements by the police.1
35
Nevertheless, the acid test is not awareness but compliance.' 30 In this
regard, it is interesting to consider the complaint of a Pennsylvania
prosecutor that "[tihere can be no doubt that the Mapp decision has
significantly impaired the ability of the police to secure evidence to
convict the guilty."' 1
7
Association Section on Criminal Justice, Majority Report, in SUMMARY OF ACTIoN AND
REPoRTS TO TE HousE OF DELEaATES, Report No. 107c, at 9 (1973 A.B.A. Mid-Year
Meeting).
131. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968); W. LAFAVE ARREST: THE DE-
CISION TO TAKE A SUSPECr nqTo CUsTODY 488 (1965); TIE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRImn
IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967); J. SKOLmCK, JUSTICE WrrOUT TRIAL 225, 228 (1967);
authorities cited in Oaks 721 n.157. But compare Professor Oaks' conclusion that "there
is hardly any evidence that the rule exerts any deterrent effect on the small fraction
of law enforcement activity that is aimed at prosecution." Oaks 755.
132. Oaks 731; cf. statement by Oaks, quoted in note 131 supra.
133. Justice Clark asserted that the rule removes the incentive to disregard constitu-
tional guarantees. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652, 656 (1961). See also United
States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), reported in 18 BNA
Cnnm. L. REP. 2465, 2466 (1976).
134. Allen, supra note 5, at 37.
135. Oaks 708 (emphasis added).
136. Cf. id.
137. Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 4, 42 (1962). See also Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law En-
forcement: The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEx. L. REV. 939
(1966).. A number of polls and surveys have been taken to test the perceived effective-
ness of the exclusionary rule. In an informal poll of federal judges at the 1972 Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, a
[Vol. 1975:621
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2. Indirect Persuasion Through Community Pressure
In an expression of apparently unwarranted faith in Americans,
Justice Traynor declared in 1955 that exclusion of unconstitutional
evidence would "arouse public opinion as a deterrent to . . . law
enforcement officers who allow criminals to escape by pursuing them in
lawless ways."'1 8 Unfortunately, public opinion, at least in this coun-
try, has condemned the courts for making life difficult for zealous police
officers; rarely has public opinion condemned the police for their illegal
tactics. Frustrated with procedural due process requirements that bene-
fit "criminals," many people abhor the exclusionary rule as yet another
tactic guileful defendants can use in attempting to save their unworthy
necks. The notion that communities will deter their public servants
from violating people's constitutional rights, although attractive, seems
quixotic.
Despite the impressive array of criminal justice scholars and practi-
tioners who have denied the capacity of the exclusionary rule to deter
misconduct in most situations, Professor Oaks' article reports:
The foregoing findings represent the largest fund of information yet as-
sembled on the effect of the exclusionary rule, but they obviously fall
short of an empirical substantiation or refutation of the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule.1 3 9
strong majority opposed the total abandonment of the exclusionary rule, a somewhat
weaker majority favored modification of the rule, and by a vote of 111 to 73, the judges
felt the suppression doctrine has been an effective deterrent to law violation by police.
The Exclusionary Rule, 61 F.R.D. 259, 285-86 (1974). An opinion survey of 90 police
chiefs, sheriffs, trial judges, prosecutors and defense counsel in North Carolina revealed
that approximately 70 percent felt the exclusionary rule was "an effective way of reduc-
ing the number of illegal searches." Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An In-
quiry into Mapp v. Ohio In North Carolina-The Model, the Study and the Implications,
45 N.C.L. REV. 119, 134 (1966). In a 1963 survey of "one randomly selected police
chief, prosecuting attorney, judge, defense attorney, and A.C.L.U. official in each of the
fifty states to determine among other things their perceptions of changes in police be-
havior before and after Mapp v. Ohio," 57 percent of the respondents from the 24 states
which had already adopted the suppression doctrine prior to Mapp felt there was an in-
crease in police adherence to legality in making searches since 1961; 75 percent of the
respondents from the 24 states required to adopt the rule by Mapp reported an increase.
S. NAOL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROCESS 9-11 (1975).
138. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 44849, 282 P.2d 905, 913-14 (1955). Justice
Traynor was not alone in holding this belief. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 105, at 20.
139. Oaks 709. Other attempts to test the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect have,
as Justice Stewart predicted in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), failed
to assemble "conclusive factual data." See Katz, supra note 137; Nagel, Testing the Ef-
fects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 283; Spiotto, supra note
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Of course, we do not know whether our police, with a demonstrated
willingness to overstep constitutional boundaries, would be stepping
even more on constitutional rights if there were no exclusionary rule.
This uncertainty about deterrence and the belief that other rationales
may justify retention of the suppression doctrine have stimulated vigor-
ous debate about the rule's social costs and benefits.
C. Social Benefits
1. Maintenance of Popular Respect for Legal System
The argument is made that admitting the fruits of official lawlessness
would generate popular disrespect for the criminal justice system and
laws in general. "If the Government becomes a law-breaker," declared
Mr. Justice Brandeis, "it breeds contempt for the law . . .,.40 But,
as with Justice Traynor's hope that the public would focus their frustra-
tion with rising crime on police wrongdoing rather than on the courts,
this notion does not seem to be true.' 4 This Article shall return later to
the question whether exclusion of illegally obtained evidence prevents,
rather than promotes, popular disrespect and lack of confidence.
14; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practice, 34
RocKy MT. L. Rnv. 150 (1962); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-
and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87 (1968); Com-
ment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional Right of Pri-
vacy, 47 Nw. U.L. RFv. 493 (1952). Judge Mansfield, expressing tentative confidence
in the exclusionary rule's deterrent capacity, noted that "[given the fragmentary empiri-
cal evidence regarding the actual effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in deterring un-
constitutional searches, any discussion of its deterrent effects must be undertaken with
considerable humility." United States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2,
1976), reported in 18 BNA GRIM. L. REP. 2465, 2466 (1976).
For criticism of the methodology used by some researchers to disprove the rule's abil-
ity to deter, see Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 475 n.593; Critique, supra note 6. The
conclusion of the Critique is that the various attempts to measure empirically the rule's
impact do "not demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule. Rather, [they]
tend to illustrate the obstacles that stand in the way of any sound, empirical evaluation
of the rule." Id. at 763.
140. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 635
(1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); 'Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954).
141. For Justice Traynor's view, see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 448-49, 282
P.2d 905, 913-14 (1955). Of course, we deal with imprecise measurements of what a
majority of Americans seem to feel. To say that public anger would not be aroused
by reception of unconstitutional evidence is not to say that a significant and vocal mi-
nority of citizens would not object vigorously.
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2. Avoidance of Misconceptions Flowing from Rule's Abandonment
Both defenders and detractors of the exclusionary rule seem to agree
that the rules abandonment might be misread by police as a license to
conduct unreasonable searches and seizures-a real risk given our lega-
cy of overzealous police conduct. Even such an ardent opponent of the
rule as Chief Justice Burger asserted that
the public interest would be poorly served if law enforcement officials
were suddenly to gain the impression, however erroneous, that all consti-
tutional restraints on police had somehow been removed-that an open
season on "criminals" had been declared. 142
In the pre-Mapp case of Salsburg v. Maryland,14 however, the Court
rejected the argument that state legislative withdrawal of the exclusion-
ary rule would amount to affirmative sanction of unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Abandoning the rule in theory might or might not bolster police
illegality. In practice, however, it seems apparent that police who
currently complain of being handcuffed 44 would have little hesitation
about using their new-found freedom, unless a substitute enforcement
device had sharper teeth than the exclusionary rule.
3. Avoidance of Insult to Police Professionalism by Abandoning Rule
Rather than adopt the cynical view of police intentions that underlies
the previous argument, some proponents of the exclusionary rule appeal
to the better instincts of law enforcement officers. Conducting the floor
debate that persuaded the American Bar Association's House of Dele-
gates to vote for retention of the present exclusionary rule, Samuel Dash
asserted that abandonment would insult the police because it would be
tantamount to saying they cannot work effectively under the Constitu-
tion. He also reported that the International Association of Chiefs of
142. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 421 (1971) (dissenting opinion). The Chief Justice thinks this risk would be dim-
inished if the exclusionary rule were not abandoned until a substitute remedy were in
force. As might be expected, defenders of the exclusionary rule foresee problems of po-
lice misunderstanding if the rule is abandoned. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 44-46 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 437-38,
282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955); cf. Kamisar, supra note 102, at 1094 n.39.
143. 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
144. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 139, at 283-86; Specter, supra note 137, at 42. To
the extent these complaints are sincere, the exclusionary rule has at least some deterrent
value.
653
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'Police have found the exclusionary rule "an aid to the professionalism of
police."' 45
4. Opportunity for Judicial Scrutiny of Police Operations and Articu-
lation of Constitutional Standards
Even steadfast opponents of the suppression doctrine admit that the
exclusionary rule has helped focus judicial attention on the need to train
and supervise police. 146 To Professor Oaks,
[t]he advantage of the exclusionary rule--entirely apart from any direct
deterrent effect-is that it provides an occasion for judicial review, and
it gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees. By demonstrating
that society will attach serious consequences to the violation of constitu-
tional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the moral and
educative force of the law.' 47
The occasion for judicial review that the rule provides is of para-
mount importance. Although there seems to be little incentive for the
victim of an unreasonable search and seizure to prosecute the various
alternatives to the exclusionary rule, the rule does provide the victim
with incentive to litigate the legality of the search if he has been charged
with an offense and the prosecution has decided to use the illegally
obtained evidence. Thus, the exclusionary rule has the "salutary effect
145. 1973 Mid-Year Meeting of A.B.A. House of Delegates, February 1973, reported
at 41 U.S.LW. 2438 (1973). Mr. Dash at that time was Chairman of the A.B.A.
Section on Criminal Justice.
146. GovWRNoR's SELECT COM~IarME ON LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS, REPORT:
PROTECTNG Tr LAw-ABEDiNG: "ComNOLLiNG CRiME IN CALixonNi" 155 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as GOVERNoR'S SELEcT COMMITTEE]. Advocates of the exclusionary
rule concur. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554-57 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Brief for Cal. Pub. Defender's Ass'n, supra note 108, at 61-62. Without
taking a position on the exclusionary rule other than to call the arguments supporting
it "unpersuasive," Professor Weinreb notes that "judicial involvement [with the fourth
amendment] mostly depends" on the exclusionary rule. Weinreb, Generalities of the
Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 47 (1974).
147. Oaks 756. See also GOvERNOR's SELECT COMMITrEE 155 (rule "has helped fo-
cus attention on the importance of constitutional rights"); W. LAFAvE, supra note 131,
at 504-05 (judicial articulation of constitutional rights in conjunction with exclusionary
rule has increased public awareness of constitutional requirements); Amsterdam, supra
note 104, at 429. A Second Circuit panel recently asserted its belief that the suppression
doctrine makes magistrates "aware that their decision to issue a search warrant is a mat-
ter of importance . . . [and] may well induce them to give search warrant applications
the scrutiny which a proper regard for the Fourth Amendment requires. . . ." United
States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), reported in 18 BNA
CRIM. L. REP. 2465, 2466 (1976).
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.. . that search and seizure issues are litigated and the boundaries and
protections of the Fourth Amendment become rules of law enunciated
by our courts."' 48  Without the incentive to appeal to the Supreme
Court that the exclusionary rule provides criminal defendants, the Court
might find itself lacking the opportunity to adjust the rules of criminal
procedure and fourth amendment substantive rights to rapidly changing
social circumstances. The risk is that our constitutional rights will
atrophy. 149
Would an alternative device, such as a tort action against the offend-
ing officer or his employer, focus a reasonable amount of attention on
questions concerning police practices? The California Public Defend-
er's Association contends it would not:
148. Brief for Cal. Pub. Defenders Ass'n, supra note 108, at 60.
149. See United States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), re-
ported in 18 DNA CRim. L. RP. 2465 (1976). Justice Traynor described the effect
of the California Supreme Court opinion that, prior to Mapp v. Ohio, held the exclu-
sionary rule applicable in search and seizure cases:
The Cahan decision had one immediate salutary effect. Public ignorance
and indifference now gave way to lively public discussion on the problem of
what constitutes lawful police conduct. The realization struck many for the
first time that the conduct of police in searches, seizures, arrests, and investiga-
tions could be crucially relevant in criminal prosecutions. In the midst of par-
tisan hues and cries more than one thoughtful observer came to realize how
passive the average law-abiding citizen must have been and how emotional he
had now become about constitutional guarantees that concern him as signifi-
cantly as they concern the most sordid criminal.
Traynor, supra note 39, at 322-23. The great California jurist went on to decry the
absence of Supreme Court guidance on fourth amendment standards when the exclusion-
ary remedy is not available:
For more than a decade, Wolf's right without a remedy frustrated the possibili-
ties of litigation in the Supreme Court that could have given more than spec-
tral illumination of the right. In consequence no case law developed at the
highest level to yield guiding standards for determining what searches and
seizures would be subject to condemnation under the fourteenth amendment.
The most we learned was to be newly skeptical of the old adage that half a
wolf is better than none.
Id. at 327.
Justice Brennan in his dissent in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975),
warned against "stop[ping] dead in its tracks judicial development of Fourth Amend-
ment rights," and Justice Reed, no great friend of suppression, recognized in Upshaw
v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 427 (1948) (dissenting opinion), that the admission of
illegally obtained evidence, at least in federal trials, "would imperil the efficacy of those
constitutional rights." See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949)
(Jackson J., joined by Frankfurter & Murphy, JJ., dissenting). Some authorities oppose
the exclusionary rule because they feel it makes for bad law on the substantive constitu-
tional rights, but agree that these rights might atrophy without the impetus that the ex-
clusionary rule gives to people to assert their rights. See text accompanying note 147
supra.
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It is folly to expect the powerless within the society to pursue remedies
against the authorities since the poor often lack the resources, energy,
time and knowledge to make alternatives complete remedies. At least
at the present time, defense attorneys and public defenders who repre-
sent the indigent can raise these issues.' 50
Consider also Justice Jackson's observation in Irvine v. California','
that an innocent victim of a search may refrain from bringing a tort
action if he does not want to reveal publicly that he has been under
suspicion. For these and other reasons, proposed alternatives may not
ensure the necessary judicial scrutiny of behavior affecting constitutional
rights.
5. Avoidance of Prejudice to Rehabilitation Efforts
The Canadian Committee on Corrections has suggested that reception
of unconstitutionally seized evidence, at least when the evidence has
been obtained through a deliberate violation of rights, will tend to
decrease the possibility for the defendant's rehabilitation."5 2 This justi-
fication for the exclusionary rule could be extended, however, to all
illegal seizures-inadvertent as well as deliberate. Surely the defendant
may be penalized for crimes involving negligence and recklessness,
which are less than deliberate violations of the law. In his eyes,
therefore, the Committee, by proposing to admit the fruit of negligently
and recklessly unconstitutional searches and seizures, would allow the
police to break the law in ways that he cannot. This perception is not
likely to increase the offender's respect for a system of law, but rather is
likely to exacerbate his lawless behavior.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
It is an inflexible rule requiring judicial suppression of reliable evidence
regardless of the gravity of the police illegality and with dubious consti-
tutional authority.153
150. Brief for Cal. Pub. Defenders Ass'n, supra note 108, at 61.
151. 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954).
152. CANADIAN COMMrrrBE ON COPREMcONS (popularly known as the Ouimet Com-
mittee), TowARD UNrrY: CuIMINAL JUSCE AND CORREMONs 74 (1969).
153. Wingo, supra note 117, at 582. James Spiotto has offered his own sweeping
indictment of the exclusionary rule:
Suppose a legal anarchist, dedicated to the subversion and overthrow of a coun-
try by legal means, sought to create a rule which would effectively bring this
about. The main objectives of this destructive rule would be: (1) to corrupt
police, both the overzealous and the greedy; (2) to prevent the innocent from
[Vol. 1975:621
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A. Not Constitutionally Compelled
1. Never Was Constitutionally Compelled
a. No Express Exclusion Provision in Fourth Amendment
It has been argued that the absence of any express mention of the
exclusionary rule in the fourth amendment indicates that the framers did
not intend constitutionally to require such a rule.154 The difficulty with
this argument, however, is that the fourth amendment provides no
remedy whatsoever for its violation, and it would be odd to assume that
violation with impunity was the expectation of the framers. 155
b. Mere Rule of Evidence or Product of Supreme Court's Supervisory
Power
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio, it was often argued that the exclusionary rule
was not a constitutionally-compelled remedy, 56 but a mere rule of
evidence or simply a product of the Supreme Court's supervisory power
over lower federal courts.' 57 If the Court's supervisory power was the
having any remedy; (3) to break down the trust and working relationship be-
tween the police, prosecutors, courts and citizens; (4) to let only the very
guilty go free; and (5) to have a rule which police openly flaunt. Such an
anarchist would be hard pressed to find a better rule than the exclusionary rule
to fulfill his purpose.
J. Spiotto, An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule: From Its Origins to Its Al-
ternatives, supra note 128, at 120-21. See also Little, The Exclusionary Rule as a Means
of Enforcing Fourth Amendment Morality on Police, 3 IND. L.F. 375 (1970); Waite,
Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 169 (1955); Waite, Police Regulation
by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. RPnv. 679 (1944).
154. See Wingo, supra note 117, at 585. Professor Kaplan suggests that "[wihile
it is certainly possible that an interpretation first made 125 years after a constitutional
provision might nonetheless be an appropriate one, the time lag between the adoption
of the fourth amendment and the first appearance of the exclusionary rule is at least
some indication that it was hardly basic to the constitutional purpose." Kaplan, supra
note 5, at 1030-31 (footnote omitted).
155. Moreover, it may be that no mention was made in the fourth amendment of
a remedy for attempts to introduce unconstitutionally seized property into evidence be-
cause the problem was not in the minds of the framers. See text accompanying note
128 supra.
156. Compare the American Civil Liberties Union position that the Supreme Court
did not fashion a remedy for illegal searches and seizures when it enunciated
the constitutional requirement of the exclusionary rule in Weeks. . . and again
in Mapp . . . . It merely stated its refusal consciously to facilitate and reward
the unconstitutional activities of the executive branch.
Brief for ACLU, supra note 101, at 6.
157. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring);
Field v. United States, 263 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1959); Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d
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only authorization for the rule, then a Court-mandated suppression
doctrine for the states would conflict with the basic tenets of federalism
because the state judicial systems are not subject to the extra-constitu-
tional supervision of the federal courts.',
In Mapp v. Ohio, however, the Supreme Court derived from the
Constitution the power to require state courts to suppress evidence.
Professor Allen read this announcement by the Court as the death knell
of the supervisory power argument against the state rule."" And in
Malloy v. Hogan,1 60 the Court declared that "Mapp necessarily repu-
diated the Twining concept of the privilege [not to be convicted on
unconstitutional evidence] as a mere rule of evidence . . .-.
c. Not a Remedy for Invasion of Defendant's Privacy
Judge Friendly has argued that the exclusionary rule is not intended
to vindicate the right of privacy of the victim of an illicit search and
seizure because the benefit received (often, release from custody) is
wholly disproportionate to the wrong suffered.16 2  Moreover, unless one
is prepared to view judicial reception of unconstitutional evidence as a
continuing or new violation of the ban on unreasonable seizures, it is
498, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Prettyman, J., dissenting); Collins v. Webb, 133 F. Supp.
877, 878 (N.D. Calif. 1955); State v. Hillman, 84 R.I. 396, 399, 125 A.2d 94, 95
(1956); Grant, The Tarnished Silver Platter. Federalism and Admissibility of Illegally
Seized Evidence, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1, 18 (1961).
158. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41, 347 (1943); Hill, su-
pra note 101, at 193, 212, 214; Comment, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Congres-
sional Assault on Mapp v. Ohio, 61 GEo. IJ. 1453, 1467 (1973); cf. Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957).
159. Allen, supra note 5, at 24.
160. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
161. Id. at 9. In considering pronouncements about what Mapp necessarily did or
did not repudiate, one should bear in mind Judge Friendly's observation that "no ma-
jority of the Supreme Court has held that the [Fourth] Amendment compels [the exclu-
sionary rule], see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 ... (1961) (concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Black)." United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 1968) (dis-
senting opinion). Justice Traynor has stated that Mapp's exclusionary rule "is no mere
rule of evidence, but part and parcel of the Constitution." Traynor, supra note 39, at
339.
162. Friendly, supra note 4, at 951. "Indeed, this lack of proportionality demon-
strates why the exclusionary rule cannot be justified as a moral imperative preventing
the courts from soiling themselves with tainted evidence." Kaplan, supra note 5, at
1036. Chief Justice Burger, during oral argument of United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974), commented that the exclusionary rule is not a remedy-i.e. a right of the
individual-but "a means of keeping the system healthy." 14 BNA CRiM. L. REP. 4044,
4045 (argued Oct. 11, 1973).
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difficult to assert a personal right to privacy as justification for the rule.
At least with respect to grand jury proceedings, a majority of the
Supreme Court has made clear that the violation is complete when the
evidence is seized by the police; thus the subsequent presentation of the
illegally seized evidence to the grand jury does not constitute a new
violation. 163
d. No Right to be Free from Conviction on Unconstitutional Evidence
Mapp rested in part on "seeming adoption of Justice Rutledge's thesis
in Wolf that there is a constitutional right not to be convicted on the
basis of illegally-seized evidence."''1 4  By refusing to apply Mapp retro-
actively, however, the Court in Linkletter v. Walker 65 may have under-
mined this thesis:
Justice Clark, again writing for the Court, gave as a principal reason
for the decision the fact that the "deterrent . . . purpose" of the exclu-
sionary rule would not "be advanced by making the rule retrospective.
The misconduct of the police. . . has already occurred and will not be
corrected by releasing the prisoners involved."'u 6
163. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). For criticism of this rea-
soning, see Critique, supra note 6, at 780-81. Some judges urge that introduction of the
illegally seized evidence is itself a further violation of the criminal defendant's right of
privacy. Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 616 (9th Cir. 1968) (separate opin-
ion), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970).
164. Hill, supra note 101, at 183.
165. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
166. Hill, supra note 101, at 184 n.14, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, at
636-37 (1965). Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in Linkletter, conceded that the
majority had abandoned the notion that the rule is intended to protect personal rights:
One reason-perhaps a basic one-put forward by the Court for its refusal
to give Linkletter the benefit of the search and seizure exclusionary rule is the
repeated statement that the purpose of that rule is to deter sheriffs, policemen,
and other law officers from making unlawful searches and seizures. The infer-
ence I gather from these repeated statements is that the rule is not a right or
a privilege accorded to defendants charged with crime but is a sort of punish-
ment against officers in order to keep them from depriving people of their con-
stitutional rights .... mhe undoubted implication of today's opinion that
the rule is not a safeguard for defendants but is a mere punishing rod to be
applied to law enforcement officers is a rather startling departure from many
past opinions, and even from Mapp itself.
381 U.S. 618, 648-49. Some authorities have suggested maintenance of the ex-
clusionary rule despite their concurrence that the focus on personal rights is misdirected.
See, e.g., United States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), re-
ported in 18 BNA CiuM. L. REP. 2465, 2466 (1976).
See also the summary of oral arguments in Stone v. Powell, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975),
granting cert. to 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), and Wolff v. Rice, 422 U.S. 1055, granting
cert. to 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), in 44 U.S.L.W. 3485, 3486-87 (1976).
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e. Rationales of Rule Undercut by Standing and Collateral Use Doc-
trines
Both the standing requirements and the numerous ways in which the
unconstitutional evidence may permissibly be used in our criminal jus-
tice system arguably undercut the deterrence and judicial integrity ra-
tionales. Before a criminal defendant may move to suppress evidence
as the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure, he must have standing to
make the motion. 167 Professor Oaks has declared that
[i]f the exclusionary rule were seriously bent on deterring the police or
on avoiding judicial involvement in illegal behavior it would exclude all
illegally seized evidence, without inquiry into whose property or personal
ights were violated.' 68
Illegally obtained evidence may be used for purposes of indictment,
impeachment, sentencing, and parole and probation revocation hear-
ings; if a private person or a private investigator unaffiliated with the
government made the illegal seizure, the evidence is admissible for
substantive purposes as well.1 9 Moreover, the general rule that a
167. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Combs v. United States, 408
U.S. 224 (1972) (per curiam); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 104, at
360-61; Note, Police Coercion of Witnesses, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 865, 867-73; Note,
Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488. Profes-
sor Amsterdam urges "that the Supreme Court's 'standing' rules constitute an incitement
to the police to conduct unconstitutional searches against small fish in order to catch
big ones. . . ." Amsterdam, supra at 433.
168. Oaks, supra note 4, at 734. Accordingly, some commentators have urged the
exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence without regard to standing requirements
in order to promote deterrence. See Grove, Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence:
The Standing Requirement on Its Last Leg, 18 CATH. U.L R.nv. 150, 177-78 (1968);
Note, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California, 24 STAN. L. Rav. 947, 957-59
(1972). It is also argued that the standing requirements derive from a notion that ex-
clusion of unconstitutional evidence is a personal right and that such requirements are
inconsistent with the attempt in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), to
make deterrence the sole justification for the exclusionary rule. See Critique, supra note
6, at 782-83. For an attempt to reconcile the standing requirements with the deterrence
justification for the suppression doctrine, see Note, supra note 57, at 514-15. See gen-
erally White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
333 (1970); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, supra
note 102, at 349.
The standing requirements may be eliminated, as they have been in California, by al-
lowing vicarious assertion of the right to have illegally seized evidence suppressed. See
Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971); People
v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955); Traynor, supra note 39, at
335; Note, Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California, supra at 957.
169. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (use before grand jury);
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defendant waives his claim of unreasonable search and seizure by plead-
ing guilty may further undermine the deterrence and judicial "clean
hands" rationales.17 0
United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966) (use before grand jury); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (impeachment); 34 Ono S.L.J. 706 (1973); cf. United States
v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975) (parole revocation hearing); United States v.
Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971) (parole revocation hearing); United States v. Schi-
pani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (sentencing);
United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970) (parole
revocation hearing); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970) (sentencing); Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 312
A.2d 357 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974) (limit on use for impeachment);
Majority Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation of the American Bar Associa-
tion on S. 2657, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 119 CONG. REc. 4237, 4238
(1973) (private illegal procurement of evidence) [hereinafter cited as Majority Report
of the Committee on Federal Legislation]. See also The Exclusionary Rule, supra note
137, at 276 (remarks by Donald Santarelli at 1972 Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial Circuit). On illegal searches and seizures
by private investigators, see N.Y. Times, June 26, 1975, § 1, at 18, col. 4, which de-
scribes the extent of illegal wiretap advice and services offered by private detective agen-
cies, as reported by President Ford's National Wiretap Commission. With respect to
the kind and degree of police participation necessary to trigger the fourth amendment
when the illegal search was initiated by a private person, see State v. Morris, 42 Ohio
St. 2d 307, 329 N.E.2d 85, (1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3392 (1976).
It has also been asserted that the Supreme Court's "treatment of 'taint' as a question
of fact instead of a question of reasonable anticipation encourages illegalities that the
police or prosecution can subsequently 'attenuate' by undetectable uses of their own prod-
ucts." Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 433. In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975),
the Supreme Court held that merely giving a defendant his Miranda warnings does not
dissipate the taint of a defendant's illegal arrest and render post-arrest statements admis-
sible. The Court carefully limited its holding, however, to rejection of a per se rule
that taint is automatically attenuated in "cure-all" fashion by the utterance of Miranda
warnings. Id. at 602. Attenuation remains a question of fact.
One proponent of the exclusionary rule has argued that to serve the imperative of judi-
cial integrity and prevent totalitarian police tactics the rule should be expanded to "ex-
tra-trial proceedings," such as sentencing, parole revocation and civil narcotics commit-
ment hearings. Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for
Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 102, at 1147-49. For the
suggestion that the Supreme Court has struck a compromise between the interests of a
criminal defendant and those of society by excluding illegal evidence at trials and admit-
ting it at "extra-trial proceedings," see id. at 1151.
The prospect that illegally seized evidence might be admitted without providing
grounds for overturning a conviction on appeal through the "harmless error" doctrine
would strike still another blow at the deterrence and judicial integrity rationales. But
this doctrine has had little application in the search and seizure area. See Note, supra
note 57, at 522. See also Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Consti-
tutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLuM. L REv. 88 (1974).
170. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 724 (1968).
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Of course, to observe an inconsistency between the often cited justifi-
cations for the rule on the one hand and the procedural requirements
and permissible uses of illicit evidence on the other is not to establish
where the error lies. Either broadening the use of the exclusionary
rule or abandoning these justifications would resolve the imbalance.
f. Reception of the Evidence Not Unfair to Defendant
Since the fourth amendment does not expressly provide for exclusion,
some proponents of the rule rely on the basic concepts of fairness
implicit in the criminal justice system. But consider in this regard, the
following thoughts of a Canadian justice:
The allowance of admissible evidence relevant to the issue before the
Court and of substantial probative value may operate unfortunately for
the accused, but not unfairly. It is only the allowance of evidence
gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous,
and whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the Court
is trifling, which can be said to operate unfairly.17'
2. No Longer Constitutionally Compelled
Even when, in the apparent absence of alternatives, a procedural rule
is held to be constitutionally required, it may cease to be so if suitable
alternatives are developed, or if other measures have eliminated or
brought under control the evil at which it is aimed. In short, constitu-
tional holdings in some matters of implemental detail may not be immut-
able.172
a. Inability to Deter
As indicated above, the current posture of the Supreme Court majori-
ty seems to be that effective deterrence is the only possible justification
for constitutionally compelling the exclusionary rule.173 Although Pro-
fessor Oaks carefully indicated the inconclusiveness of his exhaustive
study of the rule's deterrent ability, 74 many critics of the rule have
swept past his uncertainties and have asserted that his study disproved
the deterrent efficacy of the ruleY.5  Such critics maintain that although
171. The Queen v. Wray, [1970] 11 D.L.R.3d 673, 689-90 (1970) (Maitland, 3.).
172. Hill, supra note 101, at 181.
173. Text accompanying note 60 supra; see text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
See also People v. Williams, - Colo. -, 541 P.2d 76 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
174. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
175. E.g., Majority Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation, supra note 169,
at 4239; Comment, supra note 6, at 383. The Majority Report stated: "Dallin Oaks,
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the rule was thought to have deterrent capacity when it was adopted, the
rule's sole constitutional justification is now vitiated by its failure to
deter.
At least in cases in which deterrence is clearly impossible, critics con-
tend, an unreasonable search and seizure should not trigger a suppres-
sion order. For example, it has been argued that it is counterproductive
to exclude evidence when a warrant is found to be defective if the police
officer made a good faith effort to secure a warrant and to obey
probable cause requirements. 176 The police officer is purportedly pun-
ished by exclusion, even though the court, not he, made the error.
Events over which a person has no control, the argument continues,
cannot be deterred no matter how much the person is punished.
There is force to this argument; but if one recognizes that the false or
misleading allegations made by police in their affidavits for warrants are
not necessarily made in good faith, it would certainly be sensible to
attempt to deter the duping of magistrates. A significant increase in
false and misleading affidavits for warrants might occur, however, if a
blanket rule were announced providing that a warrant would bar any
objection to the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
in his highly regarded study,... concluded that the exclusionary rule has been ineffec-
tive as a deterrent." The student commentator referred to "the findings of [Oaks']
study that police misbehavior was not deterred by the exclusionary rule" and declared
that such findings were corroborated by the empirical research of James Spiotto, see note
14 supra. Spiotto's research, however, has been severely criticized on methodological
grounds. See Critique, supra note 6. Chief Justice Burger in his Bivens dissent stated
the half truth that "there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that the rule
actually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement officials" and then asserted, without
citing authority: "Suppressing unchallenged truth . . . demonstrably has neither de-
terred deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment nor decreased those errors in judg-
ment that will inevitably occur given the pressures inherent in police work having to
do with serious crimes." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416, 418 (1971) (emphasis added). As Professor Oaks pointed
out, his data "obviously fall short of an empirical substantiation or refutation of the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule." Oaks 709 (emphasis added). By failing,
however, to check whether the number of warrants sought by police increased following
Mapp, Professor Oaks omitted a potentially important source of information for his re-
search. Those commentators and courts that assumed without proof that the exclusion-
ary rule was an effective deterrent have incurred the biting criticism that such a
belief "is a logical enough theory, impregnable in the library. But in light of eventuali-
ties it appears to have been dim-visioned theory spectacled in rose." Waite, Police Reg-
ulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REV. 679, 685 (1944).
176. See Majority Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation, supra note 169,
at 4239. For a contrary position, see the majority opinion in United States v. Karatha-
nos, Civil No. 75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), reported in 18 BNA Cnmm. L. REP. 2465
(1976).
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b. No Longer the Only Effective Deterrent
Clearly, the Court has been motivated to adopt and retain the exclu-
sionary rule, at least in part, because the Court has perceived the rule as
the only effective remedy for violation of fourth amendment rights.Y
Implicit in such a position, however, is the factual conclusion that
alternatives are ineffective. If this conclusion is shown to be false, the
constitutional need for suppression of illegal evidence is open to serious
question. The Court's awareness that the exclusionary rule might no
longer be constitutionally compelled if effective alternatives were availa-
ble is reflected in its comment, in a slightly different context, in Miranda
v. Arizona:178
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have that effect.
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search
for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However,
unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be ob-
served.179
Even such strong critics of the rule as Chief Justice Burger and
Professor Oaks recognize, however, that one cannot seriously argue that
effective alternatives are available until tenable replacements are enacted
by legislatures. s0 Although several interesting alternative proposals
177. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Perlman,
supra note 104.
178. 384U.S.436 (1966).
179. Id. at 467. For statements of similar attitudes, see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218,239 (1967).
180. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I would hesitate to abandon it until
some meaningful substitute is developed"); Oaks 756 ("the exclusionary rule should not
be abolished until there is something to take its place"). For a similar statement by
Justice Powell, see note 91 supra. In determining whether states should be entitled to
petition the Supreme Court for approval of their alternative enforcement devices, con-
sideration must be given to the propriety of the Court's inviting litigation in case after
case to determine the efficacy of each state's substitute remedy. The Court has been
asked to permit relaxation of the exclusionary rule in states that have created acceptable
tort remedies for violations of fourth amendment rights. For a summary of the oral
arguments in Stone v. Powell, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), granting cert. to 507 F.2d 93 (9th
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have been made, few have been tested in practice. Until data are
available concerning the effect of these alternatives, it is impossible to
state with any degree of certainty that these alternatives are either more
effective or less effective than the exclusionary rule. Justice Brennan, in
a dissent written after nearly all of the proposed alternatives discussed
later in this Article had been described in published works, concluded
that "no equally effective alternative has yet been devised."'181
c. Lack of Necessity Due to Increased Police Professionalism
A group called Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE)
has urged that the exclusionary rule is no longer constitutionally com-
pelled because today there exists a high degree of police professionalism.
Moreover, they assert, the vast majority of illegal searches and seizures
are made in good faith by police who are trying to obey the rather
confusing law of probable cause. Thus, since the police violations are
unintentional in most cases in which evidence is excluded, freeing a
criminal is an unduly harsh result. In any event, the few "bad" police
officers are not deterred by the exclusionary rule.""2
B. Obstacles to Effective Deterrence
1. No Personal Bite
Although the exclusionary rule often sets defendants free, it imposes
no personal or financial penalty on the officer or his employing agen-
cy.'1 3  The only personal consequence for the officer is his possible
Cir. 1974), and Wolff v. Rice, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), granting cert. to 513 F.2d 1280
(8th Cir. 1975), see 44 U.S.L.W. 3485 (1976).
181. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 (1975).
182. See Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae at
11-19, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). Professor Amsterdam rejects the no-
tion that the exclusionary rule is weakened by its lack of direct sanction against the in-
dividual police officer:
It is not supposed to "deter" in the fashion of the law of larceny, for example,
by threatening punishment to him who steals a television set-a theory of de-
terrence, by the way, whose lack of empirical justification makes the exclusion-
ary rule look as solid by comparison as the law of gravity.
Rather, the exclusionary rule is designed to operate in the manner of the pro-
cedure now being used in some appliance stores with the encouragement of po-
lice authorities: branding the social security number of the purchaser into the
chassis of new television sets in order to make them less attractive as objects
of larceny by diminishing their resale value in the hands of anyone but the
true owner.
Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 43 1.
183. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
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disappointment at having failed to "put a criminal behind bars." In
addition, the officer may share the general uneasiness of those citizens
who feel that the community is "full of crooks."
2. Delayed Bite
A time lag frequently exists between the officer's illegal conduct and
the exclusion of evidence. Indeed, exclusion may come months or even
years later. This temporal distance is said to weaken the deterrent
effect of the rule."8 4
3. A Bite out of the Blue
The police officer often feels hopelessly confused by the law of
probable cause; but since not even the Justices of the Supreme Court
agree on what the rules are, this confusion is not surprising. '8  To the
officer untrained in law, many decisions that suppress the fruits of his
diligent efforts are both unforeseeable and incomprehensible. Unable
to understand the rules governing search and seizure, even the officer
acting in good faith is likely to run afoul of constitutional requirements.
And when the sanction is applied indiscriminately-and, for the police-
man, inexplicably-to inadvertent as well as flagrant violations, the rule
loses both its credibility and effect.
The deterrent effect is further reduced by the police officer's failure to
perceive any readily available alternatives to risking violation of the
fourth amendment in his effort to maintain order, catch criminals, and
return stolen property. Nor have the courts been particularly helpful in
facilitating the officer's perception of lawful alternatives. For example,
judges rarely communicate to the policeman their reasons for invalidat-
ing his conduct,186 nor do they generally write opinions or explain orally
U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136
(1954); Oaks, supra note 4, at 725.
184. See GovBRNoR's SELcr Comlrrm, supra note 146, at 145; Burger, Who Will
Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L REv. 1, 11 (1964).
185. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE, supra note 131, at 164-81; Burger, supra note 184; LaFave,
Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not ... Run Smooth,"
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255; Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment
Standards: The Warrantless Search, 45 CONN. B.J. 2 (1971); Oaks 725, 731; Comment,
supra note 104, at 70-71. As one commentator put it: "Enough is enough. These
processes would not deter or enlighten a policeman in Gary with a Ph.D. who was
going to law school at night." Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19
DEPAur. L. Rlv. 80, 100 (1969). See also Traynor, supra note 39, at 330.
186. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 184, at 12; LaFave, Improving Police Performance
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why they have granted the motion to suppress.187 For that matter, few
police departments systematically attempt to educate their officers on
the subject of fourth amendment rights." 8
Proponents of the exclusionary rule urge that better communication
concerning substantive constitutional rights would make the rule a better
deterrent.'8 9 Opponents, however, are skeptical. They point out that
not only does the police officer lack the capacity to obey all of the fourth
amendment rules, but faced with suppressions that seem to operate both
unpredictably and unfairly, he also lacks the incentive to obey these
rules.
4. Misdirected Bite
Opponents argue that excluding evidence is the wrong sanction be-
cause exclusion has no effect whenever admission of evidence is not the
police officer's goal.190  Whether in 1886 it was true that "the
Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 403 (1965); LaFave & Remington,
Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement
Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 1012 (1965); Oaks 730-31; Spiotto, supra note 14,
at 276. Indeed a policeman may never learn of the exclusion if he is not in court when
1he order is made. For further discussion of the lack of communication between courts
and police, see J. SKOLNICY, supra note 131, at 219-29; S. WAsBY, THE IMPACT OF THE
UNrrD STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PgsnpnsTuWvS 83-99 (1970); Milner, Supreme
Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 JAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 467
(1971).
The Washington, D.C. Police Department has experimented with a monitoring system
in which officers are assigned to the courts and the prosecutors' offices to report on all
cases dropped or dismissed for reasons involving unconstitutionally seized evidence. See
Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule,
36 LAw & ComnT~. PRoB. 488, 498-99 (1971). One student commentator has pro-
posed that the court should, at the request of the criminal defendant, notify the police
department, the United States Attorney, the District Attorney, and the municipal corpo-
ration counsel of an allegation that evidence was seized unconstitutionally. Comment,
supra note 104, at 88. An Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States, who
beads the Justice Department's task force on modification of the exclusionary rule, has
suggested that often police officers never bother to find out about the outcome of cases
even when they could do so. The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 137, at 274 (remarks
by Donald Santarelli at 1972 Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Judicial Circuit).
187. See Wingo, supra note 117, at 578. Compare the "Judges' Rules," promulgated
by the Queen's Bench in England to guide police in obtaining confessions. See M. ZAN-
DER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 93 (1973).
188. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 131, at 219-20.
189. See, e.g., Brief for ACLU, supra note 101, at 10-11, citing LaFave & Remington,
mspra note 186, at 1012.
190. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968); Oaks 721 n.157 and authorities cited
therein.
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'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amend-
ment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to
give evidence against himself,"'191 today it seems clear that a substantial
number of illegal searches and seizures are not directed toward prosecu-
tion.
The desire for prosecution is often low, for example, when police
confiscate gambling paraphernalia, liquor, or narcotics. Frequently,
police use such confiscations as self-help punitive sanctions or as ways
merely to remove the contraband from circulation. In the control of
prostitutes and homosexuals and whenever there exists a public outcry
for visible enforcement, unlawful invasions of privacy are rarely aimed
at gathering evidence for a prosecution. Police similarly lack a goal to
prosecute when they attempt to recover stolen property or make self-
protective weapons searches. 92
Jerome Skolnick reports that generally the desire of the policeman for
prosecution is greater the bigger the "pinch," that is, the more serious
the crime. 19  '[In a small pinch," he explains, "the policeman is
usually not interested in an arrest but in creating an informant.""'"
But even if a policeman might want to have a prosecution instituted,
he may be willing to sacrifice this objective in favor of some other end,
such as recovering stolen property or imposing a short incarceration and
bail and court costs on a suspected criminal. When motivations such
as these underlie the officer's illicit conduct, the exclusionary rule is
unlikely to have any deterrent effect. Furthermore, the institutional
pressures to arrest generally bear more heavily on police officers than do
the pressures to convict. The latter pressures fall mainly on the prose-
cutor, and to the extent the prosecutor can control the actions of the
police, he is a prime target for the deterrence provided by the exclusion-
ary rule. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, however, the prosecutor
cannot normally prevent police from violating constitutional rights:
191. Boydv. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
192. See generally LaFave, supra note 186, at 443-44; Oaks 721-22. Professor Allen
notes that the fourth amendment is violated most often in the effort to control vice
crimes (such as gambling, drugs, prostitution), which are frequently handled by police
through methods not intended to lead to prosecution, primarily because of public ambiva-
lence toward the conduct made criminal. Thus, in those cases in which the fourth
amendment is most violated, the exclusionary rule has its least possible deterrent ca-
pacity. Allen, supra note 5, at 38-39.
193. 1. SKOLNiCK, supra note 131, at 224.
194. Id. at 228.
[Vol. 1975:621
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/2
Vol. 1975:621] ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
[T]he prosecutor who loses his case because of police misconduct is not
an official of the police department; he can rarely set in motion any
corrective action or administrative penalties. Moreover, he does not
have control or direction over police procedures or police actions that
lead to the exclusion of evidence. It is the rare exception when a pros-
ecutor takes part in arrests, searches, or seizures so that he can guide
police action. 19 5
An additional point made by detractors of the exclusionary rule is
that the rule will not deter police wrongdoing unless the illegal evidence
is needed by the government to obtain a conviction. 196 This point does
not reduce the rule's deterrent capacity, however, because the policeman
will rarely know at the time he decides to conduct a search whether
the prosecution will need the evidence seized.
In essence, the "misdirected bite" argument maintains simply that the
exclusionary rule fails to deter a significant number of the illegal
searches and seizures that police officers routinely conduct. It seems
reasonable to assume, however, that at least when police officers intend
the objects seized to be used as evidence in a prosecution, the rule has
some deterrent force. The argument then is in reality a call for supple-
mentary deterrent devices to close the gaps rather than a call for the
abandonment of the exclusionary rule.
5. Bigger Bites
Judicial threats to exclude evidence are outweighed in the minds of
most police officers by counterpolicies and countervoices. Even if the
officer understands the rules of search and seizure, the condemnation by
fellow officers and superiors is likely to be a more forceful deterrent
than is the condemnation by a judge. If the officer responds according-
ly, the exclusionary rule will not deter whenever police values differ
from legal rules.' 97
195. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 417 (1971). See also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 30 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE: THE
POLICE]; Oaks 726; Wingo, supra note 117, at 576.
196. See Tiffany, The Fourth Amendment and Police Citizen Confrontations, 60 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 442, 452 (1969).
197. See TASK FORCE: THE PoLcE 28-29; Oaks 727. Professor Oaks concedes, how-
ever, that the existence of the exclusionary rule may "reinforce" police officers "who
are disposed to observe the search and seizure rules but need something tangible to give
fellow officers as their reason for doing so." Id. at 712.
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Careful observers of police behavior report that a policeman who
unlawfully invades a citizen's privacy may be conforming to department
policy, written or unwritten.19 Such department policy is influenced
not only by the pressure to make arrests, but also by the perception that
following court mandates may endanger the policeman's safety and
impede the apprehension of criminals. For example, law enforcement
personnel typically have little respect for, and little desire to comply
with, the requirement that an officer knock and announce his presence
before entering a dwelling. The knock may give a suspect time to
secure a weapon or destroy evidence.
Some police adminstrators condone disregard of the law because they
feel that violation of the fourth amendment is expected of policemen by
a public interested in aggressive law enforcement. 199 Professor Oaks,
agreeing that the public approves police illegality in the name of fighting
crime, claims that a policeman's violation of the fourth amendment
rights of a citizen "entails no loss of prestige" among colleagues or in the
larger community.200 Thus the bigger bite of countervalues diminishes
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
6. Might Not Bite
Deterrence is impaired because the odds are good that a policeman
can violate the Constitution without detection by a court. In part, this
condition exists because most criminal prosecutions follow the plea
bargaining route. Motivated by the state's possession of wrongfully
obtained incriminating evidence, the defendant may plead guilty and not
even move to suppress the illegal evidence.21 And because the police-
man knows that such guilty pleas will often be made, the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule is further reduced. "If capital punishment does
not deter an offender because it will not happen," Professor Bums has
198. E.g., E. BrrrNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SociETY 28 n.46
(1970); TASK FORCE: ThE POLICE 28-29. See also Oaks 700 (summarizing Jerome
Skolnick's observations on police attitudes and behavior in light of the exclusionary
rule).
199. E. BrrrNER, supra note 198 (quoting several urban police chiefs to this effect);
Sevilla, Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, supra note 111, at 13.
200. Oaks, supra note 4, at 724; see id. at 727.
201. Sometimes, of course, a defendant will not plead guilty until he has lost a mo-
tion to suppress, but prosecutors seeking to avoid preparing argument on a motion to
suppress may use lenient plea offers to tempt defendants into early guilty pleas. For
further discussion of the interaction between guilty pleas and the exclusionary rule, see
text accompanying note 230 infra.
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asked, "why should court exclusion of evidence or appellate reversal of
trial decisions deter police when 90 percent of the time there will be no
trial?" 202
Other sustainable motions to suppress are never sustained because the
motion is not timely made and thus the right to exclusion is waived20 3 or
because the defendant lacks standing to assert the violation. The
exclusionary remedy will not operate in either instance, and the police-
man and prosecutor may, therefore, use the fruits of unconstitutional
labors to convict the defendant.
Further decreasing the likelihood that the exclusionary rule will be
applied is the reluctance of some trial courts to suppress obviously
tainted evidence. Such judicial contempt for law, far from deterring
misconduct, permits and encourages it. Moreover, if a policeman is
willing to lie under oath about the manner in which he obtained the
evidence, he will frequently succeed in preventing suppression, since
officers of the law usually are given more credence than criminal
defendants in courtrooms.204 But, even if a court holds that the evidence
cannot be used to prove guilt, the policeman's efforts may not have been
wasted; such evidence may still legitimately be used for purposes of
impeachment, and sentencing and parole revocation hearings. 2 5  Thus,
opponents argue, because the risk is low that the policeman will suffer
the consequences of the exclusionary rule, deterrence is unlikely.
C. Social Costs
1. "Handcuffs the Police"
This is a common cry.20 6 A small random sample of criminal jus-
tice officials in various states surveyed two years after Mapp v. Ohio
suggested that police effectiveness had decreased more in states that had
been forced to adopt the exclusionary rule by Mapp than in states that
already had the rule.207 As Professor Oaks and several others have
202. Bums, supra note 185, at 96.
203. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12(c) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
204. See Oaks 725; Sevilla, Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, supra note 111,
at 12; Spiotto, supra note 14, at 269.
205. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S SELECT CoMMrrrEn, supra note 146, at 145-46; American
Bar Association Section on Criminal Justice, Minority Report, in SumARY oF ACTION
Am REPOR7S To Tim HoUsE oF DELEGATES, Report No. 107c, at 19 (1973 A.B.A. Mid-
Year Meeting); Specter, supra note 137, at 42; cf. Nagel, supra note 139, at 42.
207. It has been noted, however, that the FBI, which has operated under the federal
eclusionary rule since 1914, has not found the rule an impossible burden. See Elkins
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pointed out, however, the "handcuffs" argument is nothing but an at-
tack on the substantive right to be free from unreasonable invasions of
privacy by the government. 20 8  Why are the police said to be hand-
cuffed? It is possible that the rule deters their aggressive efforts to some
extent, but it is more likely that police feel manacled because they are
prevented from using the fruits of illegal searches. Even without the
exclusionary rules, however, government officers would be barred by
the fourth and fourteenth amendments from conducting these searches.
2. Encourages Unlawful Police Conduct
If there is a germ of validity in the "handcuffs" argument, it is that
the vagueness of the fourth amendment rules, coupled with the exclu-
sionary remedy, produces a chilling effect on the policeman's urge to
pursue criminals aggressively. 209 Not only is the suppression doctrine
said to deter lawful police work, but also, according to critics, it actually
stimulates unlawful conduct. Police, suspecting they will be unable to
obtain the evidence required to control certain behavior through the
criminal justice system, devise self-help measures-that is, they take the
law into their own hands.210 Moreover, a police officer desiring to
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 n.8 (1960); Ernst, The Policeman and Due Process,
2 J. Pun. L. 250, 251 (1951); Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND.
L.J 133, 173-74 (1953). But see Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches: A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REV. 565, 592 (1955) (analogy
unpersuasive because of differences between the resources and responsibilities of FBI as
compared with state and local police departments). Regarding the perceived impact of
Mapp v. Ohio on police practices, see Critique, supra note 6, at 758-60; note 137 supra.
208. E.g., 1 NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REVISED RECORD 560
(1938), reprinted in J. MfICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRA-
TION, 1191, 1192 (1940) (remarks by Senator F. Wagner); Kamisar, supra note 102,
at 1153-54; Oaks 754. Consider Professor Kaplan's comment:
Probably the major reason for the high political price of the exclusionary
rule is that, by definition, it operates only after incriminating evidence has al-
ready been obtained. As a result, it flaunts before us the costs we must pay
for fourth amendment guarantees. Of course, the command of the fourth
amendment itself contemplates less than complete efficiency in criminal law
enforcement. The problem is that the exclusionary rule rubs our noses in it.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1037.
209. Allen, supra note 5, at 39. But cf. note 207 supra.
210. GovERoR's SEL.ncr CoMMrrnE, supra note 146, at 152 ("If because of the
rule, police cannot obtain the convictions they consider necessary to carry out their law
enforcement function, they may resort to harassing raids and confiscation to impose ex-
tra-judicial punishment"); see TASK FORCE: THm PoucE 187; Allen, supra note 5, at
39; Oaks 750-52; Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 257 (1961).
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avoid exclusion of evidence may feel impelled to lie about the conditions
of the arrest or search and seizure. Professor Oaks reports that an
unidentified police official admitted that officers routinely
"lie about [their conformity with] the no-knock rule [which requires an
announcement of authority and purpose before forcing entry in a
private dwelling] because it affects their personal safety."211
To say that the exclusionary rule tends to foster false testimony
to satisfy admissibility standards is perhaps less a condemnation of
the legal remedy than of police integrity. But regardless of the cause,
the problem remains. Some police officials estimate that officers distort
the facts in approximately one-third of all cases in which they are
assisted by special detail policemen, such as the vice squad. And when
the defendant is a "professional thief," the incidence of lying about
probable cause for arrest and search may be as high as 98 percent. 12 As
the state of Illinois urged in an amicus brief, "The effect of the exclu-
sionary rule in search and seizure cases is not deterrence but perjury. '2 13
Perhaps even more reprehensible than convictions secured with falsi-
fied police reports is another practice made possible by the exclusionary
rule: collusion between police officers and defense attorneys to obtain
the acquittals of guilty defendants. That such collusion occurs repeat-
edly has been documented. 214  At least the lying to convict can be
211. Oaks 741 n.226 (brackets in original). See also Oaks 697-99 (sharp increase
in number of arrests involving narcotics dropped to ground prior to arrest, as evidence
of police fabrication of grounds to satisfy probable cause requirements). On police false
testimony in general, see J. SKOLNICK, supra note 131, at 214-15; J. Spiotto, supra note
128; Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year After: An Appraisal of Its Impact in New York,
148 N.Y.L.J. 4, 4 n.2 (1962); Oaks 739-42; Younger, Constitutional Protection on
Search and Seizure Dead, 3 TRIAL, August/September, 1967, at 41; Comment, supra
note 158, at 1458 n.43.
212. Oaks 741-42.
213. Brief for State of Illinois as Amicus Curiae at 6, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S.
33 (1972). See also P. CHEViGNY, POLICE POWER 187-88 (1969); J. RUBENSTEIN, CIr
POLICE 386-90 (1973); J. SKOLNICK, supra note 131, at 214-15; J. WAMBAUGH, THE BLUE
KNIGHT 178-220 (1972); Barlow, Patterns of Arrest for Misdemeanor Narcotics Posses-
sion: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRm. L. BULL. 549 (1968); Oaks 739;
Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics
Cases, supra note 139, at 95; Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases,
A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971). Contrast the view that the "exclu-
sionary rule is a 'cause' of perjury only in a superficial sense. The more basic cause
is the simple violation of the fourth amendment by the police that makes the perjury
relevant." Critique, supra note 6, at 761 n.92.
214. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); Brief for State of
Illinois, supra note 213, at 4-5; A. DEtrTscH, Tus TROUBLE wITH Cops 14-15 (1955);
GovER oR's SELECr CoMMrrrEE, supra note 146, at 152; J. Spiotto, supra note 128;
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explained as overzealousness and can be checked by equal but opposite
forces; the lying to acquit, however, spells total corruption, the police-
man having abandoned even the police value system. Furthermore, the
exclusionary rule has the special attribute of enabling an officer to
immunize a criminal defendant against conviction by intentionally con-
ducting an illegal arrest or search and seizure in the first instance, thus
making it unnecessary later to distort the facts surrounding the arrest or
search. In this way, police routinely satisfy both the public outcry for
crack-downs on prostitution or gambling and the pressure of organized
crime for a hands-off policy.
3. Distorts the Fact-Finding Process
The jury is deceived when the truth is suppressed. Because the
tangible evidence that is suppressed is generally no less reliable simply
because it was unlawfully obtained, a strong countervailing policy ought
to be present before a jury is deprived of the benefit of highly probative,
available evidence. Perhaps protection of constitutional rights of citi-
zens or "the imperative of judicial integrity"2"5 is such a countervailing
concern. But consider the argument that
[t]he constitutional rights of a person should not be diminished by the
fact that he also committed a crime. Similarly, the fact that a person's
rights were violated should not have a bearing on his own guilt. Both
matters should receive a full airing in the proper forum.210
Many other commentators have objected that the exclusionary rule shifts
the emphasis of the trial from adjudication of the defendant's innocence
or guilt to adjudication of police methods. 217  At worst, defense attor-
Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 392 (1951);
McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CluM.
L.C. & P.S. 266 (1961); Oaks 749-50; Paulsen, supra note 210, at 256; Peterson, Restric-
tions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 46, 57-59 (1957).
215. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); see text accompanying note
107 supra.
216. Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule for Fourth Amendment Viola-
tions, 58 JuDicATuRE 74 (1974).
217. E.g., 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVmENC IN Ths AT COMMON LAW § 2184a, at 51-52
(McNaughton ed. 1961); J. WILsoN, VARmTmS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 52 (1968); Barrett,
supra note 207, at 591; Paulsen, supra note 210, at 256-57; Wingo, supra note 117, at
583-84; Comment, supra note 158, at 1458. Consider Justice Frankfurter's statement
in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1961) (emphasis added), that Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), "requiring the motion to suppress to be made before
trial, is a crystallization of decisions of this Court requiring that procedure, and is de-
signed to eliminate from the trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant
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neys may "become so concerned with the question of suppression that
they never seriously prepare for trial or explore defenses on the mer-
is.,2"" In addition, a criminal trial may be poorly adapted to reviewing
police actions because, lacking a direct complaint charging the police-
man as a defendant, the court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the
policeman's guilt.2 19
4. Breeds Popular Disrespect for Law
Because the exclusionary rule is applied whenever evidence is found
to be the fruit of unlawful conduct, whether the unlawful conduct be
intentional or inadvertent, commentators complain that the rule is too
rigid. Most critics suggest something like a "substantial violation" test,
in which a flagrant violation of the fourth amendment would trigger the
exclusionary rule but an honest mistake would not.220
Arguing that exclusion is an ineffective deterrent unless the violation
has been "intentionally or flagrantly illegal,"221 Judge Friendly observes
that the talk of deterrence is reminiscent of the criminal law's deterrent
purposes. But in that context, he says, judges usually have discretion
to the question of guilt." Contrast the view that in the typical criminal justice system
in the United States,
[tihe question . . . is not guilt, which is factually if not procedurally assumed,
but disposition-what is to be done with the defendant. In such a system, the
critics' complaint that the exclusionary rule "distracts" the attention of the
court away from the issue of guilt has a rather hollow ring.
Critique, supra note 6, at 775 (footnote omitted).
218. Brief for State of Illinois, supra note 213, at 4. The assertion in the brief is
not supported by evidence or citation to authority.
219. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 210, at 256-57. In effect, the court is deciding whether
the criminal defendant's fourth amendment rights have been violated by the policeman
in a proceeding that affords the policeman neither representation nor due process
rights. Nevertheless, the policeman is not being personally punished when a court ex-
cludes evidence. If a civil judgment were rendered against a policeman for violation
of a person's constitutional rights, the officer would first have an opportunity to be heard
md to defend himself, and if he were made a defendant in one of the rare criminal
prosecutions for fourth amendment violations, the policeman would be protected by the
full panoply of due process guarantees.
220. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); National Ass'n of Attorneys Gen-
eral, Resolution, December 15, 1971, cited in Brief for Americans for Effective Law En-
forcement, supra note 182, at 8; Barrett, supra note 207, at 591; Majority Report of the
Committee on Federal Legislation, supra note 169; Comment, supra note 158, at 1458
n.44. See also S. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For discussion of the various pro-
posed modifications of the standards for excluding evidence, see notes 261-64 and ac-
companying text infra.
221. Friendly, supra note 4, at 952.
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with respect to the degree of punishment to be inflicted on the wrong-
doer.222 Chief Justice Burger notes, however, that in the case of the
exclusionary rule "universal 'capital punishment'" is inflicted "on all
evidence when police error is shown in its acquisition. ' '22  The alleged
results of such inflexibility are capricious decisions respecting equally
guilty defendants:
One may be convicted, but another freed solely because in his case a
police officer failed to give notice of his authority before entry, even
though acting under a valid search warrant issued by a court.
224
When the defendant has been charged with a serious crime, the
disproportion between the violation and the remedy is thought to be
even more objectionable to the public at large. Our current policy,
claim the critics, makes no differentiation between the release of mur-
derers and drunks; in addition, it treats a police mistake as more serious
than the release of a murderer.2
25
These critics seem disingenuous, however, because they certainly
must realize that most of the "criminals" freed as a result of the
222. Id.
223. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 419 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
224. Govnm No's SELECt COMMrrTEE, supra note 146, at 151.
225. Id. at 146; cf. Spiotto, supra note 4, at 39 (1973). Chief Justice Burger reiter-
ated this view during oral arguments of Stone v. Powell, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), granting
cert. to 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), and Wolff v. Rice, 422 U.S. 1055, granting cert.
to 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975). See 44 U.S.L.W. 3485, 3486 (1976). The
report of the oral argument in Wolff v. Rice in The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Feb.
26, 1976, at 1, col. 2, quotes the Chief Justice's characterization of the issue as being
whether "'a man who set a booby trap to kill a policeman for personal political reasons
will get off scot-free.'" One student commentator claims that the release of the de-
fendant charged with rape and attempted murder in Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968), "is a common example of the operation of the so-called
'exclusionary rule."' Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure: Ex-
aminations and Prognosis, 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 768 (1972). For a critical ap-
praisal of the suggestion that the exclusionary rule "favors the hardened criminal
most of all," see Critique, supra note 6, at 764, 764-76. Cases such as Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), which involved a "particularly brutal" murder of a
14-year-old girl, are often cited to illustrate how the exclusionary rule frees serious of-
fenders, but it is important to note that Mr. Coolidge was reconvicted in his new trial
without the suppressed evidence. Mr. Miranda, incidentally, was also reconvicted with-
out the use of his confession. The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 137, at 278 (remarks
by John Flynn at 1972 Judicial Conference of United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Judicial Circuit). An interesting and perhaps significant inquiry would be to as-
certain what percentage of "serious offenders" are ultimately set free because of the sup-
pression of evidence.
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exclusionary rule are those charged not with murder but with possession
offenses such as gambling, narcotics, and weapons. Conviction for
these crimes virtually requires tangible evidence that can only be ob-
tained by search and seizure. A study of motions to suppress in felony
cases in the District of Columbia in 1965 revealed that in all homicide,
rape, and assault cases combined, a motion to suppress was granted for
only one percent of the charges. And with respect to that one percent,
only one case in six was dismissed as a result of the motion to
suppress.2 26 In short, it is obfuscatory emotionalism to imply that
murderers frequently go free by invoking the exclusionary rule.
Nevertheless, people guilty of other kinds of crimes are set free by the
exclusionary rule, and opponents of the present rule often point to the
popular fear and disrespect for the legal system that is generated when
criminals go free. 227  The popular fear is that innocent citizens may be
injured by an offender who is released because the "constable blun-
dered."228
We must be mindful that the contest is not between the State and
the individual. The contest is wholly between competing rights of the
individual-the right to be protected from criminal attack and the sev-
eral rights in the Amendments. When the truth is suppressed and the
criminal is set free, the pain of suppression is felt, not by the inanimate
State or by some penitent policeman, but by the offender's next victims
for whose protection [judges] hold office.229
Even if the defendant is not immediately set free when evidence is
suppressed, the exclusionary rule is said to contribute to the crime
problem and thus to public fear. One contention centers around the
rule's effect on the plea bargaining process. If the possibility of a
successful motion to suppress exists, the prosecutor will tempt the
defendant by offering a short term of imprisonment, 23° which means the
criminal will be loosed on society that much sooner. Moreover, it is
226. Oaks 686-87. See also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1036; note 6 supra.
227. See, e.g., State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 587, 279 A.2d 675, 676 (1971); Burger,
supra note 184, at 12, 22, 23; Paulsen, supra note 210, at 256. See also People v. Wil-
liams, - Colo. -, 541 P.2d 76, 79 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
228. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). See also 8 J.
WiGMORE, supra note 217, § 2184a, at 51-52; Paulsen, supra note 210, at 256; Wilson,
Police Authority in a Free Society, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 175, 177 (1963).
229. State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 590, 279 A.2d 675, 677 (1971).
230. See Gov-RNsoR's SELECT CoMM Errn, supra note 146, at 146, 152; Alschuler,
The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L REv. 50, 56 (1968); Oaks 748;
Comment, supra note 158, at 1458.
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urged that the rule requires sacrificing the certainty of conviction for the
mere possibility of deterring the police officer from law breaking,2 31 and
that this loss of certainty of conviction has contributed to increased
crime.
232
The freeing of "obviously" guilty defendants is also claimed to be the
source of public lack of confidence in the courts.283  As then Circuit
Judge Warren Burger declared:
[W]e may have come the full circle from the place where Brandeis
stood . . . and a vast number of people are losing respect for law and
the administration of justice because they think that the Suppression
Doctrine is defeating justice. That much of this reaction is due to lack
of understanding does not mean we can ignore it.284
Certainly the courts should not ignore the majority voice, but we are
dealing here with the rights of minorities. Perhaps rather than take
advantage of public "lack of understanding," our courts should fulfill
their great educative role by explaining the importance of safeguarding
fundamental rights-even when the rights are those of our outcasts.2 5 It
231. See Oaks, supra note 4, at 737.
232. See PREsWEDr's CoMMnssioN ON CRIME IN THE Disnuar OF COLUMBIA, RE-
PORT 872-73 (1966) (minority report).
233. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 184, at 12, 22, 23; Paulsen, supra note 210, at 256.
For attempts to measure public attitudes, see A. Rmss, Public Perceptions and Recollec-
tions About Crime, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice 80-90, in STUDIES IN CRIME
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (President's Comm'n on Law
Enforcement & Admin. of Justice, Field Survey III, 1967); Crime-The Courts, GALLUP
OPINION INDEX, Report No. 45, at 12 (March 1969).
Professor Wigmore saw the suppression of highly probative evidence as inimical to
popular respect for the criminal justice system:
'Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have
confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for
crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We
shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction.
This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of teaching peo-
ple like Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitu-
tion. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who
breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else."
8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 'EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAw § 2184, at 40 (3d ed. 1940). The problem with Wigmore's enchant-
ing parable is his convenient, but unfounded, assumption that somehow Titus will have
been "found guilty" prior to the exclusion of evidence. Professor Oaks warns that we
cannot be certain the defendant is guilty. Oaks 739.
234. Burger, supra note 184, at 12. The reference is to Brandeis' famous statement:
"If Government becomes a law breaker it breeds contempt for the law . . . ." Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
235. Justice Douglas observed that "wherever a culprit is caught red-handed . . . it
is difficult to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose. A rule protective
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is also noteworthy that in the comparable situation of freeing a defend-
ant whose coerced confession has been corroborated, which has an equal
capacity for producing disrespect for the law and courts, we nevertheless
suppress the coerced confessions out of a sense of justice.236
Despite these counterarguments, the exclusionary rule remains in
disfavor. Professor Wright has asserted that a rule which turns loose on
society criminals responsible for violent crimes "can be justified only by
clear and convincing evidence that its benefit to society outweighs this
obvious cost.' 237  Let us, therefore, consider the additional costs that
critics claim the rule imposes.
5. Causes Court Delay
It is claimed that exclusionary rule court proceedings consume
a substantial amount of trial court time and create an overwhelm-
ing appellate workload.238 Moreover, some practitioners claim that
witnesses willing to testify on the merits of a case become dis-
couraged or unavailable during the delay caused by a hearing on the
motion to suppress.239 If it is merely a matter of lack of personnel, it
would be tempting to urge that more judges, prosecutors and defense
attorneys (public or private) simply be assigned to criminal cases. After
all, the public is entitled to a criminal justice system that dispenses fair
and speedy services. If significant attention is required to protect the
individual rights for which this country was founded, then significant
resources should be allocated to the task.
Curiously, some of those who complain most stridently about court
delay and the loss of witnesses propose a modified exclusionary rule
with a substantial violation test. 40 Yet a modified standard such as this
of law-abiding citizens, is not apt to flourish where its advocates are criminals." Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 156 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See note 243
inIra. On the responsibility of lawyers to play an educative role with respect to the
importance of the exclusionary rule, see Traynor, supra note 39, at 342-43.
236. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); cf. id. at 684-85 (dissenting opin-
ion) (distinguishing the confession situation). Professor Oaks contends that the sup-
pression of confessions causes dismissal less often than does suppression of physical evi-
dence. Oaks 738.
237. Wright, supra note 104, at 742.
238. Majority Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation, supra note 169, at
4239; Paulsen, supra note 210, at 256-57; Comment, supra note 158, at 1457.
239. Brief for State of Illinois, supra note 213, at 4.
240. See id. For discussion of the substantial violation test, see text accompanying
notes 261-64 and note 261 infra.
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would tend to cause even more delay because it would require courts to
make an additional finding beyond probable cause: If no probable
cause existed, was the constitutional right substantially violated? 241
6. Protects Only the Guilty
The exclusionary rule operates only when evidence has been seized
and is sought to be introduced to incriminate the defendant. Because
most illegally seized evidence is reliable, the argument goes, those
against whom such evidence is sought to be introduced are guilty. On
the other hand, if an unconstitutional search turns up no evidence of
crime, the victim of the search is innocent but cannot vindicate his
constitutional rights by moving to suppress because there is nothing to
suppress. To many, a rule that aids only the guilty242 is an anathema.
The argument that the rule "protects only the guilty" is problematic.
Although it is admittedly true that the exclusionary rule is an after-the-
fact remedy only for those against whom incriminating evidence has
been discovered, these persons are not necessarily the only ones who
benefit from the educative and deterrent effect of the rule. By rejecting
the fruits of an illegal search, courts arguably demonstrate the import-
ance of constitutional rights243 and thus secure the privacy of the vast
majority of Americans who do not commit crimes.
241. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Judge Friendly predicts that the substantial violation approach would save time:
mhe recognition of a penumbral zone where mistake will not call for the
drastic remedy of exclusion would relieve [courts] of exceedingly difficult
decisions whether an officer overstepped the sometimes almost imperceptible
line between a valid arrest or search and an invalid one.
Friendly, supra note 4, at 953. In essence, Judge Friendly implies that courts would
skip the question whether there was probable cause if they felt, as he thinks is true in
most cases, that there was no flagrant or deliberate violation of fourth amendment rights.
242. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 415-16 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 136 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1949); Majority Report of the
Committee on Federal Legislation, supra note 169, at 4239; Oaks 736; Taft, Protecting
the Public from Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815,
816 (1964).
243. Justice Frankfurter, in 1947, stated:
[iMt is precisely because the appeal to the fourth amendment is so often made
by dubious characters that its infringements call for alert and strenuous resist-
ance. Freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, easily summon powerful
support against encroachment. The prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure is normally invoked by those accused of crime, and criminals have
few friends.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 156 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Murphy
& Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). See note 235 supra.
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In a very different way, the same point can be made about the
number of Americans potentially protected by the exclusionary rule. If
one questions the basic assumption that the vast majority of Americans
are innocent of wrongdoing, the question then becomes: Who are "the
guilty" protected by the rule? Most of us like to believe that a "we-
they" dichotomy exists between law-abiding, tax-paying citizens and
criminals. This is doubtful. 244 Rather, the crimes of most Americans
are not detected or are not prosecuted, and thus only one in 100 of us
becomes a criminal defendant in any given year.245  If police were to
conduct illegal searches and to seize items illegally from the large
number of Americans who actually violate the laws, perhaps the exclu-
sionary rule would suddenly become popular. Certainly, events such as
the systematic defiance of probable cause requirements in the San
Francisco Police Department's dragnet searches for the "Zebra kill-
ers"246 should give pause to those persons who downplay the relevance
of fourth amendment protections in the lives of law-abiding citizens.
Another basic objection to this "only protects the guilty" argument is
that, like the argument that the exclusionary rule deters police miscon-
duct only when there is intent to prosecute, the argument calls for
supplementation, not abandonment, of the exclusionary rule. The point
is that at least it protects the guilty, who have as strong a right to
constitutional protection as the law-abiding citizens. Indeed, the exclu-
sionary rule may not be designed to protect the innocent. To protect
them may require implementing an effective tort or other remedy. This
combination of remedies gives to each class of aggrieved persons the
remedy most likely to afford meaningful protection from illegal police
conduct.
244. A study of the extent of delinquent behavior among adolescents revealed that
88 percent had committed crimes, although only nine percent of their delinquent acts
were detected by the criminal justice system. Other studies show that up to 93 percent
of youthful adults admitted offenses which could have sent them to prison. Klapmutz,
Toward a New Criminology, in CRiME AND DELINQUENCY TERATURE (1973). On the
"we-they" dichotomy, see Comment, The Impending Limitation of the Scope of the Ex-
clusionary Rule: Will the Supreme Court Vandalize the Constitution?, 5 N.C. CENr.
L.J. 91, 95 (1973).
245. Roughly two million Americans have been criminal defendants during each of
several recent years. Klapmutz, supra note 244.
246. See N.Y. Times, April 19, 1974, at 1, col. 2 ("Hundreds of Coast Blacks Frisked
in Hunt for Killers"). On April 25, 1974, a United States District Court in San Fran-
cisco enjoined the police from stopping and searching persons unless there was reason
independent of a general profile used during the dragnet sweep to suspect the person had
committed a crime. For discussion of injunctive relief in cases of systematic police vio-
lations, see text accompanying notes 380-85 infra.
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7. Discourages Development of Alternatives and Supplements
The effort to develop exclusionary rule supplements to protect
persons from whom no incriminating evidence was seized is said
to be hindered by the very existence of the rule.
The enormous concentration and reliance upon the exclusionary rule
may forestall the development of alternative mechanisms for controlling
improper behavior by the police. By a peculiar form of federal preemp-
tion, the Mapp decision may sap state officials' energy and determina-
tion to control law enforcement officials in alternative ways that might
prove just as effective and even more comprehensive than the exclu-
sionary rule.247
In addition to limiting the incentive to experiment with new enforcement
techniques, the exclusionary rule is perceived as too arbitrary and inflex-
ible to merit imposing other currently available sanctions, such as in-
ternal police discipline, whenever evidence is suppressed. 248
8. Dilutes Substantive Right Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures
Professor Hill has observed that "[the definition of a right turns, in
important part, on the degree to which it is implemented. ' 24  Because
of the myopic view that criminals are the only beneficiaries of the
exclusionary rule, courts dilute the substantive right against unreason-
able searches and seizures rather than suppress evidence. 210
It has been suggested that whenever the possibility exists of a guilty
person going free, the pressure on courts to distort probable cause
247. Oaks, supra note 4, at 753.
248. See Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, supra note 182, at 23-
24; cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For comparison, consider the view of two
careful observers that American courts use the exclusionary rule because of the failure
of internal discipline-the failure of police to police themselves. N. MoRlus & G. HAW-
xINS, supra note 5, at 101.
249. Hill, supra note 101, at 192.
250. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup.
CT. REv. 46, 55; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1036-37, 1047; Note, The Privacy Interest
of the Fourth Amendment: Does Mapp v. Ohio Protect It or Pillage It?, 74 W. VA.
L. REV. 154, 155-56 (1972); note 252 infra. Observing that the Supreme Court dilutes
the substantive right against unreasonable search and seizure so that the exclusion-
ary rule can realistically be used for enforcement, Professor Kitch reflects: "It is all
a bit backward." Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-
1969 Edition, 1969 SU'. CT. Rnv. 155, 166.
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concepts in order to sustain the admissibility of evidence is analogous to
the pressure on police officers to distort facts to prevent the ex-
clusion of evidence.251 Intentional distortion of the law by courts2 52
is as imposing a problem as purposeful perjury by police officers. Mr.
Justice Douglas warned that the weakening of probable cause dimin-
ishes the security of all people:
[T]he standard set by the Constitution... is one that will protect both
the officer and the citizen. For if the officer acts with "probable cause"
• . . he is protected even though the citizen is innocent.253
251. Brief for State of Illinois, supra note 213, at 6 & n.l.
252. The evisceration of fourth amendment requirements may be seen in a number
of Supreme Court cases. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding
that police officer making mere traffic arrest can conduct warrantless full search of
driver, without any reason to suspect that driver is concealing weapons or would be dan-
gerous), noted in 8 U. SAN FRANcisco L. Rnv. 777 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 261 (1973) (companion case to Robinson); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (giv-
ing police the much-abused right to stop and frisk citizen when police officer reasonably
fears that citizen is armed and dangerous); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171-
75 (1949) (holding that generally accepted rules of evidence do not apply in motion
to suppress hearing to determine whether police had probable cause to arrest). Compare
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(decrying weakening of fourth amendment protections caused by Terry), with Traynor,
supra note 39, at 334 (terming the stop and frisk procedure a service rather than a dis-
service to privacy rights). See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960),
discussed in Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1037; Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d'205 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
The exclusionary rule has had another significant effect: with the exception of a few
decisions turning on first amendment issues in obscenity cases, the Court's recent deci-
sion in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), marked the first time in four years that
the Court held a state search and seizure unconstitutional. The four-year hiatus may
well have been purposefully used to avoid reconsidering the exclusionary rule, which a
holding of unconstitutionality might have required, in the absence of the kind of alterna-
tive remedy that the majority maintains is necessary before the Court would abandon
the rule. In Brown, the Court did not re-evaluate the exclusionary rule in holding that
the mere giving of Miranda warnings does not per se dissipate the taint of a defendant's
illegal arrest and render his post-arrest statements admissible. A collateral consequence
of the Court's general refusal to grant certiorari when a lower court has held a search
and seizure constitutional may be the development of serious conflicts among the federal
circuit cases and the tolerance of highly questionable fourth amendment law in some
areas of the country. Cf. 34 Omno ST. LJ. 706, 706 & n.6 (1973) (noting conflicting
state and lower federal court decisions on the scope of the rule permitting unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence to be used to impeach a criminal defendant).
253. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 324 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
It has been argued that abandonment of the exclusionary rule in cases in which a war-
rant has been secured might result in the dilution of the probable cause standard. That
is, "magistrate shopping" would reduce the standard "to that required by the least de-
manding official authorized to issue warrants." United States v. Karathanos, Civil No.
75-1322 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), reported in BNA Casm. L. RP. 2465, 2466 (1976).Washington University Open Scholarship
684 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
When first encountered, this argument against the exclusionary rule
may seem persuasive, even to proponents of the suppression doctrine.
But the argument rests on the dubious dual assumptions that elimina-
tion of the exclusionary rule would result in a restoration of lost fourth
amendment standards and that fourth amendment rights can be pro-
tected by a remedy other than the exclusionary rule. So long as tort
remedies are seldom used, the probable net effect of abandoning the ex-
clusionary rule would be to make search and seizure provisions of the
fourth amendment irrelevant. Nevertheless, the widespread uneasiness
with the present rule seems to make its amendment or abandonment in-
evitable. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the various proposals
that have been made for enforcing the fourth amendment.
V. PROPOSALS FOR ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Positions on the Exclusionary Rule
Analysis of case law, proposed legislation, and commentary yields
three basic recommendations for dealing with the assault on the exclu-
sionary rule: keep it, change it, discard it. The proponents of all three
positions recognize that securing the constitutional rights of all people
requires the implementation of other devices, either in addition to or
instead of the exclusionary rule. A review of these positions and
suggested devices follows.
1. Keep It
Although some students of the problem have suggested retaining
the exclusionary rule for federal proceedings but abandoning or modify-
ing it for the states, most authorities propose that the same policy be
followed for both federal and state criminal proceedings. 2 " Leading
voices for retaining the current rule include Supreme Court Justices
Brennan and Marshall and former Justice Douglas.2r In addition, the
254. Justice Frankfurter and Professor Kamisar both advocated that the exclusionary
rule be required only in federal proceedings. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949);
Kamisar, supra note 102, at 1105. It should be noted that strong criticism of the exclu-
sionary rule did not begin until after the rule was applied to the states through Mapp
v. Ohio; therefore, the Supreme Court may be inclined to overrule Mapp but not Weeks
v. United States, which applied the rule in federal criminal trials.
255. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (Brennan, J., joined
by Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Many commentators have been proponents
of the exclusionary rule over the years. E.g., Allen, supra note 105, at 17-19; Amster-
dam, supra note 104; Atkinson, supra note 104; Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Fail-
ing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J.
[Vol. 1975:621
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House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its 1973 Mid-
Year Meeting voted approval of the current exclusionary rule and
disapproval of a congressional bill that would modify the rule. Some
commentators, bold in the face of the massive assault on the rule, have
urged extending the rule's application to evidence now uniformly held
admissible.257 It should be noted, however, that included within the
significant group now defending the exclusionary rule are those who are
prepared to modify or abandon the rule if alternative remedies prove
more effective.2 8
681 (1974); The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 137, at 278-83 (remarks by John Flynn
at 1972 Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial
Circuit); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures,
33 Iowa L. REv. 472, 499 (1948); Hall, supra note 207, at 173-76; Kamisar, Public
Safety and Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. ClIM. L.C. & P.S.
171 (1962); Kamisar, Some Reflections on Criticizing the Courts, and "Policing the Po-
lice," 53 J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 453 (1962); Kamisar, supra note 102; McKay, Mapp v.
Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy, 15 Amiz. L. REv. 327 (1973);
Paulsen, supra note 210; Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw.
U.L. REv. 65, 74 (1957); Quintana, Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 17 How. L.J. 805 (1973); Traynor, supra note 39; Comment, supra note 58; Cri-
tique, supra note 6; Comment, supra note 244; Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial
Review, supra note 102. Circuit judges Mansfield and Oakes recently expressed support
for retention of the rule. United States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1332 (2d Cir. Feb.
2, 1976), reported in 18 BNA CalM. L. REP. 2465-67 (1976).
256. See 41 U.S.L.W. 2438 (1973).
257. In the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures of 1974, Professor Amsterdam argued
for an expansion of the rule to suppress evidence, other than weapons, obtained as a
result of a lawful stop and frisk:
When a frisk power allowed exclusively upon the predicate that the officer
needs to protect himself from deadly assaults by a person he has stopped for
questioning becomes a motive to stop and question persons whom the officer
would not stop at all except for the opportunity to use a frisk as an evidence-
gathering device, surely fourth amendment values are seriously infringed. And
surely the exclusionary rule may properly be used to withdraw incitements of
that infringement.
Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 437-38. See also Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judi-
cial Review, supra note 102, at 1147-64.
258. See, e.g., American Bar Association Section on Criminal Justice, supra note 130,
at 10 (proposing retention of rule and addition of tort remedy and, if empirical data
indicate tort action is effective, re-examination of Mapp exclusionary rule); 34 Omo ST.
L.J. 706, 707 (1973). The respondents in California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, stated in
their brief:
mhis Court might well, in its decision in this case, promulgate alternatives
to the exclusionary rule to be applied concomitantly with and in addition to
the exclusionary rule. If these alternative sanctions appear workable, it may
thereafter be possible to retreat from the exclusionary rule.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 105, at 89 (emphasis original). See also note 266
infra. For citations to most of the published defenses of the exclusionary rule, see note
255 supra.
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2. Change It
Chief Justice Burger, who in Bivens called upon Congress and state
legislatures to provide alternative remedies so that the Supreme Court
could abandon the exclusionary rule,259 hinted that he would approve
judicial restriction of the rule without awaiting legislation. 20°  It is
possible that such a position could command a Supreme Court majority.
If the Court were to restrict the rule, it would most likely do so by
adopting one of the many formulations of the substantial violation test
that have been put forward in recent years.20 ' To do so would be in
259. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 421-24 (1971) (dissenting opinion). Compare the position taken by Justice Pow-
ell. See note 91 supra.
260. Chief Justice Burger stated in his Bivens dissent:
Independent of the alternative embraced in this dissenting opinion, I believe
the time has come to re-examine the scope of the exclusionary rule and con-
sider at least some narrowing of its thrust so as to eliminate the anomalies it
has produced.
403 U.S. at 424. Senator Bentsen of Texas obliged the Chief Justice by introducing S.
2657, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See text accompanying note 334 infra.
261. See, e.g., S. 881, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973) (setting forth six criteria for a sub-
stantial violation). This bill is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 334-
371 infra. See particularly the text following note 338 infra. Judge Friendly has sug-
gested that "intentionally or flagrantly illegal" police conduct should trigger the exclu-
sionary rule. Friendly, supra note 4, at 952; see Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 835-
36 (5th Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., concurring). Professor Wright would retain the rule
for outrageous police conduct of the kind in Mapp v. Ohio and Irvine v. California be-
cause "[i]t is demeaning to the courts and to the legal system if conviction can rest
on blatant disregard by the police of the constitutional rights of our people." Wright,
supra note 104, at 744 (emphasis added). Professor Kamisar, commenting on Justice
Frankfurter's position, has asserted:
To use the fruits of certain violations of due process . . . Frankfurter was
to say in Rochin v. California, is "to sanction the brutal conduct," to afford
it "the cloak of law," "to brutalize the temper of a society." But to use the
fruits of other violations of due process, Frankfurter seems to have said in
Wolf, is to do none of these things. No sanction. No cloak. No effect on
society's temper. Or not enough to worry very much about.
Kamisar, supra note 102, at 1124 (footnote omitted). Professor Hill proposes that po-
lice "willfulness or indifference" toward constitutional violations should justify suppres-
sion of evidence. Hill, supra note 101, at 184. The state of Illinois has urged:
The rule excluding evidence improperly seized should be applied only when the
seizure constitutes a substantial violation of rights and only after the court
weighs the question of exclusion in light of the public interest in obtaining re-
liable evidence for the prosecution of serious crimes of violence.
Brief for State of Illinois, supra note 213, at 3 (emphasis added). Illinois in its brief
also recommended considering whether the police conduct was "flagrant, deliberately
abusive of basic rights or intentionally violative of obvious rules governing search and
seizure." Id. at 13. In connection with the briefs hint that the exclusionary rule be
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keeping with Justice Traynor's suggestion in People v. Cahan that
suitable exceptions could be developed for "unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . which may involve only minor intrusions of privacy or
result from good-faith mistakes of judgment on the part of police
officers. "262 One possible result of adopting a substantial violation test
would be that when a police officer obtained a warrant which later
proved to be defective, the exclusionary rule would not be applied
because it was the issuing magistrate who was at fault and not the police
officer who in good faith acted upon the warrant.268
Capturing the attitude of many of those who urge restriction of the
exclusionary rule, the Governor of California's Select Committee on
Law Enforcement Problems stated in its report:
There is nothing magic about the word "constitutional." Violations of
constitutional rights, like any others, cover a spectrum from innocently
used sparingly in cases of "serious crimes of violence," consider Professor Kaplan's pro-
posal that we legitimize what he thinks courts are doing anyway by abandoning the rule
in the "most serious cases-treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping
by organized groups." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1046. Only in the most egregious cases
of police misconduct would Kaplan permit suppression of evidence when such a serious
crime is involved. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), Justice Rehnquist
suggests that the exclusionary rule is appropriate only when a police violation is delib-
erate. For discussion of this case, see Note, supra note 58, at 113-22. See also Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). The head of the
United States Department of Justice task force on modification of the exclusionary rule
has also urged a substantial violation test. The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 137, at
285 (remarks by Donald Santarelli at 1972 Judicial Conference of United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial Circuit).
262. 44 Cal. 2d 434, unnumbered note at 441-42, 282 P.2d 905, 909 n.4 (1955).
Note, however, that in Cahan Justice Traynor expressly recognized that the court was
adopting a rule of evidence in adopting the exclusionary rule. Developing exceptions
now after Mapp's holding that the rule is constitutionally compelled might raise differ-
ent questions.
263. See LaFave, supra note 186, at 411-15; Majority Report of the Committee on
Federal Legislation, supra note 169, at 4239. But consider the possibility of police ma-
nipulation of the warrant system by lying to the magistrate about the factors required
for probable cause. And contrast the argument that the exclusionary rule should be
abandoned except with respect to evidence obtained pursuant to an improperly issued
warrant because in that case there can be no tort remedy against the policeman, the po-
lice department, or the magistrate. Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule-Can
There Be an Effective Alternative?, 47 Los ANGELES B. BuLL. 91, 94 (1972); see note
309 infra. A divided panel of the Second Circuit recently rejected the contention that
the exclusionary rule should not apply when the police officer had obtained a warrant.
United States v. Karathanos, Civil No. 75-1332 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 1976), reported in 18
BNA CuM. L. REP. 2465 (1976).
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trivial to deliberately terrible. It is unreasonable to fail to recognize the
difference.264
The major objection to a substantial violation test, which will be consid-
ered in greater detail in the discussion of pending federal legislation, is
that it is a vague standard that would allow a court to admit even the
product of a "deliberately terrible" constitutional violation.
3. Discard It
The notion of abolishing the exclusionary rule entirely and imposing
no substitute is an untenable position, and no serious observer is urging
it. To do so would be a return to the situation in which Wolf v.
Colorado left the state criminal defendant. As Professor Allen pointed
out, the basic problem with Wolf was that "the Court's reach had
exceeded its grasp: The Court recognized a broad, if undefined, area
of federal constitutional right for which, however, no provision for fed-
eral enforcement was made. '265
But several responsible commentators and judges have taken the
position that the exclusionary rule could be abolished if a truly effective
alternative becomes available. 266  Attempts have been made in Con-
gress and in at least one state legislature to enact statutes abolishing the
exclusionary rule and replacing it with what the authors of the bills
claim are effective enforcement mechanisms. 261  These and other fre-
quently proposed alternatives or supplements to the exclusionary rule
are considered below.
264. Govmu.oR's SELEr COMMIE, supra note 146, at 153.
265. Allen, supra note 5, at 5. It is unclear, however, how this situation is different
from the proposition that the exclusionary rule should be abandoned as soon as state
legislatures or Congress enact any device that the Supreme Court can point to as an
alternative remedy--even if the device be ineffective.
266. E.g., Oaks, supra note 4, at 755; Comment, supra note 104, at 91; see note 258
supra. Justice Traynor commented in People v. Cahan:
If those guarantees [against unreasonable searches and seizures] were being ef-
fectively enforced by other means than excluding evidence obtained by their
violation, different problems would be presented . . . . Experience has dem-
onstrated, however, that neither administrative, criminal, nor civil remedies are
effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.
44 Cal. 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955). One commentator has proposed a par-
tial abandonment of the suppression doctrine in "cases where the police department in
question has taken seriously its responsibility to adhere to the fourth amendment." Kap-
lan, supra note 5, at 1050.
267. See H.R. 5628, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); California S.B. 1153 (1973). Both
bills are discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 321-32 infra.
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B. Alternatives or Supplements to the Exclusionary Rule
Several obstacles hinder the experimentation necessary before the
proposed devices can be pronounced superior to the exclusionary rule.
First, many state officials have retreated in disgust from the problem
because they view the federal government as having usurped responsi-
bility for control of police conduct through Mapp v. Ohio and other
Supreme Court decisions. Second, those persons most likely to insist
that any alternative be a truly effective vehicle for deterrence and
judicial articulation of constitutional rights-the defense attorneys-are
currently insisting that the exclusionary rule be retained. In that pos-
ture, defense attorneys have rarely suggested supplements for fear the
devices they recommend will be treated as alternatives permitting aban-
donment of the rule. 68
Neither of these obstacles seems insurmountable. Enlightened state
officials ought to proceed with the quest for better constitutional safe-
guards even though the Supreme Court has already established minimal
standards. Because the defense attorneys realize that some judges may
become more reluctant to suppress evidence if such a decision will
expose an officer to the risk of direct penalties, the attorneys' opposition
even to experimenting with supplements is understandable. Neverthe-
less, this opposition of defense attorneys should not be permitted to
prevent experimentation with creative supplements. During the experi-
ments, however, defense counsel should be supported in their efforts to
prevent the dilution of the substantive right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The most effective way to measure and compare the success of the
various proposed devices might be temporarily to suspend operation of
the exclusionary rule in several randomly selected jurisdictions. Differ-
ent sanctions would be imposed in place of the rule, and the experience
of those jurisdictions would then be compared with the experience of
jurisdictions that had retained only the exclusionary rule. Although no
researcher would quarrel with the attempt to keep the number of
variables as low as possible so that results may be attributed directly to
the device in question, such experimentation may raise significant equal
268. Cf. H.R. 9623, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (civil action with sharp teeth, intro-
duced by Congressman Bertram Podell, 13th District, New York), discussed in text fol-
lowing note 333 infra; Levin, supra note 216 (proposed civil action), discussed in text
accompanying notes 301-06 infra.
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protection problems.200 The best available option, therefore, seems to
be experimentation with different mechanisms in different jurisdictions,
not as alternatives, but as supplements to the exclusionary rule.
1. Traditional Tort Actions
a. Traditional Causes of Action
The basic common law remedy for unreasonable search and seizure
was an action in trespass.270 Other remedies available in state courts
were actions for false arrest, false imprisonment, trespass, assault, and
malicious destruction of property. Although all but the last are current-
ly used in Canada,2 7' opinion is nearly unanimous that traditional tort
actions have been inadequate remedies for police misconduct in this
country. 2  The traditional federal cause of action for violations of
269. But cf. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). In this pre-Mapp case the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Maryland's partial exclusionary rule
against an equal protection attack. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 35, § 5 (1971). The Mary-
land scheme, inter alia, prohibited the use of illegal evidence in specified gambling mis-
demeanor prosecutions in certain Maryland counties, but admitted the illegal evidence
in other counties. The section was treated as superseded by Mapp, see Banks v. Peper-
sack, 244 F. Supp. 675, 679 (D. Md. 1965), and was formally repealed in 1973. Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Bill, ch. 2, § 2, [1973] Laws of Md. Spec. Sess. 388; see
General Revisor's Note, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Bill, ch. 2, § 1, tit. 10, [19731
Laws of Md. Spec. Sess. 331-32.
270. See Spiotto, supra note 14. See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Vio-
lations of Individual Rights, 39 MN. L REV. 493, 498, 513 (1955).
271. See Baade, supra note 4, at 1341; Oaks 705.
272. See, e.g., A. BESsEL, CONTROL OvER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAWv: ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 10-13 (1955); P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 213, at 248-66; A. COR-
NELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE 42-46 (2d ed. 1930); E. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE
28-30, 43, 48-51, 61-75, 89-92, 293 (1931); W. AFAvE, supra note 131, at 412-27; C.
McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 293 (1954); E. MACnEN, THE LAW
OF SEARCH AND SmIZURE 138-42 (1950); NATIONAL COMMnISSION ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT: To ESTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMES-
TIC TRANQUILTrY 146 (1969); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO AP-
PEAL 28-31 (1947); WHO RULES r POLICE? 98 (L. RUCHELMAN ed. 1973); C. Sevilla,
ReMapping the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Suggestion, supra note 111, at 5-6;
Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 429; Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L Rnv. 785, 787 (1970); Atkinson, supra note
104, at 22-23; California State Bar Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, Report,
29 CAL. ST. B. Ass'N J. 263, 264 (1954); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. Rnv. 191, 204-05 (1929); Dellinger, Of
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1553-63
(1972); Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L.
REv. 621 (1955); Foote, supra note 270; Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment,
14 S. CAL. L. REV. 359, 372 (1941); Hall, supra note 207, at 153-57, 173; Morris, The
End of an Experiment in Federalism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L. REV. &
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constitutional rights by state police is section 1983.273 Unfortunately,
commentators concur that this remedy has proved as ineffective as
conventional state causes of action.274  Because of this general ineffec-
tiveness, the specifics of these state or federal causes of action shall not
be explored, although the reasons posited for their failure will be
examined.
b. Inability to Deter Police Wrongdoing
The traditional tort actions hold little promise as devices to deter
police wrongdoing because of the extreme unlikelihood that any given
fourth amendment violation will result in a successful tort suit against
the erring policeman. The first hurdle presented for the victim of an
unreasonable search and seizure is that of sovereign immunity. Unless
this immunity has been waived, the victim often has no recourse against
either the policeman or the employing governmental body.27 5  More-
ST. BJ. 407, 429-30 (1961); Oaks 673; Paulsen, supra note 255, at 72-74 n.230; Peter-
son, supra note 214; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 385-
88 (1939); Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the Community
Rights Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1023
(1970); Sloane & Leedes, A Mapp for the Road Towards Exclusion, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 27,
37 (1961); Spiotto, supra note 14; Wingo, supia note 117, at 580; Wray, Exclusion of
Evidence Illegally Obtained, 26 TENN. L. REv. 332, 346-51 (1959); Comment, Search
and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw.
U.L. REv. 493, 502-07 (1952); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained
Evidence: Its Development and Appl;cation, supra note 7, at 74; Note, Philadelphia
Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1208-12 (1952).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1985 provides a federal cause of action
against officers who conspire to deprive a person of his constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C.
1 1985 (1970).
274. See W. Briggs, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983: An Effective Deterrent to Police Brutality?
(unpublished student research paper on file at University of Chicago Law School Li-
brary); Oaks 674. Briggs studied Chicago federal court docket books for the years 1960
through 1967 and found a sample of 35 § 1983 damage actions against Chicago police
officers in which the City, Superintendent, or police department was originally joined
as co-defendant. Plaintiffs won in 18 of the 35 cases, the judgments totaling $126,000.
The city paid the judgments under state law, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-5 (Smith-
Hurd 1962); id. § 1-4-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975), but none of the policemen in these
18 suits were even reprimanded by the police department. See generally Kates & Kouba,
Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL.
L. REV. 131 (1972); Comment, Use of § 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Con-
duct: Guarding the Guards, 5 HARv. Civ. RiGHTS-Crv. LIB. L. REv. 104 (1970); Note,
Developing Governmental Liability Undcr 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201
(1971).
275. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 987-92; Mathes & Jones, Towards
a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo.
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over, if the victim has been convicted of a crime and imprisoned, state
"civil death" statutes may bar him from suing for damages during the
period he is imprisoned.2 76
But even if an aggrieved citizen is able to sue, he is unlikely to do so
for a variety of reasons. First of all, the would-be claimant who has
been convicted and imprisoned may fear reprisal if he sues those who,
for all practical purposes, are now his jailers.27 7  Second, during the
plea bargaining process, he may have waived his right to litigate the
constitutionality of the policeman's conduct.
If there has been an arguable violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
officer's self-interest would be served by obtaining some kind of an
agreement out of the accused that he not pursue the tort remedy in re-
turn for the lowering of the charge or dismissal of the complaint.278
Finally, most persons do not bring civil suit because of the realistic
expectation that they will gain nothing from the litigation but that
instead they will lose the costs of litigation.
The reasons why the victim of the unconstitutional search and seizure
so often loses his suit while the defendant-policeman prevails are numer-
ous. The first and most important reason is that the claimant who has
been charged with or convicted of crimes is not likely to evoke the jury's
sympathy,2 79 particularly after the defendant-policeman explains that he
was only trying to protect society. Even if the claimant has not been
criminally charged, he will not be a sympathetic figure to the average
jury if, as most victims of police illegality, he is part of America's lower
L.J. 889 (1965); Note, supra note 57, at 529-30. One report argues that policemen
ought to enjoy the same broad immunity that judges have under Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Govmwoi's SELEcr CoMMrrrEE, supra note 146, at 156. State
courts have, however, been increasingly willing to eliminate sovereign immunity as a de-
fense to tort suits against the state. See, e.g., Hicks v. New Mexico, - N.M. -, 544
P.2d 1153 (1975).
276. Foote, supra note 270, at 507; e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (Deering 1974).
277. See Brief for Cal. Pub. Defender's Ass'n, supra note 108, at 61; Morris, supra
note 272, at 430; Note, supra note 272. Because of the risk in transporting convicts
between prison and courthouse, one student commentator has suggested that a prisoner
remain in prison and sue the offending police agency "through his attorney, or, if acting
in propria persona, by a verified complaint and sworn affidavit." Comment, supra note
104, at 86. The fear of reprisal renders this suggestion impractical, however.
278. Brief for Cal. Pub. Defender's Ass'n, supra note 108, at 60. See also Foote,
supra note 270, at 507.
279. See, e.g., Oaks 673. Although judges might be less biased than juries, compel-
ling the policeman to defend himself in a bench trial would probably be unconstitutional
as an infringement of the right to a jury trial.
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class. Second, the jury bias in favor of a policeman often allows the
policeman successfully to lie his way to victory by fabricating a story of
adherence to constitutional requirements during the search and seizure.
Third, if the policeman was acting under department policies or regula-
tions in violating the Constitution, he can simply invoke the defense of
adherence to custom.28 0
Finally, even if the plaintiff can overcome or avoid the first three
difficulties, he may fail on the merits of his suit, either because he
cannot prove he suffered actual damages or because he cannot meet the
stiff burden of proof with respect to lack of police justification to
search.2"" It has been asserted that in most cases there will be little or
no direct injury to person or property as a result of a search.282  Fur-
thermore, Professor Foote has observed that criminals are not likely to
have the kind of reputation that can be injured by police searches.28 3
And because actual damages are so difficult to prove in unconstitutional
search cases, punitive damages are rarely available.2" 4
Putting aside the problem of proving damages, however, the victim of
unconstitutional police work still must meet an almost prohibitive bur-
den of proof. The Bivens case is a recent striking example of the
development of this burden. The Supreme Court in Bivens, after
having created a federal cause of action sounding in tort to redress the
deplorable conduct of the federal narcotics agents, remanded the tort
280. See GovEuNoR's SELECr COMMITTEE, supra note 146, at 157; cf. Dillenbeck v.
City of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 472, 446 P.2d 129, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968) (holding
police training materials on operation of motor vehicle in emergency situations admissi-
ble in wrongful death action as evidence relating to appropriate standard of care).
281. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 43-44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see Gov-
mRNoR's SELECT COMmr E, supra note 146, at 157-58; C. Sevilla, ReMapping the Ex-
clusionary Rule: An Alternative Suggestion, supra note 111, at 5; Comment, supra note
104, at 79.
282. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-47 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting);
Wingo, supra note 117, at 579.
283. Foote, supra note 270, at 500 & n.42. See also Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205,
220 S.W.2d 398 (1949).
284. In traditional tort suits or § 1983 suits, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), actual dam-
ages must be proved before punitive damages can be awarded. See Morris, Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAII V. L Rnv. 1173, 1180-81 (1931). See also Mackey v.
Chandler, 142 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.S.C. 1957) (setting aside verdict for punitive dam-
ages). In 1973, however, a federal district court awarded the victim of an unconstitu-
tional search five hundred dollars punitive damages against the local police chief who
had entered the victim's residence and conducted a warrantless search of the premises.
CIVIL LIERTIES, May 1974, at 3.
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claim for disposition.25 On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that although the police officer was not immune from
suit, he need not prove that he had probable cause for an arrest or
search to establish a defense to the tort claim; a mere showing
that he acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity
of the arrest and search would suffice.285
But even assuming the claimant can win a damage award high
enough to make suing seemingly worthwhile, the meager income of
most policemen is likely to leave them judgment proof.287  In that case,
the aggrieved party's constitutional rights are worth little more than the
paper on which the court order is printed. If, however, the policeman is
insured or the policeman's employer is sued in his stead, the claimant
285. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397-98 (1971).
286. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972). Cf. Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720, reprinted in part
in 44 U.S.L.W. 2184 (7th Cir. 1975) (prison administrator immune from damages un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where acting in good faith and with reasonable belief in the con-
stitutional validity of the prison regulation being enforced). Until 1974, the Federal
Tort Claims Act contained a widely criticized general exception to governmental liabil-
ity that denied recovery to victims of most intentional torts. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(1970); see, e.g., 3 K. DAVIs, ADimSTRATrv LAW TREATIsE § 25.08 (1958, Supp.
1970); L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE ACTION 256 (1965); Gellhorn
& Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U.L. Ruv. 1325,
1341 (1954). Exemplifying the kind of result criticized by the commentators is Smith
v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1971). The plaintiff, who had been
shot by a federalized national guardsman while the guardsman was attempting to quell
an urban riot, attempted to base his action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on a neg-
ligence theory in order to avoid the intentional tort exception, which expressly encom-
passed assault and battery. The court determined, however, that the guardsman's action
was an assault, rather than just negligence; therefore, the plaintiff was not allowed to
maintain the action. See also Zavala v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tex.
1974).. Then in 1974, the Federal Tort Claims Act was amended to give claimants a
cause of action against the federal government for the intentional torts of the govern-
ment's agents. Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50, amending
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1975)). Note
that the amendment created a cause of action against the federal government rather
than, as in Bivens, an action against the offending federal officer. There have been no
reported decisions under the amendment, but it seems likely that the burden and standard
of proof will be the same in these cases as it was in the Bivens case on remand. For
that reason, and because the amendment makes no provision for attorneys' fees or mini-
mum liquidated damages, the new federal tort action will probably be no more effective
than other existing remedies for transgressions by federal agents.
287. See TAsK FORCE: THE POuCE, supra note 195, at 199; Amsterdam, The Su-
preme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, supra note 272, at 787;
Foote, supra note 270, at 499; Morris, supra note 272, at 429; Oaks 673; Wingo, supra
note 117, at 580.
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may be able to collect his judgment, but the suit is unlikely to serve as a
deterrent. With respect to insurance, the premiums are minimal. Re-
cent premiums for policies from Lloyds of London were just $6 down
and $3 per year for coverage up to $5000.2ss And if the governmental
entity employing the policeman is sued, the policeman feels no direct
punishment except for that which his superiors might apply. Moreover,
a state, county or municipality will not be deterred from encouraging
constitutional violations to the extent that it is willing to incur civil
damage awards as the price for controlling crime.
c. Adverse Effects of Using the Tort Action
Not only does the traditional tort action fail to deter illegal police
conduct; it can also have a number of adverse effects. The first such
effect arises if the exclusionary rule has been abandoned and the govern-
mental entity is inclined to incur civil damage awards whenever it wants
a conviction badly enough. The government can simply buy the convic-
tion after illegally obtaining whatever evidence it needs for the convic-
tion.""' As Professor Hans Baade has stated, exclusive use of the tort
remedy would "substitute subsequent cash payments for timely lawful
behavior."20
Another possible adverse effect of using tort actions to redress police
illegality is overloading of court dockets. Both Justices Black and
Blackmun, dissenting separately in Bivens, opined that a federal tort
action would flood the already-burdened courts with additional litiga-
tion.291 Mr. Justice Black was also concerned about a third adverse
effect of using tort actions, that policemen would be deterred from the
"proper and honest performance of their duties. ' 292  This possible
effect is the classic justification for protecting an officer from damage
suits and was well articulated by Judge Learned Hand in an action for
malicious prosecution:
288. WHO RuLrs THE POLICE?, supra note 272, at 98. One proposal discussed in the
text would limit the possibilities for indemnification and require an officer personally
to pay the premiums on any insurance he purchases. See text accompanying notes 301-
06 inira.
289. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); American Bar Association Section on Criminal Justice, supra note 130, at 10.
290. Baade, supra note 4, at 1361.
291. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388,428-30 (1971).
292. Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
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[I]t is impossible -to know whether the claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and. . . to submit all officials, the innocent as well
as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of
its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out
to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later
find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith.29 3
Sharing this view, some courts have in turn weakened the traditional tort
action.294 For this reason, as well as the other reasons discussed above,
several proposals have recently been made to change the traditional tort
action.
2. Recent Proposals for Modifying the Tort Action
a. Federal Cause of Action Established in Bivens
The federal cause of action against individual federal officers that the
Court established in Bivens does not surmount any of the difficulties
with the traditional tort remedies. Although the existence of a federal
cause of action under the fourth amendment is new, the conventional
strictures being applied by lower courts to the claimants render the
action an ineffective device.29 5
b. Miscellaneous Suggestions for Changes
To make suits against official wrongdoers more feasible, observers
have urged a number of changes, some of which are presented in this
subsection; other proposed modifications are examined in the subsec-
tions on specific tort schemes which follow. Because the typical victim
of police lawlessness cannot afford to hire an attorney, a right to counsel
might be created for at least some kinds of civil suits. 290  To solve the
293. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (emphasis added). Com-
pare the similar objection that the exclusionary rule deters lawful police work. See text
accompanying notes 208-09 supra. Surely some restraint on police conduct is justifiable
in a free society, despite the risk of dampening police ardor.
294. See, e.g., Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952) (an arrest
held legal in order not to make officers reluctant to arrest suspects); Hammitt v. Straley,
338 Mich. 587, 61 N.W.2d 641 (1953) (holding doubts should be resolved in officer's
favor so that officer will not fear reprisals for aggressive law enforcement).
295. See text accompanying notes 285 & 286 supra. For discussion of the Bivens
tort remedy, see Note, A Federal Cause of Action Against a Municipality for Fourth
Amendment Violations by Its Agents, 42 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 850 (1974).
296. See Oaks 718; cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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problem of a judgment-proof defendant, several commentators have
advised allowing civil actions against governmental bodies on the princi-
ple of respondeat superior.297  Another scheme, currently used in Cana-
da,"98 involves making the chief of police personally liable for the torts
committed by his subordinates in the purported or actual line of duty.
Creation of a special adminstrative or quasi-judicial tribunal to hear
civil actions alleging unconstitutional police work might eliminate the
problem of lack of sympathy by the trier of fact for the claimant. 299
Finally, to overcome the traditional inadequacy of damage awards,
Professor Oaks has recommended making the enormity of the police-
man's wrong, not the actual injury to the plaintiff, the measure of
damages. 00
c. Joint Liability Plan
Harvey Levin has proposed the following model statute, which he
calls the "Joint Liability Plan":301
1. When an action is brought against a government officer in his official
capacity, charging him with a violation of the claimant's fourth amend-
ment rights, or when such an action is brought against a governmental
unit, the officer and the state, county or municipality which has jurisdic-
297. See, e.g., McGarr, supra note 214, at 268; Oaks 717-18; Plumb, supra note 272,
at 387; Taft, supra note 242, at 817; Wingo, supra note 117, at 581; Note, supra note
295, at 862; Comment, supra note 104, at 81-82. See also note 286 supra. In Califor-
nia, a police department is liable for damages caused by an unreasonable search and
seizure conducted by one of its officers. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815.2, 945-49 (Deer-
ing 1973).
298. See ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 351, § 24 (1970).
299. See text accompanying note 279 supra. Chief Justice Burger made this sugges-
tion in his Bivens dissent. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 423 (1971). The head of the United States Department of
Justice task force on modification of the exclusionary rule has expressed approval of this
approach. The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 137, at 284-85 (remarks by Donald Santa-
relli at 1972 Judicial Conference of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judi-
cial Circuit). Perhaps simply eliminating the jury, in the case of a government defend-
ant, would achieve the same result. In this regard, Professor Oaks has stated:
By means of the exclusionary rule the state judiciary has grown accustomed
to compensating a guilty person who was aggrieved by an illegal search by
awarding him his freedom. There is no reason to suppose that they would be
less willing to give money damages as a form of compensation, especially when
the remedy would extend to all who were aggrieved, the innocent as well as
the guilty.
Oaks 718.
300. Oaks 718.
301. Levin, supra note 216, at 75-76.
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tion over the officer's law enforcement agency shall be party defendant
to the action.
2. The state, county or municipality shall pay all claims involving viola-
tions of fourth amendment rights for which its officers are liable.
3. The trier of fact shall find the following: whether the officer vio-
lated the claimant's fourth amendment rights; if the officer violated the
claimant's fourth amendment rights, whether the violation was com-
mitted in an intentional, a reckless, or a grossly negligent manner.80
2
4. If the trier of fact finds that the officer violated the claimant's fourth
amendment rights, it shall award the claimant a minimum amount pre-
scribed by statute, and any additional amount to compensate the claim-
ant for damages which exceed the minimum award.
5. If the trier of fact finds that the violation was intentionally com-
mitted, the state, county or municipality shall recover from the officer
the damages paid to the claimant, and the officer shall be discharged
from government service.
6. If the trier of fact finds that the violation was unintentionally com-
mitted but committed in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, a pen-
alty shall attach to the officer's salary in the amount and for the duration
prescribed by statute. Each time the officer is found to have committed
a fourth amendment violation either in a reckless or grossly negligent
manner, the penalty shall increase according to a schedule prescribed
by statute.
7. Nothing shall prohibit the law enforcement agency or the civil serv-
ice commission from taking disciplinary action, other than that pre-
scribed by this plan, against the officer.
8. No individual, group, union, organization, or other representative of
a government officer shall indemnify the officer, in whole or part,
against a judgment resulting in liability under this plan.
Nothing shall prohibit a government officer from individually pur-
chasing liability insurance from a group, company, corporation, or any
other organization principally engaged in the business of insurance. But
no individual, group, union, organization, or other representative of a
302. Levin notes that the preponderance of evidence standard would be the proper
standard of proof for determining whether the officer had violated the claimant's rights
but suggests that a higher standard, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, should be
used in determining whether the violation was intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent.
The reason for the difference in standards is that while the first finding is the basis for
determining the claimant's recovery-that is, to make the claimant whole-the second
finding is the basis for assessing penalties against the officer, which is more in the na-
ture of a criminal trial finding. Id. at 79 n.20.
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government officer shall pay, in whole or part, the premium or other
charge for any type of indemnity insurance in which said officer is in-
demnified or insured against liability for fourth amendment violations.
Under this scheme any unreasonable search or seizure would be the
subject of a damage award payable by the government entity. The
offending officer, however, would be penalized30 3 only for an intention-
al, reckless, or grossly negligent violation-in other words, only for a
"very unreasonable" unreasonable search and seizure. He would not be
penalized at all for a negligent violation-that is, a "merely unreasona-
ble" unreasonable search and seizure-or for a good faith violation-
that is, a "reasonable" unreasonable search and seizure. Some critics
have suggested that this "unreasonableness" test may, like a substantial
violation test, be a Pandora's box:
If the substantive law of the fourth amendment is uncertain, consider
the uncertainty inherent in a case-by-case evaluation by all the trial
judges in the country of what "substantial violation" means. Courts will
be asking themselves whether the police officer conducted a "reasonable
or unreasonable" unreasonable search and seizure. It is difficult to
imagine a rule that would cause greater confusion to the average police
officer. 30 4
Although policemen might be confused by the proposed scheme, in
reality an officer should not need to understand anything except the
admittedly jumbled rules of what constitutes an unreasonable search and
seizure. Even though, under this scheme, a policeman could not be
penalized for a merely negligent or good faith violation, he would still be
expected to attempt to conform his conduct to the fourth amendment's
proscription of any unreasonable search and seizure.
Apparently section 7 of the model statute contemplates that a govern-
mental entity forced to pay money damages for reckless or grossly
negligent police wrongdoing will discipline the offending officer. In the
case of intentional police misconduct, however, section 5 expressly
requires that the officer be discharged from "government service. ' 305 A
difficulty with the proposal is that juries (which presumably will be
required because section 1 provides the policeman is to be made a party
defendant) may still exercise their bias for the policeman by routinely
303. The penalty would be paid, not to the claimant, but into general government
revenues.
304. Brief for ACLU, supra note 101, at 18.
305. The proposal does not specify whether the discharged officer is barred from all
kinds of government service or only law enforcement-related employment.
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absolving him from penalties, even though they have awarded the
claimant damages. If such a practice were to become commonplace, it
is doubtful that policemen would be deterred from wrongdoing even to
the extent that they are deterred by the exclusionary rule.
Finally, the deterrent purpose, as opposed to the compensation pur-
pose, of this tort action might be negated by the existence of insurance.
Despite section 8's requirement that a policeman pay his own insurance
premiums, as long as the premiums remain minimal, there will be little
deterrent effect.306
d. Nonjudicial Proceeding Providing Broad Range of Damages
A rather complex mechanism has been suggested by a Los Angeles
attorney.30 7  He would abandon the exclusionary rule for all illegally
seized evidence that was otherwise relevant and admissible unless the
evidence was obtained under an improperly issued warrant. 8  Any
"victim of an illegal and warrantless arrest, search or seizure" would
have a civil "cause of action against the offending officer and against the
governmental unit employing that officer. '30 9  Although the scheme
does not provide for joining the prosecutor as a defendant, if appropri-
ate damages against the prosecutor were also available, he might be
deterred from prosecuting cases without merit.
All claims would be heard without a jury by an administrative or
quasi-judicial body established to hear such cases. The hearing examin-
306. See text accompanying note 288 supra.
307. Horowitz, supra note 263, at 94.
308. The author asserts that suppression is required in such a case because under his
scheme, there would be no tort remedy against the police officer, police department, or
the judge who issued the warrant. Id. at 96. But contrast the argument that "maintain-
ing the Exclusionary Rule for judicial error only might have the undesirable effect of
causing police officers to not obtain warrants in those circumstances where they should."
Comment, supra note 104, at 85.
309. Horowitz, supra note 263, at 94. By withholding the tort remedy for illegal ar-
rests, searches, or seizures when they are made pursuant to a warrant, the statute pro-
vides an incentive for the officer to obtain a warrant. By retaining the exclusionary
rule in the case of an illegal seizure made pursuant to a warrant, however, the scheme
may provide a disincentive for the officer to obtain a warrant. As Justice Powell noted
recently, admitting the fruits of fourth amendment violations "where, for example, offi-
cers in good faith arrest an individual in reliance on a warrant later invalidated" might
encourage "the police to seek a warrant whenever possible." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 611 & n.3 (1975) (concurring opinion). Note, however, that such a procedure is
subject to possible abuse by police officers. See note 263 supra; text accompanying
notes 325 & 326 infra; cf. Comment, supra note 104, at 80.
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ers would be required to be members of the bar with broad backgrounds
in criminal law. Two advantages are supposed to flow from having a
nonjudicial tribunal determine the claims, as opposed to a judge: First,
congested trial dockets would be relieved because claims would be
diverted; second, efficient claim processing would be provided as spe-
cialization and expertise developed within the tribunal. 1
Although the standard of proof would be by a preponderance of the
evidence, discovery would be limited to that available in criminal cases
and the defendants would have the burden of initially coming forward
with evidence. Once defendants made a prima facie showing of proba-
ble cause, however, the burden of proof would shift back to the claim-
ant.' 11 To ensure rapid determinations and close supervision by courts,
there would be no review of hearing examiners' decisions at the adminis-
trative level but, as with some workmen's compensation systems, 31 2 the
losing party could petition for review to the state appellate courts. 3
The claimant, who would be required to file his action within six months
of the alleged illegal conduct, would have a right to be present and
testify at the hearing. 14 If the claimant was a defendant in a criminal
trial, the hearing could be postponed until after the criminal proceedings
terminated, thus preventing the claimant from being forced to in-
criminate himself to prove his claim in the civil action.315
The novel damage provisions allow the claimant to recover the actual
damages he suffered, including bail expenses, attorney's fees for repre-
sentation in the criminal prosecution against him, damage to property
(other than contraband), and lost income (other than illegal income)
during pretrial incarceration and during post-conviction imprisonment.
There would be no reimbursement, however, for fines paid as a result of
related criminal proceedings. One catch to this seeming prisoner's
paradise of damage recovery is a "but for" test: Claimant recovers only
if he can show that he would not have been convicted of a crime or
otherwise suffered damages but for the illegally obtained evidence.
Therefore, if conviction could have been secured without the unconstitu-
310. Horowitz, supra note 263, at 97.
311. Id. at 94, 97-98.
312. E.g., CAL. LKBOR CODE §§ 5950-5956 (Deering 1973).
313. Horowitz, supra note 263, at 94, 98.
314. Id. at 94, 98-99. Inconsistent civil death statutes would necessarily be repealed
to this extent. Cf. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 945.6 (Deering 1973).
315. Horowitz, supra note 263, at 99.
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tional evidence, claimant may recover little or no damages.10 A possi-
bly unintended result of this "but for" test is that those acquitted or
those not prosecuted may not be entitled to a recovery. If that result is
true, this scheme would benefit only the restricted group now benefitted
by the exclusionary rule.
A claimant who is entitled to recovery would receive minimum statu-
tory damages, varying according to the "nature and extent of [the]
connected criminal case, if any."3 17  The more severe the claimant's
injury, the higher the minimum damages. Thus, for example, a claim-
ant who was detained until trial, convicted, and then imprisoned on the
basis of unconstitutional evidence would receive a higher minimum
award than a claimant who was released on bail before trial, convicted,
and then placed on probation. To provide an incentive for ex-
pert litigators to handle a claimant's case, a prevailing claimant would
be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. 1 8 Although defendants' liability
for actual damages would be joint and several, punitive damages would
be available only against the officer, and then only if the officer's illegal
conduct was deliberate or malicious. 1 9
But the claimant who has committed a crime will not find this a "get
rich quick" scheme. If there is a victim of his criminal conduct, the
victim can establish a lien on the claimant's recovery for any actual
damages the victim suffers. Nevertheless, this limitation would not
deflate the compensatory aspect of the plan in the many cases in which
illegal police conduct is an effort to control victimless crimes.8 20
e. California Senate Bill 11533 21
California Senate Bill 1153, introduced in the 1973 California legisla-
tive session by Senator Lagomarsino, was patterned after the statute
proposed by Chief Justice Burger in his Bivens dissent.3 22  The bill
316. Id. at 94, 121-22.
317. Id. at 94.
318. Id. at 94, 122-23.
319. Id. at 94, 123.
320. See text accompanying notes 5 & 6 supra.
321. As amended June 8, 1973.
322. 403 U.S. at 422-23 (footnote omitted):
A simple structure would suffice. For example, Congress could enact a statute
along the following lines:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforce-
ment officials committed in the performance of assigned duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person
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would abolish the exclusionary rule (except for evidence obtained by
illegal electronic eavesdropping) and replace it with a tort remedy
against the agency that employed an offending officer. Liability would
arise if a police officer conducted an unreasonable search and seizure
while acting "within the scope of his employment." 2 '
To encourage claimants to use the action, provision is made for
reasonable attorney's fees, a minimum award of $250, and punitive
damages.3 24 As does the proposal discussed in the subsection above, the
bill encourages policemen to obtain warrants by barring liability for any
illicit searches made pursuant to a warrant.325 This bar could be a
dangerous immunizational device, however, because some judges issue
warrants pro forma, and thus a policeman could easily obtain a warrant
while acting in bad faith.326
Since the officer is not personally made a party, there is no constitu-
tional objection to the bill's elimination of jury trial. Nevertheless, the
aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth
Amendment or statutes regulating official conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps patterned
after the United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the stat-
ute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of evi-
dence secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
and
(e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be
excluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
In reference to determining the constitutionality of the statute, Chief Justice Burger
stated in a footnote:
Any such legislation should emphasize the interdependence between the waiver
of sovereign immunity and the elimination of the judicially created exclusion-
ary rule so that if the legislative determination to repudiate the exclusionary
rule falls, the entire statutory scheme would fall.
Id. at 423 n.7.
323. If a police officer disobeying agency regulations would not be considered acting
"within the scope of his employment' then evidence seized as a result of the most egregi-
ous intentional lawlessness would neither result in exclusion nor give rise to a claim by
the victim of that lawlessness.
324. The $250 minimum damages and reasonable attorney's fees provisions may
have been included at the suggestion of the student author of the comment referred to
in note 104 supra, at 80. On minimum damages, see especially id. at 80 n.59. Punitive
damages are available only when an officer is found guilty of malicious, fraudulent or
oppressive conduct. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-37.2 (Deering 1974) (providing,
inter alia, for triple damages).
325. See also Comment, supra note 104, at 84 (making similar proposal).
326. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORY COMMrTEE ON THE POLICE FUNc-
TION, STANDARDs RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 149 (1972); notes 263 &
309 supra.
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provisions abolishing the exclusionary rule, combined with the insevera-
bility clause suggested by Chief Justice Burger,3 27 make the entire bill
unconstitutional under Mapp v. Ohio, which held the exclusionary rule
to be constitutionally compelled.32 s
f. H.R. 5628, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)32"
In contrast to the Senate bill considered in detail below, the House bill
introduced by Representative Steiger of Arizona completely eliminates
the exclusionary rule in federal criminal proceedings330 and replaces it
with a tort action against the United States. Liability arises only when a
fourth amendment violation by a federal agent or someone acting at his
request occurs "in the course of the official duty of such officer." ' The
liability is for actual and punitive damages, 32 and the action is made
"the exclusive civil remedy against any person for such violation . ...
Because the bill does nothing, however, to overcome the difficulties
with traditional tort remedies, the bill would in effect permit the use of
327. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 423 n.7 (1971), quoted in note 322 supra.
328. The bill died on the State Senate floor in February 1974. Voorsanger, United
States v. Robinson, Gustafson v. Florida, and United States v. Calandra: Death Knell
of the Exclusionary Rule?, 1 HAiSTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 179, 212 n.141 (1974). A few
other states are collecting information concerning legislation on the exclusionary rule.
In Michigan, for example, the State Bar Commissioners appointed a 25-member com-
mittee to review and recommend changes in state criminal procedure. The committee
examined possible statutory modifications of the exclusionary rule, but decided not to
propose legislation on that aspect of criminal procedure. Israel, Legislative Regulation
of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan Proposals, 73 MiCH. L. REv. 222, 224 (1974).
329. An identical bill was introduced by Representative Steiger in 1973. H.R. 10275,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
330. The Senate bill keeps the rule for "substantial violations." H.R. 5628 eliminates
the exclusionary rule "if there is an adequate legal remedy for any person aggrieved
. ... " Subsection (b) provides that "the legal remedy provided under subsection (c)
shall be considered an adequate legal remedy."
331. The problem raised in note 323 supra regarding California Senate Bill 1153 is
equally applicable here.
332. Subsection (c) (3) of the bill provides:
Punitive damages may be awarded. . .upon consideration of all of the cir-
cumstances of the case, including-
(A) the extent of deviation from permissible conduct;
(B) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(C) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(D) the extent of personal injury, both physical and mental;
(E) the extent of property damage; and
(F) the extent to which the award of such damages will tend to prevent
violations of the fourth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
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illegal evidence without providing any real remedy for the constitutional
violation.
g. H.R. 9623, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
Congressman Podell of New York introduced H.R. 9623 in response
to the flagrant abuses by federal narcotics agents of the "no-knock"
laws.3 3 Designed to fortify the fourth amendment by supplementing
the exclusionary rule, the bill is a short one with sharp teeth. It makes
the United States liable for treble damages for injury to persons (includ-
ing damages for pain and suffering) or to property resulting from illegal
entry to dwellings by federal officers searching for narcotics. Moreover,
any federal official who
willfully enters or willfully causes any other person to enter the dwelling
of another under color of law, but without warrant, or in violation of
lawful procedural requirements, or through negligent mistake of fact,
shall be immediately suspended without pay from his duties and shall,
upon an administrative finding of his responsibility in such entry, be im-
mediately discharged from his position as an officer or employee of the
United States.
Because a real deterrent against police lawlessness might exist if this
legislation were enacted, the exclusionary rule might then be easier to
discard. Predictably, however, this bill was not reported out of the
House Judiciary Committee during the 93d Congress.
3. S. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
a. Modification of the Exclusionary Rule
In response to Chief Justice Burger's request in Bivens that Congress
provide an alternative to the exclusionary rule for the protection of
fourth amendment rights, this Senate bill was first introduced in
197133 and then reintroduced in 1973 by Senator Bentsen of Tex-
as.'" 5 Because the bill does not abandon the exclusionary rule, but
333. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 509(b), 21
U.S.C. § 879(b) (1970).
334. S. 2657, 92d Cong., lstSess. (1971).
335. The bill draws on the proposals made by Chief Justice Burger, in his Bivens
dissent and by the American Law Institute in its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure § SS 8.02(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971), which is reprinted in the Bivens dissent,
403 U.S. at 424-25. The final version of the American Law Institute's proposal, which
was adopted in May 1975, makes only minor changes in the 1971 draft. AMERIcAN
LAW INsTITuTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARAIGNMmNT PROCEDURE § SS 290.2(2)-(4)
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rather modifies it by using a substantial violation test, 80 the bill does
not go as far as the Chief Justice advocates. Nevertheless, if commenta-
tors are correct when they claim that the vast majority of police viola-
tions are insubstantial,3 7 then in practice the legislation might virtually
end the suppression of evidence in criminal cases.
Indeed, the extreme flexibility of the bill's substantial violation test
would enable a court determined to admit even the fruits of willful
misconduct to do so with impunity. The bill provides:
In determining whether a violation is substantial . . . the court shall
consider all of the circumstances,338 including-
(1) the extent of deviation from sanctioned conduct;
(2) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(3) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(4) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent such viola-
tions;
(5) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been
discovered; and
(6) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the defendant's abil-
ity to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are
sought to be offered in evidence against him.
Because the willfulness of the violation is only one of many considera-
tions, items seized in a deliberately unconstitutional search could be
(1975). See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560 & n.21 (1975) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
336. Thebillprovides:
Evidence shall not be excluded from any Federal criminal proceeding solely
because that evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment of
the Constitution, unless the court finds, as a matter of law, that such violation
was substantial.
Other proposed state and federal legislation would abandon the rule entirely. See, e.g.,
text accompanying note 330 supra. The bill itself is in two parts. The first part amends
chapter 223 of title 28 of the United States Code by limiting the exclusionary rule, and
the second part amends the Federal Tort Claims Act by providing a tort remedy against
the United States for illegal searches and seizures.
337. See text accompanying note 182 supra.
338. (Emphasis added.) Some critics of the proposal have condemned this "all cir-
cumstances" test as nothing but a warmed-over version of the Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), "shocks the conscience" test, which failed because of its extreme sub-
jectivity and was rejected in Mapp v. Ohio. Brief for ACLU, supra note 101, at 16,
20. The harsh result in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), see text accompany-
ing notes 36-38 supra, was said to exemplify the failure of the all circumstances test.
The North Carolina legislature has considered a proposal that uses a similar substantial
violation test. See Nakell, Proposed Revision of North Carolina's Search and Seizure
Law, 52 N.C.L. Rnv. 277, 282 (1973).
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admitted in evidence if the court were to find as a matter of law that,
considering all the circumstances, the violation was not substantial. 339
But if courts were to use the substantial violation test to reach such a
result, the problem of police lawlessness would only be exacerbated.
Certainly, officers would no longer find it pointless to seize evidence
illegally when prosecution was the goal, for the evidence might very well
be ruled admissible.340
In addition to the dilemma raised by the "willful misconduct" criteri-
on, the factors for determining substantiality are problematic in other
339. See Comment, supra note 158, at 1460. One should not underestimate the ex-
tent to which determined courts can find something insubstantial as a matter of law
which, as a matter of commonsense, would seem very substantial. In this regard, con-
sider the tour de force of statutory construction accomplished in a marvelous caricature
of legal reasoning entitled Regina v. Ojibway. Pomerantz & Breslin, Judicial Humour-
Construction of a Statute, 8 Cam. L.Q. 137 (1965). In the same vein, consider Lewis
Carroll's delightful contribution:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." "The question
is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
'The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master-that's
all."
L CARROLL, TmouOH Ta LOOKING GLASS 299-300 (Gossett & Dunlop ed.). Professor
Kaplan argues that "[slo long as lower court trial judges remain opposed on principle
to the sanction they are supposed to be enforcing, the addition of another especially sub-
jective factual determination [whether the police illegality was 'inadvertent'] will consti-
tute almost an open invitation to nullification at the trial court level." Kaplan, supra
note 5, at 1045. Consider also an observation made by Justice Stewart in United States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), in a dissent joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall. Justice Stewart had reasoned that a warrant should have been required for
the search and seizure of a jailed defendant's clothing when there was little danger that
the defendant would destroy the evidence on the clothes because he was apparently un-
aware of its presence and when the search was not sufficiently contemporaneous with
the arrest to be an incident of the arrest. Citing Boyd v. United States, Justice Stewart
wrote:
The intrusion here was hardly a shocking one, and it cannot be said that
the police acted in bad faith. The Fourth Amendment, however, was not de-
signed to apply only to situations where the intrusion is massive and the viola-
tion of privacy shockingly flagrant.
Id. at 812.
340. See Comment, supra note 158, at 1461. There is another drawback to this
"willfulness" approach, which admits evidence when the police officer was unaware of
the illegality of his search and seizure:
It would put a premium on the ignorance of the police officer and, more sig-
nificantly, on [sic] the department which trains him. .. . Nor would it suf-
fice further to modify the rule and require that the police error be reasonable
as well as inadvertent. While such a standard would motivate a police depart-
ment to insure that its officers made only reasonable mistakes, it is hard to
determine what constitutes a reasonable mistake of law.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1044.
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ways. First, despite the fourth amendment's prohibition of all unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, subsection (1) implicitly condones cer-
tain police deviations from the rules of search and seizure.34 1 Second,
although the courts have experienced difficulty in defining the right to
privacy and determining when it has been invaded, subsection (3), by
requiring the courts to define degrees of invasion, imposes on the courts
the added burden of making metaphysical determinations. Whether ex-
clusion of evidence "will tend to prevent such violations," as subsection
(4) inquires, does bear on a court's desire to exclude the evidence, but
the question seems hardly relevant to determining whether a substantial
violation has occurred. Finally subsections (5) and (6) have been
criticized as342
not furnish[ing] useful guidelines for the court. The bill directs atten-
tion of the court to "whether, but for the violation, the things seized
would have been discovered." This "but for" test is of no help in deter-
mining whether a substantial violation has occurred since but for the vi-
olation the issue of exclusion would not have arisen. 343 The final cri-
terion focuses on the extent to which the introduction of the illegally
seized evidence would prejudice the defendant. This is an extremely
puzzling factor since any admissible evidence will be prejudicial to a de-
fendant, and since virtually every critic of the exclusionary rule has
faulted the exclusionary rule precisely because it suppresses incriminat-
ing and therefore prejudicial evidence.
Although they did not mention it in the list of criteria, the framers of
the bill have indicated that among "all of the circumstances" to be
considered is a comparison of the fourth amendment violation with the
crime charged against the defendant. If, in relation to the defendant's
crime and the circumstances surrounding the fourth amendment viola-
tion, the policeman's violation does not constitute a substantial violation,
then the evidence would be admitted.8 44 Evidently, the bill's purpose is
to provide great flexibility in admissibility of evidence decisions and to
mandate exclusion only in truly extreme cases such as Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 45 in which police forcibly pumped a suspect's stomach to
"seize" supposed narcotics. Although the bill itself says nothing about
341. Comment, supra note 158, at 1460.
342. Id. at 1461.
343. "The Supreme Court has already rejected a similar but for test. See Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)." (Footnote in original.)
344. Telephone conversation with legislative assistant to Senator Bentsen, January
22, 1974; cf. Brief for State of Illinois, supra note 213, at 10-14 (similar proposal).
345. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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who has the burden of proving a substantial violation or lack thereof,
some commentators suggest that the intent was for the criminal defend-
ant to prove that a substantial infringement has occurred in order to
have evidence suppressed. 3 46  Placing this burden on the defendant,
however, may create "a presumption that even when an illegal police
search has occurred, the fourth amendment violation involved was
insubstantial."''1 7
For all the above reasons, this Senate bill seems unlikely to ensure
that courts will refrain from playing "an ignoble part" in any but the
most horrid fourth amendment infractions. Moreover, because of the
ease with which courts can admit the fruits of serious constitutional
violations, as well as the weakness of the bill's tort remedy as a deterrent
device, 34 an increase in police violations of the fourth amendment can
be expected. Finally, the requirement that federal district courts hold a
suppression hearing to determine the substantiality of a violation
is likely to produce at least as much court delay as presently exists
under the exclusionary rule.34 9
b. Tort Remedy
Chief Justice Burger petitioned Congress to enact an "effective"
alternative to the exclusionary rule,350 but the tort action provided in
this bill appears to be an ineffective alternative. 351 As an amendment to
the Federal Tort Claims Act,3"2 the proposal would make the United
States liable for actual and punitive damages up to a maximum of
346. See, e.g., Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1973, § A, at 2, col. 1; Comment, supra
note 158, at 1462. Professor Kaplan, too, assumes that the burden of proving a deliber-
ate violation of search and seizure rules would be on the defendant. He notes that "[ilt
is always easier to convince jurors that a person's illegal action was inadvertent than
it is to convince them it was purposeful." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1045 n.93. Al-
though it is the prosecution's burden to justify a warrantless search, the burden of proof
would shift to the defendant if he "must show that the police have engaged in a criminal
act in conducting the search." Id.
347. Comment, supra note 158, at 1462.
348. See subsection (b) infra.
349. See text accompanying notes 238-41 and note 241 supra. Writing about the
American Law Institute's proposed "substantial violation" standards for the exclusion of
evidence, which are almost identical to those in the Bentsen bill, Professor Kaplan con-
cluded: "It is hard to conceive of a less administrable standard than this." Kaplan,
supra note 5, at 1048 n.106. See note 335 supra.
350. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388,421 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
351. But see Comment, supra note 158, at 1465.
352. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1970).
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$25,000 for any unreasonable search and seizure by a federal agent or
anyone acting under him. Attorneys, under penalty of fine and impris-
onment, would not be permitted to charge a claimant more than 25
percent of the judgment recovered. 3 8  Although the federal district
courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over the civil actions authorized
by the bill,354 other applicable provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act
would require filing the claim with the federal agency responsible for the
offending officer before the court case could be instituted.8" Frequent-
ly, the adminstrative proceedings may offer greater efficiency and infor-
mality in reaching just dispositions than would civil litigation. If a
claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative determination, he may
then file the civil action, but he will not, under a general provision of the
Federal Tort Claims Act,356 have a right to a jury trial. Because of the
traditional bias of juries in favor of police officers, however, this should
not be a serious loss for most claimants.
Thus, the tort scheme envisioned by the Bentsen bill resolves a few of
the difficulties with traditional tort actions.357 Many other difficulties
remain, however, and render the bill's tort remedy inadequate. Basical-
ly, the incentives to sue are too weak to ensure the ongoing judicial
scrutiny of police practice needed to prevent the atrophy of fourth
.amendment rights. For example, the bill establishes a $25,000 ceiling
on recovery, but does not guarantee successful claimants a minimum
recovery.5  Moreover, although court costs may be awarded to a
353. Other provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act similarly limit the amount the
attorney may charge, but use different maximum percentages. See 28 U.S.C. § 2678
(1970).
354. In pertinent part, the bill provides:
The remedy against the United States provided by this chapter for an illegal
search and seizure shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding
by reason of the same subject matter against any of the persons described in
section 2692 whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.(Emphasis added.) The title of the section, "Judgment as a bar," is inconsistent with the
content of the section. The title would suggest that the plaintiff forgoes the right to bring
further suit only if he loses. If he did not lose, one would assume other actions might lie.
But the text of the section clearly indicates that the tort action created by the bill is to be
the claimant's exclusive remedy, regardless of who prevails. One commentator has read
the section to provide that "a judgment in favor of the aggrieved party would bar any
other civil suit against the offending officer." Comment, supra note 158, at 1462. The
section probably should be amended to harmonize the title and the text.
355. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1970).
356. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970).
357. See text accompanying notes 275-94 supra. By making the government the de-
fendant, for example, the problem of a judgment-proof defendant is solved.
358. A number of commentators have urged that a minimum recovery be included
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prevailing party under the Federal Tort Claims Act, reasonable attor-
ney's fees may not be awarded.3 59 The absence of provisions for either
minimum liquidated damages or reasonable attorney's fees, combined
with the 25 percent limit on contingency fees, makes it improbable that
penniless plaintiffs-the most likely victims of police transgressions-
will secure the services of attorneys who are willing and able to help
them.3s 0
In addition, by imposing no penalties on the offending officer, the bill
does nothing to deter official wrongdoing, except for whatever specula-
tive effect a damage award might have, first on agency policy and then
on the officer. Some of the creative proposals discussed earlier, such as
attaching the salary of an errant policeman, discharging him from office
for an intentional breach of a person's constitutional rights, or even
making the police chief personally liable, might be inserted into the bill
to sharpen the remedy's teeth. Otherwise, because of the loopholes in
the substantial violation test that governs the evidence-excluding branch
of the bill, the government may have the shocking option of buying an
illegal conviction.
c. Constitutionality
If, as some authorities claim, the federal exclusionary rule is not
constitutionally compelled, but merely a product of the Supreme Court's
supervisory power over the lower federal courts,36' Congress could
modify the exclusionary rule without raising constitutional issues.3 62 If,
however, the federal exclusionary rule is of constitutional origin,363 then
as an element in any fourth amendment tort remedy. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 207,
at 594-95; Foote, supra note 270, at 515.
359. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970). Suits involving illegal electronic surveillance auth-
orize recovery of reasonable attorney's fees. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (1970). A recent
amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act would seem to suffer from many of the same
defects that afflict S. 881. See note 286 supra.
360. Contrast the proposal discussed in the text accompanying notes 317 & 318 supra.
361. See text accompanying notes 156-58 supra. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960), overturned the silver platter doctrine in an exercise not of constitutional
interpretation but of the supervisory power. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
362. The supervisory power controls the lower federal courts, but does not bind the
Congress any more than it binds the states, see note 158 supra and accompanying text,
and Congress has authority under articles I and I of the Constitution to "create and
abolish remedies and regulate practice and procedure in the federal courts." Comment,
supra note 158, at 1467; see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,240 (1937).
363. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360-61 (1974) (Brennan,
Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949) (Rut-
ledge & Murphy, JJ., dissenting).
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the constitutionality of S. 881 depends on the Supreme Court's willing-
ness to overrule prior doctrine. For a majority of the Justices-all but
Justices Brennan and Marshall-the constitutionality of replacing or
modifying the exclusionary rule would probably depend on the deterrent
capacity of the proposed alternatives. The six- or seven-man majority
would view Mapp v. Ohio as having been based merely on the factual
conclusions that the exclusionary rule deters police wrongdoing and that
the rule is the only effective remedy for so doing. Almost certainly, the
Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, White, and Rehnquist would hold
S. 881 constitutional. 364
Long before Congress was considering any legislation similar to S.
881, Justice Black declared that the exclusionary rule "is not a com-
mand of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate."'36 5 Answering their brother
Black's concurring opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, Justices Rutledge and
Murphy rejected "any intimation that Congress could validly enact
legislation permitting the introduction in federal courts of evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment."3 6 More recently, and
since S. 881 was introduced, similar arguments have reappeared. While
several commentators have specifically endorsed the bill, 3 7 Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Calandra,
have echoed the sentiments of Justices Rutledge and Murphy.30 8 In the
last analysis, however, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices seem
convinced that Congress may constitutionally retire the exclusionary
364. See the Chief Justice's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971), and the opinion of the Court in United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960), Justice Stewart took a strong position favoring application of the exclusionary
rule to the states. Because the case involved the use of illegal evidence in federal courts
under the silver platter doctrine, the position taken was unnecessary to the decision and
therefore all the more noteworthy. See also the summary of oral arguments in Stone
v. Powell, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), granting cert. to 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), and
Wolff v. Rice, 422 U.S. 1055, granting cert. to 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), in 44
U.S.L.W. 3485, 3486 (1976).
365. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring). See also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-92, 496-500, 510 (1971) (views of Jus-
tices Harlan, Black, and Blackmun).
366. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,48 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
367. E.g., Wingo, supra note 117, at 588; Wright, supra note 104, at 745. See also
Vance, Why the Exclusionary Rule Should be Modified, 7 THE PROSECUTOR 399 (1971)
(reporting support for the predecessor measure by the National District Attorneys' As-
sociation).
368. 414 U.S. 338, 360-61 (1974).
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rule. The various arguments set forth above that the exclusionary rule
is mandated by the Constitution seem unlikely to change this conviction.
d. Effect on State Criminal Proceedings
Although S. 881, on its face, alters the exclusionary rule only in
federal criminal proceedings, 69 its enactment would also permit the
states to modify the exclusionary rule because of, and not despite, Mapp
v. Ohio. It must be remembered that the ultimate rationale of Mapp
was that since state courts must protect the same right that federal courts
protect, they must do so by the same sanction.37 0
It would seem to follow, therefore, that a valid federal modification of
the exclusionary rule would by force of the Mapp decision permit adop-
tion by the states of a substantially similar solution to the problem with-
out Supreme Court modification of the Mapp holding that ".
[t]he very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance
of needless conflict between state and federal courts .... -371
To be consistent, the Court would have to permit state modification
along the lines of S. 881, but the Court probably should not allow the
states to revert to the pre-Mapp situation in which many states afforded
no meaningful remedy at all for fourth amendment violations.
4. Other Proposals
In addition to the numerous proposals for modified tort actions,
including that embodied in S. 881, several other devices for controlling
police lawlessness have been suggested.
a. Criminal Prosecution
Some commentators have urged that offending officers be criminally
prosecuted.372 The state and federal laws necessary for such prosecu-
369. See note 336 supra. Presumably Congress might be able to attack Mapp di-
rectly through its power to implement fourteenth amendment rights. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 5; see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Congress would
have to argue, however, that it was not "diluting" constitutional rights. See id. at 651
n.10; Allen, supra note 5, at 6.
370. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
371. Majority Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation, supra note 169, at
4240.
372. E.g., J. WiGMORE, supra note 233 (recommending 30-day imprisonment for con-
tempt of the Constitution); Majority Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation,
supra note 169, at 4239 (recommending criminal prosecution of law officers responsible
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tions are already on the books,3 73 but the laws have remained dor-
mant.17 4  This disuse results primarily from the reluctance of prosecu-
tors to bring actions against those who supply them with the evidence
essential to perform successfully their prosecutorial role. 7  Because of
the independence and discretion prosecutors have traditionally enjoyed
in America, little can be done to require prosecutors to bring such
for "obviously unreasonable searches and seizures"). See generally B. GEoRoE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CIMINAL CASES (1973); Edwards, supra note
272; Foote, supra note 270, at 493-94; Morris, supra note 272, at 428; Paulsen, supra
note 210, at 260; Wingo, supra note 117, at 580.
373. State criminal statutes are of various kinds. Some make the officer criminally
liable for conducting a search without a warrant or with an invalid warrant: MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 629.402 (Supp. 1976); Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.190 (1969); MONT. Ruv.
CODES ANN. § 94-7-401 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974, Interim Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 33:1-65 (1940); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 195.00(1) (McKinney 1975); OLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 535 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-88 (1960); WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. H§
10.79.040, -.045 (1961).
Others punish the affiant for maliciously procuring a search warrant: ALA. CODE tit.
15, § 99 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.060 (1972); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1454
(1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 170 (Deering 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.16 (1973);
IDAHO CODE § 18-709 (1948); IowA CODE § 751.38 (1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.-
1259(8) (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.22 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-7-203 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); NEv. REv. SrAT. H§ 199.130, -.140, -.440 (1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33: 1-64 (1940); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.50 (McKinney 1975); N.D.
CENr. CODE § 29-29-18 (1974); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1239 (1951); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 133.992 (1973); S.D. CoMPILED LAws ANN. § 23-15-11 (1967); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-54-21 (1953).
Still other state laws make the officer criminally liable if he willfully exceeds his au-
thority under the search warrant: CAL. PENAL CODE § 146 (Deering 1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 933.17 (1973); IowA CODE § 751.39 (1966); Mic. STAT. ANN. § 28.1259(7)
(1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.22 (Supp. 1975); Nnv. REv. STAT. § 199.450 (1973);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00(1) (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-19 (1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 536 (1950); id. tit. 22, § 1240 (1950); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 23-15-17 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-510 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
54-22 (1953).
Federal criminal laws proscribe malicious procurement of a search warrant, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2235 (1970), conducting a search without a warrant, 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970), and
conspiracy against the federal rights of citizens, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970). See also 18
U.S.C. H8 2234, 2511, 2515. With respect to § 2515, see United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505 (1974). There have been no reported convictions under § 2236 since it
was enacted in 1935. Note, supra note 57, at 525 n.122.
In Scotland, criminal penalties are imposed on errant policemen. Baade, supra note
4, at 1330.
374. Foote, supra note 270, at 494; Oaks 673; C. Sevilla, ReMapping the Exclusion-
ary Rule: An Alternative Suggestion, supra note 111, at 4; Atkinson, supra note 104,
at 24.
375. See, e.g., B. GEoRGE, supra note 372, at 94; GovERNOR'S SELECr CoMMrrrmn,
supra note 146, at 155; Foote, supra note 270, at 493; Morris, supra note 272, at 428;
Paulsen, supra note 210, at 260; Wingo, supra note 117, at 580.
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actions. In Australia, by contrast, when a judge finds that the privacy
rights of a criminal defendant have been violated, the judge orders the
prosecutor to commence proceedings against the officer. But even if
American prosecutors were willing to bring criminal actions against
offending police officers, the burden of proving malice or willfulness
and the burden of persuading a jury to convict are difficult to meet.376
To increase the likelihood of prosecution, it has been suggested
that a separate Civil Rights Office be established in each jurisdiction.
The Office would be independent of the prosecutor and "charged solely
with the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting alleged violations
of the Constitution by law enforcement officials. ' 377 Whomever is
made responsible for prosecution, however, the victims of the fourth
amendment violations might possibly be compensated under statutes
that recompense victims of crimes.378
Of course, not all commentators favor criminal sanctions for the
control of police; many fear that the police would then be deterred from
aggressive, proper enforcement of the law.3 79
b. Injunctive Relief
In Lankford v. Gelston,35 ° the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that citizens whose dwellings were searched without
376. See Oaks, supra note 4, at 673; Paulsen, supra note 210, at 260; Wingo, supra
note 117, at 579-80.
377. Peterson, supra note 214, at 62. For an analysis of the drawbacks of such a
proposal, see Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, supra note 255, at
73. See also Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights
Appeal Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223 (1973).
378. The 94th Congress has been virtually flooded with bills to provide compensation
for victims of crime. Each bill contains its own list or description of crimes or acts
that could give rise to claims for compensation, but for the most part, these lists are
limited to violent crimes causing personal injuries. See, e.g., H.R. 9074, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 287, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1399, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); S. 1, ch. 41, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). But cf. H.R. 3073, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
379. E.g., GovERNoR's SELEcr CoMMrrIE, supra note 146, at 155-56; Atkinson, su-
pra note 104, at 24; Edwards, supra note 272, at 629. Other commentators are con-
cerned about the possible adverse effect on police morale and even about the possibility
that the enforcement of such a criminal statute "could be violative of due process in
that there might be an insufficient notice of the conduct which would constitute a crime.
See generally Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)." Comment, supra note 104,
at 90 n.92.
380. 365 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp.
935 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
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probable cause as part of a dragnet search of a black community were
entitled to injunctive relief. Relying on Mapp v. Ohio, the court
reasoned that money damages would be an ineffective deterrent to the
unconstitutional police conduct8 " and therefore issued an injunction
under section 1983382 to forbid any further illegal searches. At that
time, the police had already conducted more than 300 illegal searches of
dwellings, and the police commissioner had ordered the cessation of
further searches without probable cause. Since the commissioner's
order did not, however, specifically prohibit searches based only on
anonymous tips or state that such searches did not constitute searches
based on probable cause, the court found that the directive did not
relieve the need for an injunction.
Several commentators have approved the use of injunctive relief in the
case of systematic violations by the police. 88 Unfortunately, an injunc-
tion is likely to be no more effective as a deterrent than the Lank ford
court thought money damages would be. In addition to the difficulties
of framing and enforcing an order, courts are inclined to reject any
remedy that would place them in the role of systematically supervising
police conduct. 8 4  As Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Frankfurter
and Murphy, explained:
We must remember. . . that freedom from unreasonable search differs
from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that there is no way
381. See also Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Wilson v. Webster, 315 F. Supp. 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1970); text accompanying note
246 supra. A number of questions remain unresolved by federal courts concerning the
use of state and federal injunctions against state and federal police. See Amsterdam,
supra note 104, at 447 n.137.
382. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
383. E.g., Blumrosen, Contempt of Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 RUTOEPS
L. REV. 526 (1957); Note, supra note 295; Comment, supra note 274; Comment, Law-
less Law Enforcement, 4 LoYorA U.L Rnv. 161 (1971); Comment, Federal Injunctive
Relief from Illegal Search, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104; Comment, The Federal Injunction
as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968). See also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (Deering 1974).
384. See Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976). The district court order entered in
Rizzo and affirmed by the court of appeals had required the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment to modify internal procedures for handling citizens' complaints and had provided
for continuing judicial surveillance over the police department's operation. Council of
Orgs. v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Rizzo v. Goode, 506
F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974). Characterizing the order as a "sharp limitation on the depart-
ment's 'latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs,'" the Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals decision. 96 S. Ct. at 608. The Court relied on principles of fed-
eralism as "additional factors weighing against" the use of federal equity power for
fashioning state agency procedures to minimize misconduct on the part of a "handful"
of the agency's employees. Id. at 607.
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in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection. For ex-
ample, any effective interference with freedom of the press, or free
speech, or religion, usually requires a course of suppressions against
which the citizen can and often does go to the court and obtain an in-
junction. Other rights, such as that to an impartial jury or the aid of
counsel, are within the supervisory power of the courts themselves.
Such a right as just compensation for the taking of private property may
be vindicated after the act in terms of money.
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpe-
trated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the court's
supervision, and limited only by the judgment and moderation of officers
whose own interests and records are often at stake in the search. There
is no opportunity for injunction or appeal to disinterested intervention.
The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the officers under-
take or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence.38 5
With its contempt of court sanction, the injunction can occasionally be a
helpful enforcement mechanism, but because the situations in which it
can effectively be used are rare, the injunction should not be falsely
acclaimed as an effective alternative to the exclusionary rule.
c. Summary Proceeding
Responding to the need to translate written criminal penalties into
actual criminal punishment, several commentators have suggested a
kind of "summary proceeding in the nature of contempt, in which the
court would take the initiative . . . without the intervention of the
prosecutor."3 6  As an alternative or supplement to the exclusionary
rule, the summary proceeding may have great potential and deserves
careful study and experimentation.
d. Ombudsman
Commentators who have studied other countries' problems of control-
ling police have viewed the ombudsman concept as a possible solution
to the problem in this country.38 7 Acting as an independent government
385. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
386. Plumb, supra note 272, at 388; see California State Bar Committee on Criminal
Law and Procedure, supra note 272, at 264-65 (proposal by the California Bar Commit-
tee); Oaks 674.
387. See N. MoRRis & G. HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 101. On ombudsmen generally,
see AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION SEcTIoN OF ADMINsmAvIvE LAw, OMBUDSMAN COM-
MrrrE, DEVELOPMENT REPORT, April 15, 1971-June 30, 1972; W. GELLHORN, OMBUDS-
717
Washington University Open Scholarship
718 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:621
official, the ombudsman could take direct penal action against offending
police officers, or instead rely on publicity and public opinion to control
police illegality. Professor Oaks believes the ombudsman notion is
worth pursuing, although thorough experimentation will be required
since "there is virtually no United States experience with an ombudsman
in this role . *. .. "388 State or federal enabling legislation would be
required to provide this experience.
e. Internal Police Discipline
If internal police discipline were to be used to control typical fourth
amendment violations, stringent sanctions would be available, such as
forfeiture of promotion, loss of prestige, removal from duty, or other
disciplinary measures. The notion, however, that police departments
will regulate themselves in this area is greeted skeptically by the public,
and rightfully so, since few police departments ever punish officers for
fourth amendment violations.3 8 9 Some commentators feel that this
MEN AND OTHERS (1966); W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANs COMPLAIN (1966); S. Hurt-
wrrz, THE OM3UDSMAN (1962); TASK FORCE: THE POLICE, supra note 195, at 202-04;
Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman As a Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule:
A Proposal, 4 Tnx. TECH. L. Rlv. 317 (1973); Goldstein, Administrative Problems ht
Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 160 (1967); Spi-
otto, supra note 14.
388. Oaks, supra note 4, at 674. See also Davidow, supra note 387. For opposition
to the ombudsman idea, see Comment, The Tort Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 63 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 256,257 (1972).
389. See note 274 supra. Professor Oaks in his extensive research found not a single
instance of a police department that tied its disciplinary sanctions to application of the
exclusionary rule by the courts. Oaks 710. See generally Note, The Administration of
Complaints by Civilians Against Police, 77 HARv. L. REV. 499 (1964). Nevertheless,
one commentator urges that we attempt to "use the carrot rather than the stick" in mov-
ing toward police department self-regulation. Accordingly, he proposes that "none of
the searches of a department should be subject to the exclusionary rule if the department
is up to standard." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1051 n.112. To be "up to standard," a
department would have to promulgate and publish regulations for compliance with the
fourth amendment, institute training programs, and discipline offending officers. Id. at
1050-51. It is possible that "the regulations governing on-the-street behavior might be
sufficient but not those concerning electronic eavesdropping," that is, a department might
be up to standard in one area of activity but not in another area. Id. at 1053. Kaplan's
approach significantly rewards good-faith planning by police administrators. Under the
scheme, no suppression would be ordered even when a clearly unconstitutional search
and seizure was made, so long as that misconduct was a departure from normal, "up
to standard" behavior by officers in that police department. As Kaplan admits, this ap-
proach can be justified only if the right of an individual defendant to have suppressed
all evidence that has been unconstitutionally seized from him is not recognized. For
a similar proposal, see Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies,
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remedy can be made workable through legislative guidelines on proper
police conduct.390 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that police professional-
ism in this country has developed to the extent that the protection of our
constitutional rights can be entrusted to the same group against whose
zealousness the rights were given.
f. External Police Discipline
Some commentators find a potentially powerful mechanism for con-
trolling police transgressions in boards commonly labeled "civilian re-
view boards." Such boards might be more willing than juries to impose
penalties for police offenses. 91 Although several observers find this a
much more promising alternative than internal police discipline,' 9" oth-
36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 500, 510-11 (1971). On internal police discipline gener-
ally, see Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 428-29.
390. E.g., J. Spiotto, An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule From Its Origins
to Its Alternatives, supra note 128. See also Israel, supra note 328; Note, supra note
272, at 1211. Compare the growing support for enforcing the fourth amendment by
having police departments develop agency rules for the conduct of searches and seizures:
K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971); Caplan, supra note
389; McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 Mcm. L REv. 659 (1972); Wilson &
Alprin, supra note 186; Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE LJ. 575 (1972). Professor Am-
sterdam urges an interpretation of the fourth amendment that would require police ad-
ministrators to promulgate such rules. Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 416-31, 474 n.
580. Professor Kaplan suggested that federal legislation imposing rule-making duties on
law enforcement administrators might be appropriate under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, although he doubts the political feasibility of enacting such legislation to-
day. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 1043. If police agencies were obligated by statute or
constitutional interpretation to promulgate and adhere to search and seizure rules, courts
might be able to control law enforcement activity that does not breach the warrant or
probable cause requirements. Cf. note 257 supra. In this regard, consider Justice Tray-
nor's declaration that local statutes or rules "will have constitutional sanction, for what-
ever action is illegal is perforce unreasonable." Traynor, supra note 39, at 328. But
compare Traynor's later assertion that police conduct which "is not unreasonable in the
circumstances . . . is not rendered unreasonable in the event that it is deemed to have
involved a civil trespass." Id. at 337.
Not all commentators view police rule-making as a tenable alternative to the exclu-
sionary rule. Some assert:
IThe rule making alternatives would quickly be co-opted to protect police lib-
erties with the fourth amendment. . . . [R]ule making would serve to allow
the police to take the initiative away from the courts in defining the legality
of search practices, thus maximizing police power rather than confining it.
Critique, supra note 6, at 794. See also Caplan, supra note 389, at 500, 503-04; Quinn,
Effect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. URBAN
L 25 (1974).
391. See Wingo, supra note 117, at 580-81.
392. E.g., N. Mogms & G. HAvI-aNs, supra note 5, at 101; Goldstein, supra note 387;
Oaks 674; Wingo, supra note 117, at 581. See generally Barton, Civilian Review Boards
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ers view the various experiments with this scheme as failures.8 98
g. Incentive System
Some students of the subject have made the interesting proposal that
we pay policemen a certain amount, for example $100, each time that
the fruits of their searches are successfully received in evidence. 0 4 This
and the Handling of Complaints Against the Police, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 448 (1970);
Note, supra note 389. A creative suggestion for externally disciplining errant police of-
ficers was made by Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court. To "curb
the obvious potential for evil in the promiscuous use of stop and frisk as a technique
of harassment." he suggested state legislation along the following lines:
A requirement . . . that an officer who stops a citizen and frisks him must
report the circumstances in writing and in full detail, would tend to reduce
abuses and to insure that police officers are always conscious of the necessity
that every such detention be justified. And since the victim of the unwarranted
stop and frisk which does not lead to arrest is unlikely to complain because
of inertia, lack of time, fear of retribution or a host of other reasons, it might
be desirable also to authorize the institution of disciplinary proceedings based
upon such reports, by persons outside of the law enforcement agency.
Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
1, 14 (1969).
393. E.g., TASK FORCE: Tim POLICE, supra note 195, at 200-02. Political opposition
from police and the public has been considerable. See Feld, Police Violence and Protest,
55 MwN. L. REv. 731 (1971); Goldstein, supra note 387; Oaks 674; Comment, The
Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, supra note 383.
394. See J. White, Constitutional Criminal Procedure-Cases and Questions 63b (un-
published materials for class in criminal procedure at University of Chicago School of
Law, Spring 1974). The advantage of this scheme is that it has a direct effect on the
individuals conducting the searches. Another approach with a similarly direct impact
(albeit a deterrent one) is that found in the early Roman statutes, the Twelve Tables.
Enacted in 451-450 B.C., these laws ordained a ritual in which persons could search one
another's houses for stolen property. The statute exempted a person from penalties even
when the search turned up no stolen goods, provided he proceeded in the following man-
ner:
[One wishing to search must do so naked, girt with a liclum and holding a
platter . . . . What, it has been asked, is the licium? Probably it is some
sort of cloth for covering the privy parts. . . . [There are] two explanations
of the requirement of a platter in the hands-namely, that the object is to en-
gage the searcher's hands and so prevent him from palming anything off, or
else that it is for him to place on it what he finds. . . . At any rate there
is no doubt that the statute is complied with whatever the platter is made of.
1 THE INsTrruTEs OF GAIuS, bk. I, §§ 192-93 (F. Zulueta transl. 1946). Such a
scheme had already been termed "ridiculous" by the classical period in 200 A.D., see
id. § 193, but one must admit that it probably places the searcher in a sufficiently embar-
rassing posture to deter any but those acting in good faith and that it ingeniously solves
the problem of bringing contraband onto the premises to plant during the search. While
any platter apparently would suffice in most cases, perhaps when one searched on behalf
of another, a custom developed of using a silver platter, a custom which Justice Frank-
furter may have unearthed in his research for Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
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incentive system might also have broad implications for the control of
police in other areas, such as obtaining confessions and the appropriate
use of firearms. It is at least an idea worth testing in a controlled
experiment. Although the monetary cost may be high, it may be a
minimal one to pay for freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. On the one hand, the proposal is limited because it affects only
that small percentage of searches and seizures aimed at secur-
ing evidence for a prosecution. On the other hand, the proposal
may stimulate police to press a greater percentage of their arrests on to
prosecution.
h. Police Training
The exclusionary rule is said to provide an incentive for training
police to be aware of a suspect's rights. 395 If law enforcement officials
would fully instruct police officers about a suspect's rights and insist that
these rights not be violated, perhaps police behavior would improve.
One view suggests that concomitantly with the exclusionary rule, federal
funds could be used to create a National Police and Law Enforcement
Academy to train police leaders in search and seizure techniques. If
this proved to be successful in reducing police wrongdoing, perhaps the
exclusionary rule could then be limited.
i. Restructured Police-Prosecutor Relationship
Historically, the American police department has been independent of
the prosecutor's office: that is, neither police nor prosecutor directly
gives or takes orders from the other. As a result, the prosecutor, who is
a prime target for the effective deterrence of the exclusionary rule,3 96 is
unable to command police officers to conduct their searches within
constitutional bounds. If, however, both police and prosecutor were
subject to the same political authority, as is the situation in Canada,397
395. See Paulsen, supra note 210, at 257. This incentive may have prodded the Cal-
ifornia legislature to enact statutes setting minimum standards for police training. See
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13510-14 (Deering 1974).
396. See text accompanying note 195 supra.
397. See Baade, supra note 4, at 1340. In testimony before a congressional commit-
tee, Professor Pye (then Dean) of Duke University Law School urged that the most
promising replacement for the exclusionary rule in America would be to make the prose-
cutor ultimately responsible for all criminal justice functions. Hearings on the Improve-
ment and Reform of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the United States Before
the House Select Committee on Crime, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 686-87 (1969).
Washington University Open Scholarship
722 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:621
that authority could effectively insist on police work that would facili-
tate, not preclude, the successful prosecution of wrongdoers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule should be retained in federal and state criminal
proceedings. Currently, there exists no other mechanism for the mean-
ingful judicial articulation of fourth amendment rights; without this
articulation, those rights might atrophy. Despite gaps in the rule's
deterrent ability, even its most ardent detractors concede that police are
probably dissuaded from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures
when successful prosecution is their goal. As legislatures continue their
efforts to decriminalize "victimless" crimes, efforts that might resolve
many of the difficulties associated with the exclusionary rule, the legisla-
tures should also experiment with promising supplementary devices for
enforcing the fourth amendment. If and when these devices prove
superior to the exclusionary rule, the rule might be modified to allow
reception of evidence seized wrongfully but in good faith. At that point
only vigilance could prevent the police and courts from abusing such
flexible tests. In any event, the strange fruit of egregiously unconstitu-
tional searches must never be allowed to underpin a criminal convic-
tion, lest justice in our democracy appear the height of hypocrisy.
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